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The first production helicopter in the United States was
produced by Sikorsky Aircraft (now a division of United
Technologies) in 1941 as a direct result of a U.S. Army Air
Corps requirement. Helicopter technology advanced rapidly,
driven mainly by U.S. Department of Defense research and
development funding. The business base expanded as commercial
operators became more aware of helicopter capabilities made
available through advancing technology. Many competitors were
attracted to the industry, including a number from overseas.
This thesis examines the growth of the U.S. helicopter indus-
try and explores the issues that have led to the success or
failure of the industry's competitors. A particular issue
addressed is the role the Department of Defense has played in
shaping the industry. The work concludes with an analysis of
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When the Chinese developed a flying top in the fourth
century BC , they began the saga of vertical flight. Progress
was painfully slow, and it was not until 1907 when helicopters
built by Breguet and Cornu in France achieved the distinction
of genuine vertical flight. The early pioneers became con-
vinced that the sole factor limiting helicopter development
was the lack of a suitably powerful propulsion unit. When
the Wright brothers demonstrated the viability of heavier-
than-air powered flight in 190 3, the prospects of rapid
helicopter development appeared promising. In reality, how-
ever, the development of more powerful engines merely brought
the early designers face to face with a myriad of unanticipated
design problems that were to cause the helicopter industry
to lag the fixed wing aviation industry by a span of thirty
to forty years.
Early helicopter development was conducted in Russia,
France, Germany, England, Spain, Italy, and the United
States in the period 1900 to 1940. The first United States
military contract for the construction of a helicopter was
signed by Georges de Bothezat in 1921. This helicopter flew,
but not well, and it did not lead to production. Some
relatively successful results were obtained in France and
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Germany in the late 1930s, mostly with helicopters designed
by Professor Heinrich Focke, but European progress was delayed
by the advent of World War II.
The helicopter industry was finally born in 1938 when
the Dorsey Bill was presented in the United States House of
Representatives, and shortly afterwards became Public Law
787, authorizing the expenditure of $2 million for the research
and development of rotary wing aircraft. In 1939, Public
Law 61, passed by the Seventy-Sixth Congress, appropriated
$300,000 for helicopter development. [1:18]
Thus began a long history of United States military
involvement in the shaping of the development and structure
of the world helicopter industry. The first successful U.S.
military helicopter contract was performed in 1940 by Igor
Sikorsky who is generally regarded as the father of the heli-
copter industry. Sikorsky's XR-4 was delivered to the U.S.
Army at Wright Field, Ohio in May, 1942. This success
prompted considerable military interest, coming as it did
during World War II, and a series of military contracts
explored many helicopter applications.
Available technology constrained the industry until the
advent of the Korean conflict stimulated rapid technological
advancements, the most significant being the turbine engine,
with its substantially superior power-to-weight ratio. Many
United States manufacturers were attracted to the industry
but few survived.
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European helicopter development, delayed by the chaos
following World War II, was stimulated by the transfer of
United States helicopter technology through licensing agree-
ments granted by the more successful U.S. companies. Four
major European manufacturers emerged; Westland (England),
Aerospatiale (France) , Agusta (Italy) , and Messerschmidtt-
Boelkow-Blohm (MBB-Germany )
.
U.S. industry development continued with considerable
military research and development sponsorship and four major
U.S. manufacturers emerged; Sikorsky Aircraft, Bell Heli-
copters, Hughes Helicopters, and Boeing-Vertol. Many other
companies, including such notable names as Lockheed, McDonnell,
Kellet, Kaman, and many other smaller firms were unable to
achieve military quantity production and did not survive as
helicopter manufacturers.
Civil applications have been slow to develop and the
civil market did not achieve significant proportions until
the 1970s, when the off-shore oil rig support and corporate/
executive markets blossomed.
The U.S. helicopter industry is small compared to the
total United States aerospace industry. U.S. helicopter
deliveries in 1982 were approximately $1.4 billion compared
to U.S. civil transport sales of $6.2 billion and general
aviation aircraft sales of $2.0 billion [Ref. 2]. Growth of
the industry has been steady, albeit susceptible to the
volatile requirements of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)
.
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A significant trend has been the penetration of the U.S.
commercial market by the European makers, notably Aerospatiale
of France.
The U.S. helicopter industry is on the verge of its
greatest challenge yet, the transition into the fourth gen-
eration of helicopter technology as a result of two signifi-
cant military programs, the Joint Services Vertical Lift
program (JVX) for the Navy and Marine Corps, and the Light
Helicopter program (LHX) for the Army. Both programs offer
substantial production quantities. The rewards for the
winners of these technology advancing competitions will be
continuing military workload and the application of this
technology to civil derivatives leading to greater access to
the civil market. The losers may not survive.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
What are the critical factors that have affected the
development and evolution of the U.S. helicopter industry?
2. Subsidiary Research Questions
a. First Subsidiary Research Question
What customer/market segments have declined or
emerged and how have they affected the evolution of the U.S.
helicopter industry?
b. Second Subsidiary Research Question
How have military requirements affected the U.S.
helicopter industry?
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c. Third Subsidiary Research Question
Who have the U.S. helicopter industry competitors
been and what factors have led to their success or failure?
d. Fourth Subsidiary Research Question
How has the global helicopter industry affected
or been affected by the U.S. helicopter industry?
e. How has technology growth affected the U.S.
helicopter industry?
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research effort for this thesis relied primarily on
two data sources. The first was a comprehensive review of
available published literature, in the form of relevant
books, industry journals, periodicals, newspapers, and
industry and trade association documents. Secondly, inter-
views were conducted with the strategic planning departments
of the previously listed four major U.S. helicopter manu-
facturers. A valuable source of data and opinion was the
American Helicopter Society (AHS) , Washington D.C. This
society was incorporated in June, 194 3, with the constitu-
tional purpose of "collecting, compiling, and disseminating
information concerning the helicopter" [3:57]. In this way
it set out to represent the industry as a whole, and as such
was a valuable source of balanced industry comment and
flavour.
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D. SCOPE OF STUDY
The object of this research effort is the development
of the U.S. helicopter industry. Considerable attention has
been given to past U.S. industry history, in particular the
impact of U.S. DoD requirements on the industry. This focus
was dictated by a prior perception that the helicopter indus-
try was shaped by the provision of military research and
development funding. Technology growth was also considered
in some detail but generally in the context of its impact
on the strategic and business issues leading to competitive
advantages or disadvantages.
E. LIMITATIONS OF STUDY
Given that the thesis focuses on commercial strategic
and competitive issues, the company interviews were under-
standably guarded and non-attributable. They did serve to
provide both a flavour to the written word unearthed during
the literature review and a source of individual company
product line development and statistical production data.
The thesis does not address the financial performance of
the companies, the reasons for this being three-fold. Firstly,
the major companies are all now subsidiaries or divisions
of large corporations and accordingly their individual
line-of-business financial data are buried inside consolidated
financial statements. Secondly, the financial performance
of any of the major firms is unlikely to be a significant
19
factor in the short term, there being an adequate source of
corporate funds to overcome a transient and maybe unpredicted
cash flow problem. Obviously, sustained poor financial per-
formance would be cause for concern and, perhaps, ultimate
company failure, but this would be the result of a deeper,
underlying cause (e.g., failure to win production contracts).
Thirdly, such research effort would have detracted from the
primary focus, i.e., the impact of military requirements.
The thesis also does not address supply side issues.
The resource base, in terms of raw materials, sub-contract
supplies, labour, and capital, is an obvious contributor to
the overall competitive situation but was considered to be
beyond the scope of this effort, which focuses on the rela-
tionship between the prime manufacturers and their markets/
customers
.
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Chapter II provides an historical background of the
early development of helicopter theory, providing some
insight into those aerodynamic and technological factors
that delayed the birth of the industry. The coverage is
extended to the late 1930s/early 1940s when Igor Sikorsky
produced the world's first viable production helicopter for
the U.S. Army.
Chapter III describes in relatively general terms, the
development of the U.S. helicopter industry and its market,
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indicating the key developmental milestones and issues. It
concludes with a quantitative analysis of the growth of the
U.S. helicopter industry in the context of the free world
industry and some detailed comment on the development of
Aerospatiale of France.
Brief profiles of the major competitors are provided in
Chapter IV, together with comments on companies that did not
survive and a brief review of Soviet helicopter development.
The U.S. helicopter industry developed in generations
(piston-engined and turbine-engined) . The fourth generation
will be introduced by the JVX and LHX programs. These issues
are addressed in Chapter V.
Chapter VI explores the role of technology and the
approach adopted by countries and makers to technology
development. A consistent complaint of U.S. makers is their
claim that European governments are more supportive of civil
market oriented research and development than is the U.S.
Government.
A consistent perception, both throughout the readings
and the interviews, is the widely held view that the U.S.
helicopter industry is driven by the U.S. DoD in its devel-
opment of military requirements, this technology being
transferred to civil derivatives of military airframes. This
aspect is examined in Chapter VII.
Chapter VIII examines, in some less detail, financing,
pricing, co-production, government incentives, and manufacturer/
government relations.
21
The study concludes with Chapter IX, which is devoted
to the future prospects of the industry, in terms of markets,
product lines, technology, and competition.




The development of the helicopter has taken place over
many years. However, as depicted in Alvin Tofler's "Future
Shock", [Ref. 4], the growth of knowledge has been far from
linear. The transition from fantasy to theory, from theory
to first stumbling flights, thence to practical reality and
finally to today's technologically complex helicopter systems
has been fraught with difficulties and frustrations. This
chapter will briefly address the early development of heli-
copter theory and the transition to practicality, in order
that the growth restraining factors of the industry can be
better understood.
B. EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF HELICOPTER THEORY
When the Chinese developed a flying top that could fly
under its own power in the fourth century B.C., they began
the saga of vertical flight. The concept remained as a
toy until Leonardo da Vinci proposed the first full scale
helicopter in 1483 with his now famour design for a lifting
screw (the "helix"). This one event aside, the idea of the
helicopter did not gain momentum until 1768 when a French
mathematician, J. P. Paucton proposed that the classic
Archimedean water lifting screw could be used for human
flight. Sixteen years later, in 1784, two Frenchmen, Launoy
23
and Bienvenu, developed the first toy helicopter with a rotary
wing, able to take off under its own power. It was not
realized at the time, but the device had overcome two funda-
mental barriers to helicopter development. It had a self
contained power source, and the use of counterrotating pro-
pellers overcame the problem of torque, the force that tends
to drive the body of a single rotor device in the opposite
direction to that of the turning shaft [1:18]. Lacking a
suitable power source, they were forced to put aside their
ideas for full scale development.
An Englishman, Sir George Cayley, inspired by the toy
helicopter, is credited by many with producing the first
modern helicopter design in the early 1800s. This design
used counterrotating rotors on either side of a canvas
covered fuselage, with an additional pair of pusher propellers
at the rear for forward flight. Cayley, also, did not get
his design off the drawing board, realizing that heavier-
than-air vertical flight required a more powerful propulsion
system than was available at the time.
In 1878 an Italian, Forlanini, built a steam powered
model helicopter that flew for twenty seconds at forty feet.
This was followed in the 1880s by Thomas Alva Edison who
attempted to achieve vertical flight by mounting experimental
rotors on a vertical shaft powered by an electric motor.
His experiment failed but he continued to believe in the
helicopter, concluding, like many before and after him, that
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a successful helicopter would not be built until an engine
that weighed no more than forty-two to sixty-three ounces
for each horsepower produced could be developed [1:5], He
did, however, predict that
Whatever progress the aeroplane might make, the heli-
copter will come to be taken up by the advanced students
of aeronautics. [5:25]
Early experimenters, believing that propulsion power
was the only obstacle, were rewarded in the early 1900s with
the development of much more powerful gasoline engines.
These engines that enabled the Wright brothers to make the
first powered flight in 190 3 did indeed permit the early
pioneers of vertical flight to move from theory to reality.
What they also did, however, was to bring the designers face
to face with the other problems of stability and control,
hitherto not really considered. :;
C. TRANSITION FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
In 1907, Breguet (of France) built a helicopter that
rose vertically to a height of two feet and remained there
for two minutes. This tethered flight was followed in 1908
and 1909 by two more models but all were plagued with a
power-to-weight ratio problem, as well as difficulties with
stability and control. Paul Cornu of France, is credited
with the first helicopter "free-flight" when his aircraft
rose to one to five feet for twenty seconds in 1907, but his
design experienced the same power, stability, and control
problems.
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In the early 1900s, Igor Ivanovich Sikorsky, a young
Russian from Kiev had been dreaming about helicopter flight
for years. He firmly committed himself to the creation of
flying machines and chose the helicopter as the "likeliest
instrument for his ambition" [5:32], His first two designs
in 1909 and 1910 were not successful but he remained convinced
of the reality of his dream. As did others before him, he
realized that powerplant availability was a problem and
transferred his attention to fixed wing aircraft, achieving
success with the 9000 lb. Bolshoi-Balitsky , the world's
first four-engined aircraft. He was not to return to heli-
copters until the 19 30s, but his return at that time would
launch the helicopter industry.
In the meantime, many other efforts contributed to the
development of helicopter theory and practice. During World
War I, Lieutenant Stephan von Petroczy of the Austrian Army
Balloon Corps and Professor Theodor von Karmon built an
electrically powered machine. Whilst not totally successful,
this experiment provided some insight into the importance of
centre-of-gravity as related to stability and control.
Then, as a significant forerunner of the way the indus-
try was to later achieve its birth, the U.S. Army Air Corps
undertook its first important vertical flight program. Army
interest had begun in 1918 just after the Armistice, when
the Army foresaw great possibilities for "a machine capable
of up-and-down flight and hence operation from restricted
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areas" [6:88]. In 1921, the Army commenced a helicopter
project, funding George de Bothezat, a refugee from revolution-
torn Russia. His machine flew on December 18, 1922, seven
months behind schedule, rising to a height of thirty feet
with its 220 horsepower engine and its 3600 lb. airframe.
The Army, however, was unconvinced of the practicality of
the design and cancelled the project after spending some
$200,000. An Army report on the project drew attention to
the inherent dissymmetry of his multiple rotor-machine
(should mechanical failure occur) and its general mechanical
complexity, stating that:
Until these defects can be eliminated, the future devel-
opment of the helicopter proper appears to rest rather
in the single-screw type and the reasons for this are
at least strong enough to warrant the building and test-
ing of such a type before multiple-screw types are
adopted. [6:88]
The paper, in recognizing that the Army saw a need and
a use for the helicopter, noted that the de Bothezat heli-
copter contributed a definite step forward in helicopter
progress that could not have been achieved v/ithout the
expenditure for building a machine and flying it.
Several helicopters were built in the United States in
the 1920s by Emile Berliner (the inventor of the Victor
phonograph) and his son Henry. Like many predecessors, they
chose to solve the torque problem by using counterrotating
rotors. They experimented over a five-year period but gave
up in the face of problems they could not resolve.
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On May 4, 1924, Etienne Oehmichen (France) succeeded in
flying the first one kilometer closed circuit course and
collected 90,000 francs prize money for his efforts. His
helicopter had four main rotors, each with two blades, and
five small horizontal variable/reversible pitch propellers.
On April 18, 1924, Marquis Pateras Pescara (Spain)
established a world straight line distance record of 736
meters in his four bladed biplane rotor system machine. The
significant contribution of this machine was the ability of
the rotors to turn freely in the event of an engine failure.
As the aircraft neared the ground, the pitch of the blades
was increased to use the remainder of the stored energy in
the rotor system and land softly. This concept is called
autorotation, and is still an important feature of the modern
helicopter.
Dutch engineer A. G. von Baumhauer was one of the first
pioneers to use a counterrotating tail rotor to compensate
the single main rotor torque. He also developed the swash
plate system, a device (still in use today) that varied the
blade angle of the rotor periodically to stabilize and
control the machine [1:12].
In 1930, Italy's Corridion D'Ascanio set many records
with his unique helicopter design that featured another
significant technological development, the system for feath-
ering the main rotor blades. This involved the development
of a hinge system that allowed the blades to be rotated
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around their longitudinal axis, thereby changing the pitch
angle of the blades and changing the lift. It also featured
counterrotating blades but its overall complexity prevented
complete success.
Nicolas Florine, of Belgium, developed a radically new
design in the early 1930s. This design featured rotors
located at the fore and aft ends of the fuselage and it first
flew in April, 1933. The design was the forerunner of the
tandem rotor helicopter configuration still being used today
to meet many heavy lift requirements [1:14].
In 1935, Breguet returned to helicopters and, with Rene
Dorand, achieved with the Breguet-Dorand Giroplane what many
consider to be the first real helicopter. The Giroplane had
two four-bladed counterrotating rotors, a system permitting
each blade to adjust itself in flight to the dynamic forces
to which it was subjected.
Simultaneously, Professor Henrich Focke was achieving
considerable success in Germany, establishing a series of
world records for speed, altitude, endurance and controlled
flight. His helicopter had two rotors, each having three
articulated blades, mounted at the end of each of two wings.
Focke considered this the best way to overcome torque and to
eliminate vibration inherent in the design that mounted
rotors one on top of the other. The success of his machine
elevated the helicopter to a new plane of public awareness
[1:15].
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The dream of vertical flight might not have been realized
but for the work of a young Spanish aristocrat named Juan de
la Cierva, who "made a breakthrough that brought the elusive
helicopter to the threshold of reality" [5:51]. After many
years of experimentation that commenced in 1910, he developed
the la Cierva autogiro that resolved the problem of relieving
the high dynamic stresses developed at the rotor hub of rigidly
mounted blades. The autogiro, having a free-wheeling,
unpowered rotor, did not encounter the torque problem that
plagued early helicopter pioneers but it retain two other
problems, i.e., the gyroscopic resistance to being tilted
out of its plane of rotation and the inequality of lift
generated by the advancing blades and the retreating blades.
To counter these stresses, la Cierva developed the flapping
hinge and the lag-lead hinge and by 1927 had successfully
incorporated his articulated rotor design into practical
flying machines, thus passing out of the experimental stage.
It was perhaps la Cierva 's work that led Breguet to incor-
porate the articulated rotor into his successful 19 35
giroplane
.
Owing to British Air Ministry interest and funding, la
Cierva had located himself in England. His manufacturing
company was unable to meet demand for his inventive machine,
although it produced ninety machines. In the late 1920s he
granted production licenses to foreign manufacturers, including
Japan (where 240 were built), France, Germany and Russia.
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Airplane builder Harold Pitcairn bought the United States
franchise and built 58 machines before sublicensing the
Kellet brothers, who produced a further 22 machines. The
machine was put to many uses that will be explored in
Chapter III. [5:61]
The craft was given official recognition in 1931 when
President Herbert C. Hoover presented the Collier Trophy to
Harold Pitcairn for the "greatest achievement in aviation"
for bringing the la Cierva autogiro to the United States.
The design was further improved in the United States and
the autogiro achieved great civil success, to the point where
the United States Department of Commerce authorized develop-
ment of a "readable" autogiro that could be used on the road
as well as in the air. This machine flew in 19 36. A com-
bination of economic conditions arising from the depression
and high operating costs relative to conventional craft
spelt the end for the autogiro.
But if this strange machine with whirling wings was
showing signs of being an economic and technological
misfit, its developers had achieved at least one
signal feat. For by solving the autogiro 's problems
one by one, la Cierva and his colleagues had opened
the way at last for the practical helicopter. [1:36]
So by the end of the 19 30s problems such as the lack of
power, stability, control and torque had largely been over-
come. All the significant technological breakthroughs had
been made and the conceptual designs tried and tested in a
myriad of different models throughout the United States and
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Europe. The helicopter industry was waiting only for the
integration of these concepts into a single machine. The man
who provided this skill was Igor Sikorsky.
D. THE BIRTH OF THE HELICOPTER INDUSTRY
Igor Sikorsky, after temporarily giving up his helicopter
ambitions in 1910, achieved considerable success in Russia
as an aircraft designer during World War I. Following the
Communist revolution of 1917 he lived in Paris for a while
before proceeding to the United States. After some hard
times, he founded the Sikorsky Aeroengineering Corporation
in 1923, using borrowed money. The corporation began build-
ing the S-29A, an all metal twin engine transport. Over the
next few years Sikorsky produced nine planes of various types
but the corporation did not achieve great success until 1928,
when the S-38 amphibian won wide acclaim. By 1929, Sikorsky
was producing a much larger flying boat for Pan American
Airways and Sikorsky renamed his company the Sikorsky Aviation
Corporation and moved his plant to Stratford, Connecticut.
At this time, the company ran into financial difficulties
and became first a subsidiary and then a division of the
United Aircraft Corporation. This action provided him the
opportunity to return to his dream of the helicopter. In
late 19 30 he wrote a memo to the management of United Air-
craft, stating that,
...a helicopter that could land on the top of buildings,
on ships, and in tiny parks could be built. He urged
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the company to develop in a reasonable and economic way
its own type of helicopter. [5:78]
The onset of the depression destroyed any chance his
proposal may have had and his company continued to achieve
success in the fixed wing field. He continued his private
efforts with helicopters, however. The continuation of the
depression and increasing competition in the fixed wing
field led to a decision, in 1938, by United Aircraft, to
close down the Sikorsky division. However, the company did
suggest that it would be open to the undertaking of a per-
sonal research project by Igor Sikorsky. Sikorsky immediately
suggested the helicopter and requested that his team of
expert engineers be retained.
Sikorsky had given much thought to helicopter configura-
tion and finally decided to pursue an idea that he had
patented several years earlier, that of a single main rotor
and a small vertical tail rotor. The technology of the
autogiro was also crucial to his work, with Sikorsky point-
ing out several years later that the
...The autogiro was the important missing link between
the fixed wing concept and the helicopter concept.
Without a doubt, the technology of the rotor head and
blade, developed for the autogiro, was of significant
use in the development of the helicopter. [1:48]
After much company funded work, the result of Sikorsky's
efforts was rolled out on September 14, 19 39. The first
flight, although only a few inches and for a few minutes,
occurred on that day. Sikorsky then began a series of
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"hit-or-miss " alterations to dampen vibrations and balance
the flight controls. On May 13, 1940, Sikorsky achieved
the first free flight of his helicopter and Sikorsky's secret
became public as the now famous VS-300 and the prototype of
the world's first viable production helicopter.
The U.S. Army Air Corps had cancelled the de Bothezat
helicopter project in the mid 1920s and Army enthusiasm for
helicopter development had waned for several years. W.
Laurence LePage (an engineer for the Pitcairn Autogiro Com-
pany and later for the Kellet Autogiro Company) and Havilland
H. Piatt (a mechanical engineer from New York) , formed a
company in 19 38 for the express purpose of building a verti-
cal flight capable aircraft. This alliance produced the
Platt-LePage helicopter, the PL-3, and led to an Army contract
on July 19, 1940, for the Army's second helicopter, the
Platt-LePage XR-1. The Army also let contracts with the
Kellet Autogiro Corporation for the XR-2 and the XR-3
autogiros
.
But the Army was not satisfied with just one type and
expressed interest in the Sikorsky VS-300. In July 1940,
Captain "Frank" Gregory, of the Army, arrived at Sikorsky to
test fly the VS-300. This event was significant for the
helicopter industry because Gregory was the project officer
for the embryo United States Army Helicopter Program. As
a result of this flight, Gregory recommended that the Army
sponsor the development of the VS-300, despite a commitment
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to the Platt-LePage XR-1. Sikorsky was provided with a
contract and $50,000 to build an experimental helicopter
(the XR-4) for the Army Air Corps. The XR-4 was to be twice
the size and twice as powerful as the VS-300. The Platt-
LePage machine, because of its size, had to undergo many
developmental changes while Sikorsky was able to make defi-
nite progress with his XR-4 design. The XR-4 was finally
delivered to the Army Air Corps at Wright Field, Dayton,
Ohio, after a spectacular five-day, sixteen-hop delivery
flight that broke nearly all existing helicopter flying
records.
In December, 1942, after the completion of extensive
testing, the Army contracted for production to begin and
also placed an order for a new larger model, the XR-5.
Shortly after, in April, 1943, the Army requested yet another
version, the XR-6. Meanwhile, the Platt-LePage experimental
model was encountering difficulties and did not win a pro-
duction contract. In Germany, Allied bombing raids were
disrupting the planned production of Henrich Focke ' s FA-123
helicopter. Through this combination of events, and a
clearly technologically superior product, Sikorsky was able
to take an early lead in helicopter design and manufacturing.
Sikorsky had established an early but significant competitive
advantage and the helicopter industry had been born [5:84].
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III. THE U.S. HELICOPTER INDUSTRY - DEVELOPMENT AND MARKETS
A. INTRODUCTION
The analysis of the development of the U.S. helicopter
industry and its markets presents a dilemma. The growth of
the industry is conceptually simple, with key growth mile-
stones being dictated by major military events, i.e.. World
War II, the Korean conflict, and the Vietnam conflict, and
with the commercial/civil helicopter users accepting mini-
mally adapted military derivatives for a variety of applica-
tions (at least for the first thirty years of the industry
until the 1950s)
.
Within that simplistic context, however, the detail of
industry growth is incredibly complex, with the major manu-
facturers presenting a myriad of proposals for the numerous
military competitions. It was tempting, when conducting
this analysis, to describe every procurement in detail, but
it soon became apparent that this approach would disguise
the key events and issues leading to industry growth.
Accordingly, the discussion that follows addresses only
those events that have contributed significantly to that
industry growth, and the astute or well-informed reader may
consider that several events have been omitted.
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B. MILITARY DEVELOPMENT
1. The Beginning - 1938 to 1950
The helicopter industry was initiated when the Dorsey
Bill was presented in the House of Representatives in 19 38.
It soon became Public Law 787 and authorized the expenditure
of $2 million for the research and development of helicopters.
The following year Public Law 61 was passed by the Seventy-
sixth Congress, appropriating $300,000 for the purpose of
developing the helicopter [1:18]. This rapidly led to the
award of military contracts to the Platt-LePage Aircraft
Company and the Vought-Sikorsky Division of United Aircraft.
Platt-LePage was unsuccessful but Igor Sikorsky won produc-
tion contracts from the Army for his R4 , R5 and R6 series
helicopters, having previously developed the VS-300 helicopter
with company funds. These events demonstrated three char-
acteristics of the industry that have remained dominant
throughout its life: the driving of the industry by military
conflicts (in this case, V7orld War II), the role of the
military in specifying and dictating military requirements,
and the military tendency to order back-up or parallel
production to reduce program risk.
In Europe, pre-war helicopter technological progress
had been halted by World War II. The early post-war attempts
by Breguet (France) and Focke (Germany) ended in failures.
In the United States, however, the U.S. designers quickly
found themselves in the position of being world design and
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production leaders. By V-J day (September, 1945) Sikorsky
had produced 617 helicopters, the only manufacturer world-
wide to have entered production [1:29]. During this period
many helicopter applications were explored, ranging from the
dropping of munitions, emergency medical and rescue use,
mail deliveries, aerial photography, shipborne operations
on the Army transport BUNKER HILL, amphibious operations
(with floats), mosquito spraying, rescue hoist operations,
construction work lifting, wire laying, and off-shore opera-
tions (in support of floating repair depots off Okinawa)
.
Whilst these roles were well demonstrated most were not yet
practical or economical due to payload restrictions [l:30].
By the time World War II ended, Sikorsky (having
produced 617 aircraft for the military) had been joined by
Bell (just completing its third prototype, the Model 30),
Piasecki (flying the PV-3, the origin of the well-known
Boeing-Vertol family of tandem rotor helicopters) , Hiller
(developing the KH-44, the first co-axial helicopter in the
United States), and several other companies (Platt-LePage
,
Kellet, Bendix, Firestone and GCA, all developing their own
unique prototypes) [7:154].
In 1942, Igor Sikorsky had predicted that in the
future hundreds of thousands of helicopters would be produced
at prices comparable to those of automobiles. This was a
similar hope that Harold Pitcairn had held for his autogiro
in the 19 30s, but the dream had not been supported by
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technology. With more than 70 companies working at helicopter
development in the mid-19 40s, technology had advanced con-
siderably and there was great interest in the establishment
of short haul helicopter services. Even the Greyhound Bus
Company had filed an application to start an intercity heli-
copter service [5:99]. However, only a select few of the
many design efforts were to succeed.
Sikorsky had already established his production
capability by the end of World War II. Piasecki made progress
with his PV-3 tandem rotor design. By spreading the load
between two rotors, each rotor would be smaller and simpler
than an equivalent lift single rotor. Additionally, cargo
could be loaded almost anywhere in the long "flying banana"
shaped fuselage without upsetting the centre-of-gravity
.
The concept also proved very attractive to Navy and Marine
Vertical Replenishment (Vertrep) pilots because the aircraft
could be hovered out-of-wind (the single rotor design of
Sikorsky being sensitive to wind direction) . These design
concepts were sufficiently important to allow Piasecki to
win important contracts for his tandem rotor designs of the
HRP-1 "Flying Banana" that saw Navy, Marine and Coast Guard
use.
The Navy version was evaluated for anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) use [8:260]. Over the next two decades, the
proven tandem concept would evolve into a variety of capable,
multi-purpose helicopters produced in large quantities [5:100].
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Arthur Young produced the Bell Model 30 for Bell
Aircraft Corporation. The Bell design was similar to the
Sikorsky single main rotor/single tail rotor but employed
only a two-bladed rotor system. Being very simple, this
helicopter could be produced very cheaply and soon evolved
into the Bell Model 47. It was the first helicopter to
achieve civil certification, in 1946.
Stanley Hiller formed his own company, and after
experiments with co-axial designs, he developed his innova-
tive and highly successful "rotormatic" rotor system [1:35]
for use on the conventional single main rotor design approach.
His Model 360 became successful, achieving civil certification
in 1948.
Charles Kaman adopted the intermeshing rotor prin-
ciple employed previously by Flettner in Germany in the
1930s. He had proposed this approach to United Aircraft,
when he had been employed as Chief Aerodynamicist , but was
refused, owing to the Sikorsky commitment to a single rotor
design. He formed his own company in the late 19 40s and
was persuasive enough to win contracts from the Navy, Air
Force, and Marines [5:102].
By 1949, a new generation of helicopters had been
produced and five helicopters had received civil certifica-
tion: the Sikorsky S-51 and S-52, the Hiller 360, the Kaman
190 and the Bell 47. On November 19, 1949, the Sikorsky
H-19 made its first flight and proved it could carry 10
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passengers and a crew of two more than 350 miles. This
aircraft made possible, for the first time, a serious con-
sideration of vertical envelopment of battlefields by heli-
copter borne troops [9:45]. The Sikorsky H-19 (commercial
designation S-55) had been produced as a contract modification
to an Air Force contract for the production of the Sikorsky
S-51, which had initially been produced using company funds
following the decline of military orders after World War
II. This sequence of events was crucial to Sikorsky, leading
to a production of nearly 2000 H-19/S-55's and access to
further development contracts. It also led, ultimately, to
Sikorsky's dominance in the ASW helicopter market.
By the end of the 1940s, almost 1000 helicopters
had been produced and used in many military applications.
The Marines, using the Piasecki "Flying Bananas", had experi-
mented with the vertical envelopment concept, but the Army
was prevented from using this aircraft in the battlefield
by a bureaucracy that determined that Army aviation was
restricted to aircraft weighing two tons or less.
2. The Korean Conflict - 1950 to 1960
When the Korean conflict broke out, the early heli-
copters were used for scouting. These were primarily
Sikorsky S-51s that were not suited to medical evacuation.
Between the wars the Army Medical Corps had developed the
Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) concept. In so doing,
they sponsored the Bell 4 7 observation and medical evacuation
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helicopter. This private venture helicopter had been pro-
duced by Bell in large numbers in anticipation of a civil
market that did not eventuate. Thus, when required in large
numbers for the Army, the Bell 47 was able to defeat its
only competitor, the Sikorsky S-52-1 (a development of the
early Sikorsky R6 ) which was not production ready.
Hiller was also able to capitalize on the Korean
conflict with a military version of his commercial Hiller
360, the Army H-23 Raven which was used extensively for
observation, casualty evacuation, and general utility purposes
By the end of the Korean Conflict in mid 1953, Bell
had produced more than 1200 helicopters, Piasecki about 380,
Sikorsky about 1350 and Hiller about 530. The Korean War
had established the use of the battlefield helicopter, pri-
marily in the medical and transportation roles and had
given Sikorsky, Bell, Hiller, and Piasecki significant mili-
tary production contracts. Further, the product line
orientation of the companies was also established with Sikor-
sky and Piasecki producing larger, more complex helicopters
and Bell and Hiller producing light simple helicopters.
The French experience in Indochina during the same
period saw the use of a number of Sikorsky H-5ls and the
larger H-19s, and two Hiller 360s. Their contribution to
the war was not significant in material terms, being used
almost exclusively for medical evacuation missions but the
experience had a profound effect on the French military, who
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used helicopters extensively in the Algerian theatre. By
the time of the Algerian cease fire in 1962,
The French had concentrated no less than six hundred
helicopters in that country: 380 troop carrying craft
of the H-34 and Vertol H-21 type; 21 medium craft of
the S-34 and H-19 type and about 200 light helicopters
mainly of the Alouette type. The French also had exper-
ience with arming these helicopters with a variety of
guns and rockets. [8:3]
The French began a strong domestic helicopter indus-
try in this period but British production relied mainly on
licensed production of Sikorsky-developed machines. Whilst
the U.S. Marines had conducted the first "vertical assault"
exercises with helicopters as early as 1948, the British
launched the first combat helicopter assault in November
1956 in the Suez. British-produced Sikorsky licensed
helicopters were used in "police" operations in Africa and
Asia, Kuwait, Tanganyika, Malaysia, Sarawak, Sabah, and
Borneo [8:8]. "
3. The Vietnam Conflict - 1960 to 1970
The final military transition to helicopters came
with the Vietnam war. This conflict provided the greatest
single impetus to the world helicopter industry. The period
after Korea and before Vietnam had seen an increasing mili-
tary interest in the concept of "air mobility" and the
helicopter war. Sikorsky and Piasecki continued to compete
in the heavy helicopter arena. Piasecki had won a 1950
competition for an Air Force air rescue helicopter with the
H-21 Workhorse. The Sikorsky S-58 (military designation
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H-34) was produced concurrently under an Air Force contract
modification to the previous Sikorsky H-19 contract. The
demands of the Vietnam War ensured that both companies would
receive substantial production orders. [1:37]
The arrival of 32 U.S. Army H-21 helicopters in
Vietnam in December, 1961,
. . .was the first major symbol of United States combat
power in Vietnam; and it was the beginning of a new
era of air mobility in the United States Army. [8:8]
These helicopters were joined in April, 1962, by a
Marine helicopter squadron of Sikorsky H-34s. By the late
1960s there were several thousand helicopters in South
Vietnam. In late 1961, Secretary of Defense McNamara had
tasked the Army to study its aviation requirements. The
resulting Howze Board report led to the establishment of the
Army's 1st Air Cavalry Division (Air Mobile) which deployed
to Vietnam in 1965, with some 430 helicopters [8:9]
The early helicopters in Vietnam were not armoured
and lacked power. However, the Army, aware of this short-
coming in its emerging battlefield helicopter concept, had
sponsored engine development programs aimed at producing
lightweight turbine engines especially for helicopters.
These programs ultimately produced the Allison T-6 3, the
Avco-Lycoming T-53, and the General Electric T-58 engines.
The first turbine helicopter was the Kaman 225, which
appeared in 1951, but America's first production turbine-
powered helicopter did not appear until 1958 (the improved
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Kaman 225 pilot rescue helicopter procured by the Air Force
as the H-4 3 Huskie which saw Vietnam service and was Raman's
first long production run)
.
The mid 1960s saw a new generation of helicopters
in Vietnam, as the manufacturers and the military took advan-
tage of the new turbine engines. Boeing-Vertol , successor
to the company founded by Piasecki in 1945, replaced the
H-21 with two new turbine-powered transports, the CH-46 Sea
Knight (designed for Marine and Navy shipborne use and
capable of lifting 25 troops), and the larger CH-47 Chinook
(designed for the Army and with a 45-troop capacity) . Both
aircraft relied on the prior Piasecki tandem rotor experi-
ence. Sikorsky produced a huge heavy lift aircraft, the
twin turbo-shaft powered CH-54 Sky Crane. This aircraft
had its roots in an earlier Navy contract that had produced
the Sikorsky S-56 (CH-37) which in turn had led to a private
venture heavy lift helicopter, the S-60. Sikorsky achieved
further success in this period with two large twin-turbine
helicopters, the H-3 and the H-53. The H-3 was designed to
replace the Sikorsky H-34, whilst the H-53 was a heavy
assault version of the Sky Crane [5: 140].
The smallest helicopters in the Vietnam conflict
were the light observation helicopters (LOHs) . This task
had previously been conducted by the Bell 47 and the Hiller
360. The Army conducted a competition for the LOH in the
mid 1960s which was won by the Hughes 0H-6A Cayuse with a
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very aggressive pricing strategy. This event marked the
entry of Hughes into quantity helicopter production. The
two unsuccessful entrants were Bell and Hiller. Bell was
able to commercialize its unsuccessful 0H-4A as the very
successful Bell Jet Ranger series. This helicopter subse-
quently won a follow-on contract for the LOH as the Bell
OH-58 against the Hughes 0H-6A.
The most visibly successful helicopter of the
Vietnam war first flew at Bell in 1956. It was the simple
turbine-powered utility helicopter, the UH-1 Huey . As with
the previous Bell 47, Bell demonstrated the ability to con-
tinually improve the aircraft and it remained in full scale
production for more than twenty years. The Huey superseded
the Bell 47 MASH helicopter but it was rapidly assigned to
more combative duties. The Huey was initially "jury rigged"
with rockets and cannons in the field but factory equipped
gunships arrived in 1963 [5:147]. These were too slow to
be effective and the Advanced Aerial Fire Support System
(AAFSS) project was initiated. This development contract
was won by a newcomer, Lockheed. The Army contracted for
an interim gunship, won by Bell with their privately funded
Cobra, which reached the war in 1967 [5:150].
The American helicopter industry expanded dramati-
cally to produce the surge of helicopter requirements for
Vietnam. In their peak year during the war Boeing's Vertol
division built 398 CH-46s and CH47s, Hughes delivered 1129
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0H-6AS and TH-55s, while Bell built 2485 helicopters in one
year (UH-ls, AH-ls, and TH-13s). In addition, these firms
were producing helicopters for civil use and foreign mili-
tary services. Sikorsky produced its maximum output in 1957
(467 H-19s, CH-37s and CH-34s) but during the Vietnam war
produced fewer but larger machines, including the CH-53 and
the CH-54. [8:9]
Thus, the U.S. had a very firm grip on the helicopter
market at the end of the Vietnam conflict, but, in addition
to the material losses of the conflict (some 4,112 helicop-
ters), a more subtle commercial loss occurred. Up until
this time, the major U.S. makers, particularly Bell, Boeing-
Vertol, and Sikorsky, had granted overseas licenses to
European makers. This factor, allied with the U.S. industry
commitment to support the Vietnam conflict with massive
military helicopter production, caused a neglect of the export
civil market, allowing the European makers to gradually
penetrate both the European and domestic U.S. markets [10:148],
At the Vietnam cease-fire in January, 1973, the major
U.S. military helicopter makers were: Sikorsky (who had
established a dominant position in the ASW market with the
S-61 Sea King series, as well as a strong position in the
heavy lift and Marine assault markets with the CH-54A and
the CH-5 3) , Boeing-Vertol (with the CH-4 7 Chinook Army and
CH-46 Sea Knight Marine Corps transports) , Bell (with the
Huey and the Cobra) , Hughes (with the 0H-6A Cayuse and the
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Hughes 269/TH-55 Osage trainer), and Kaman (with the H-4 3B
Huskie for Air Force crash rescue)
.
During this period military requirements responded
to advancing technology in the area of ASW, with Sikorsky
emerging the victor in competitions first against Piasecki
with his tandem rotor designs and then against Bell who had
won a 1950 competition with the tandem rotor HSL ASW design.
Bell was not able to produce this helicopter and the Sikorsky
S-58/H-34 became the Navy's standard ASW helicopter. Sikor-
sky was then able to upgrade the H-34 by an engineering
change proposal to the S-61 Sea King (SH-3) without the
requirement to compete. In the late 1960s, budget constraints
led to the decommissioning of ASW carriers and resulted in
the consolidation of the ASW squadrons with the fighter and
attack squadrons in Air Groups on the remaining carriers.
This resulted in the S-61 carrying out not only ASW duties
but also plane guard/rescue tasks, displacing the rescue
helicopter, the Kaman UH-2. The failure of another ASW
program, the Drone Antisubmarine Helicopter (DASH) program,
left Navy destroyers without an ASW capability. This pro-
vided an opportunity for Kaman to nodify the UH-2 to the
SH-2 Light Airborne Multi Purpose Systems (LAMPS) Phase I
helicopter for the Navy.
At the end of the Vietnam conflict in 1973, Sikorsky,
Boeing-Vertol , Bell, and Kaman had survived. Hughes had
entered the market aggressively, whilst Hiller had been all
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but eliminated by the Hughes entry. Lockheed had attempted
to enter with its significant win in the AAFSS competition
with the AH-56A Cheyenne, but, faced with many technical,
economic, and political problems, was not able to bring the
Cheyenne to fruition.
4. The Post Vietnam Era - 1970 to Present
Whilst the survivors had all had long production runs,
the post Vietnam era saw a decline in the number of military
orders. Sikorsky only had the S-61 Sea King, the CH-54 Sky
Crane, and the CH-53 Sea Stallion, all in limited or late
production, Boeing-Vertol ' s production was limited to the
CH-47 Chinook, and Hughes had no new military orders in the
offing. Bell alone had received a number of orders, for
further UH-1 Hueys, AH-1 Cobras, and OH-58 Kiowa reconnais-
sance helicopters.
The 19 70s saw a number of important competitions.
The Army held a competition for the Utility Tactical Trans-
port Aircraft System (UTTAS) helicopter to replace the Huey.
The design competition was won by Sikorsky and Boeing-Vertol,
who were then contracted for prototype development. Sikorsky,
in what amounted to a make or break effort, won the fly-off
in 1976 with the UH-60 Black Hawk, leading to quantity
production with a multi-year contract. This was followed by
a Navy requirement for the Phase III LAMPS ASW helicopter.
Whilst the requirement was competed, Sikorsky easily won
the competition with the navalized Black Hawk. An Air Force
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requirement for a search and rescue helicopter is also
likely, with Sikorsky being most favoured to win with yet
another Black Hawk derivative.
The Sikorsky focus on the heavy end of the market
paid dividends when it was able to win a contract in 19 73
to develop the CH-53 series to the huge CH-53E Super Stallion
by the addition of a third engine. The original design of
this series was built with this option in mind. The CH-53E,
provided to the Navy and the Marine Corps, is the heaviest
heavy lift helicopter produced in the free world.
The other significant post Vietnam competition was
the Army requirement for an Advanced Attack Helicopter (AAH)
.
This program, designed to supersede the ill-fated Lockheed
AH-56A Cheyenne, was won by the Hughes AH-64 Apache against
the Bell YAH-63 in December, 1976. This win has assured the
survival of Hughes and was significant enough to lead to
the acquisition of Hughes by the McDonnell Douglas Corpora-
tion in January, 1984.
Bell has recently won a contract to upgrade the
large Army fleet of OH-58 helicopters to the OH-58D standard
in the Army Helicopter Improvement Program (AHIP) , winning
this competition against the Hughes 0H-6A Cayuse.
The significant military competitions are discussed
in more detail in Chapter VII. The impact of the newly
emerging programs (the JVX and the LHX) are addressed in




The practical applications of the helicopter in the
civil sector were in fact explored well before Sikorsky
demonstrated his famous VS-300 in the late 19 30s. Juan de
la Cierva had brought the autogiro to the world, and in 1928,
became the first pilot to cross the English Channel by auto-
giro. La Cierva 's factory in England produced 90 autogiros
but could not meet world demand and in the late 1920s, he
granted production licenses around the world. Amongst these,
Harold Pitcairn brought the autogiro to the United States.
[5:61]
In 19 32 Pitcairn was convinced that he could convert
public enthusiasm into sales for the autogiro. His slogan,
"this year own and enjoy a Pitcairn Autogiro", demonstrated
his belief that he had purchased the U.S. rights to the
"model T of the air" [5:62]. During the 1930s, his autogiro
was put to many practical uses. The New Jersey State Forest
Service used an autogiro to fight fires, business corpora-
tions flew them in promotional efforts, the Detroit News
and the Des Moines Register and Tribune each had one to cover
special stories, and they were used for archeological surveys
and cropdusting.
After' design improvements in the mid 1930s, the
autogiro conducted trial takeoffs from a downtown Philadelphia
post office roof and the United States Department of Commerce
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authorized the development of a "roadable autogiro" . The
dream was that the autogiro would solve traffic jams,
strengthen the national defense, and re-invigorate business
[5:66].
Economic conditions prevailed, however, and buyers
(among them Eastern Airlines, which used the craft on some
of its mail runs) , could not afford the increase in operating
costs over conventional craft. The craft did not succeed
as a product line but it did make a significant contribution
to the development of the helicopter and had demonstrated
the range of future helicopter applications prior to the
initial flight of the first practical helicopter in the
late 1930s.
2 . The Helicopters
Civil applications of the helicopter were slow to
develop. One of the earliest cargo lift demonstrations was
conducted in Europe by Heinrich Focke , in December, 19 40,
when he transported an external load of 1284 kilograms a
distance of 2 meters. In June, 1943, he conducted a similar
experiment in front of Adolph Hitler, leading to a production
order of 1000 (at a rate of 400 per month) . Production was
only in the early stages (nine completed) when World War
II ended, disrupting any further production.
In the United States, early helicopter production
was dominated by the military requirements of the U.S. Army
Air Corps, prompted by an awareness that the helicopter
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could be useful in war. Igor Sikorsky, however, had humani-
tarian visions of the helicopter:
I could see helicopters carrying people and goods directly
to the destination, and not 10 to 15 miles away and then
transported there by other means. I also foresaw the
helicopters unparalleled ability as a rescue device under
the greatest variety of circumstances. [9:15]
In spite of this, history has shown that although
virtually every helicopter designer has stressed the rescue
role, it is the military potential of the helicopter that
has paid for the technological development of the industry.
[9:15]
Some years earlier, the Army, in a report on the
first U.S. military helicopter development contract (the de
Bothezat helicopter, first flown in 1922),, was critical of
the complexity and poor performance of the helicopter,
stating that;
These features are such as to rule out its development
except in the case of such military urgency that the
life of the pilot and the observer is of little conse-
quence. ... the future development of the helicopter
proper appears to rest rather in the single screw type,
and the reasons for this are at least strong enough to
warrant the building and testing of such a type before
multiple screw types are adopted. [9:19]
Thus the military was attempting to impose its requirements
in the very early stages of industry development.
After World War II ended, helicopters developed by
Sikorsky (the S-51 and the S-52) , Bell (the Model 47)
,
Hiller (the Hiller 360), and Kaman (the K-190) all achieved
civil certification by April 15, 1949. The noteworthy
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feature of these events was the fact that none of these
manufacturers were certain of their civil markets. More
importantly, the potential buyers were not aware of the
possible range of uses and had to be convinced by the
manufacturers
.
Tug Gustafson was the first Sikorsky helicopter
salesman. When World War II ended, Sikorsky had to decide
whether they would build commercial helicopters. Gustafson
was sent to Washington, where the uninformed Departments of
Agriculture and Forestry advised that if the helicopters
could be built, the Forest Service would buy 500 and the
Department of Agriculture would buy 200. Sikorsky, believ-
ing that the helicopter could be sold by the thousands,
decided to build the commercial S-51 with a planned produc-
tion of 60 for the first year, at a price of $48,500. First
year sales were only 11, falling to three in the second year,
Gustafson later said.
We had a helicopter. . . .but we did not know what to use
it for. Where we thought that 9 5 percent of the prob-
lems were going to be technical, that marketing them
would be simple, we really found out in the first two
years that the problem was that there was no market,
even though the machine was ready to fly. So the first
thing we had to do was to go out and find and develop
possible applications. [7:164]
In 1947, Gustafson opened the first shuttles in
Boston, which lasted four months before going bankrupt. In
the fourth year of production, Sikorsky was selling very few
commercial helicopters and they concentrated on the military
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market. The Korean War developed the Marine Corps interest
in helicopter combat assault and Sikorsky pursued that
market, leading them to develop a line of progressively
heavier and more capable helicopters, primarily for the
military requirements. [7:164]
Bell Helicopters encountered similar difficulties.
After developing the Model 47 light helicopter and achieving
the first civil certification in the world in 1946, the
President of Bell, Larry Bell, stated to his test pilot,
Joe Mashman,
Now we have got to try and sell the helicopter, Joe. I
want you to go out and demonstrate that machine.
[7:161]
Initial demonstrations were to the U.S. military,
but in 19 47, the Argentine government decided to buy some
helicopters to fight locusts. During a year long program,
Mashman operated 12 Model 4 7s in Argentina and demonstrated
them all over Latin America. Mashman later stated.
Right from the start, you found that you demonstrated
to people that didn't believe in helicopters .... especially
in the 1950s and 1960s, the civil and military markets
were first learning about helicopters. [7:162]
Tug Gustafson joined Bell in 1948, when Bell was
struggling, and trying to develop a commercial business.
They formed a company called Bell Aircraft Supply, with
four helicopters, four pilots, four mechanics, $250,000, and
a charter to "go find the market" [7:164]. They determined
that the agricultural market was promising, and that the
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helicopter was the ideal applicator. However, the agricul-
tural program was a disappointment and Bell looked for
another market, following a directive from the Board of
Directors that they had "90 to 120 days to satisfy the Board
that we should keep the industry alive" [7:166]. So Gustafson
approached the petroleum industry searching for oil in the
swamps of Louisiana and won enough contracts to satisfy the
Board. The market he had developed was oil exploration
support, gravity surveys, and seismic surveys.
Having developed the market. Bell sold Bell Aircraft
Supply for $100,000 in February, 1949. This new company
eventually became Petroleum Helicopter Inc. (PHI), today
one of the biggest commercial helicopter operators in the
world. [7:166]
Hiller, being one of the few companies formed solely
to build helicopters, and without corporate financial support,
was struggling to keep alive in 1948, when civil certifica-
tion for the Hiller 360 light helicopter was obtained.
Hiller stated.
When we started production, we didn't know what the
market was; we thought it was agriculture, we installed
some agricultural equipment; we thought it was rescue,
we installed some rescuing equipment. But the customers
didn't know how to use them. It was a very dark period
in our existence because we had put all this money and
effort into a vehicle and we had certified it, we had
started production but we had no customers. [7:175]
At this point, a dramatic high altitude rescue in
Yosemite by a Hiller 360 (following the failure by Bell and
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Sikorsky helicopters to complete the rescue) attracted world-
wide attention and led to civil orders for the Hiller 360
rescue helicopters, some deliveries to the French for use in
Indochina, orders from the U.S. Army, and survival of the
company through this period.
Kaman never really attempted to penetrate the civil
market, despite obtaining civil certification for his heli-
copters in the late 1940s, primarily for cropdusting appli-
cations. The Kaman helicopters were designed especially
for the Navy and did not really answer commercial needs.
Kaman' s test pilot. Bill Murray, stated,
. . .we never built an aircraft intended for the com-
mercial market at the beginning. [7:185]
'Thus, by the early 1950s, the major manufacturers
had all attempted, in some way, to sell civil helicopters.
The anticipated explosive growth of commercial applications
had not eventuated, with potential buyers requiring substan-
tial demonstrations to be convinced. Despite the apparent
possibilities, the helicopter was constrained by a lack of
power, and consequently, a lack of useful pay load, and by a
disbelieving and unconvinced marketplace.
Even after the Korean War, all commercial helicop-
ters were direct adaptations of military types, and the
helicopter design of the 1960s was commensurate with the
fixed wing state of design art of the 19 30s. The combination
of military hardware and immature design was not a good
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formula for commercial success, so the growth of commercial
use was very shallow for twenty years. In commercial terms,
this slow growth can be attributed to the high capital cost
of helicopters, high operating costs (caused by high mainte-
nance requirements), poor payload capability, lack of public
awareness of helicopter capabilities, and the lack of all
weather flight capability. [10:2]
The Vietnam war, with the vast deployment of heli-
copters, stimulated a boost in military helicopter technology
that was able to be transferred to the commercial sector.
The most significant development was the introduction of the
turbine engine into the light, 4/5 seat helicopter that
opened up a new era in commercial helicoptering. The major
beneficiaries of these developments were Bell and Hughes,
who had decided to concentrate on this sector of the market,
with a philosophy of building helicopters that commercial
operators could make money with. Sikorsky and Boeing-Vertol
were concentrating on the heavy end of the market. Whilst
they did achieve sales in those sectors that required heavier
lift and longer range, their helicopters were generally too
expensive to buy and operate for the small commercial opera-
tor, owing to their very specialized military origins.
Additionally, the hoped for airline usage has never developed,
primarily because the helicopter cannot compete with a
comparable-capacity conventional fixed wing aircraft on the
basis of seat/mile costs, the bottom line for an air carrier.
Bell and Hughes were both able to take advantage of
military developments to transfer technology to commercial
derivatives and to expand the market for many applications
of the light turbine-powered helicopter.
Recent development has concentrated on increasing
visual appeal, reducing vibration levels, increasing passen-
ger comfort, reducing maintenance requirements, and offering
wide ranges of optional kits to make the helicopter easily
adaptable to a wide range of applications.
Bell and Hughes have both targeted corporate/executive
use, emergency medical service/air ambulance markets, media
news gathering roles, agricultural and forestry use, and
many public service applications. The helicopter has found
a market in the construction and logging industries, and it
is in this application that the heavy lift helicopters of
Sikorsky and Boeing-Vertol have found some sales.
During the 1970s, the booming civil market was the
off-shore oil rig support market. Demand for helicopters
in this role is closely correlated with the state of the
oil industry and declined in 1980/81. All U.S. makers
attacked this market. Bell and Hughes looking at the short-
haul market, and Sikorsky and Boeing-Vertol hoping for sales
in the long-haul crew change market.
The strength of the commercial market in the 19 70s
led to the development of the only two U.S. helicopters
designed especially for commercial use, the Bell 222 and
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the Sikorsky S-76. Boeing-Vertol also developed a coinmercial
version of the Chinook, the Boeing 234. Sales of all three
have not been outstanding, due mainly to the falling market
caused by the recession and high interest rates of the late
1970s and early 1980s.
The most significant recent occurrence has been the
development of the twin turbine light helicopter, which has
increased customer confidence through increased safety margins
and has increased the payload to empty weight ratio and
expanding the range of applications.
Paralleling this airframe and engine development has
been the technological advances in helicopter avionic sys-
tems, leading to a much improved all weather capability and
further expansion of existing markets. [10:4]
The growth of the civil market can be seen by refer-
ence to Figure B-4. The growth has been quite dramatic in
the last five years, with the corporate/executive market
being dominant, largely due to the advent of the improved
light turbine helicopters being offered by Bell and Hughes,
and the more recent advent of the light twin helicopter.
The disturbing factor for the U.S. helicopter industry, how-
ever, is the increasing European presence, as indicated by
Figure B-9 , This issue is addressed in more detail in the
concluding section of this chapter.
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D. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE U.S. HELICOPTER INDUSTRY
There are a number of difficulties associated with esti-
mating the size and composition of the U.S. helicopter
industry. There are numerous sources of data, and results
from different sources are not always comparable owing to
different methods of measurement. Most data sources publish
units produced. In terms of sales volume this can be mis-
leading, e.g.. Bell and Hughes produce large numbers of
small, relatively cheap helicopters, whilst Sikorsky and
Boeing-Vertol produce fewer numbers of more expensive heli-
copters. Information is not always timely and is frequently
revised several years after the event. Aggregate data is
relatively easy to obtain, but companies are very sensitive
about releasing business segment data, particularly data
revealing financial performance.
The analysis that follows is designed to indicate rela-
tive trends only and does not purport to provide absolute
measures of performance. Numbers have frequently been
rounded to make the trend more easily apparent without
destroying the credibility of the data.
The data for Tables A-1, 2, A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, and A-8
were extracted from the internal records of one of the major
U.S. helicopter manufacturers and represent an aggregation
of data of all of the world helicopter manufacturers.
Free world helicopter production, in units of production
annually, is shown in Figure B-1 (data from Table A-1) . The
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graph clearly indicates the general rising volume for the
period 1943 to 1980. The peaks in 1953 and 1968 were caused
by the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. The dramatic effect
of the Vietnam era is quite apparent. Soviet helicopter
production is not included in this data. Whilst good,
reliable Soviet data is not available, it has been estimated
by one of the U.S. manufacturers that the change in production
shares from 1970 to 1980 is as shown in Table 1 below.
TABLE 1











TOTAL PRODUCTION- (UNITS) 3717 3800
These figures indicate a relatively pronounced increase
in Soviet market share. Since the Soviet expansion has been
mainly in heavy helicopters, the Soviet intrusion is greater
in terms of pounds of production, but does not have a great




Annual unit production for the U.S. manufacturers is
shown in Figure B-2 (Table A-2) and Figure B-3 (Table A-3)
.
Bell helicopter has dominated production (in units) for all
three peaks in 1952/53, 1968, and 1980. Hughes also con-
tributed to the Vietnam peak with production of the 0H-6A
Cayuse light observation helicopter.
The U.S. makers market shares of the total free world
helicopter production are shown in Table A-4. The data have
been rounded to the nearest percentage point. Selected data
are presented for ease of reading and the peak years' data
are included. The very apparent trend is the declining
market share of Bell, resulting in the declining U.S. market
share. In 19 82, foreign makers produced more than the U.S.
makers for the first time. The Sikorsky share is increasing
as a result of the production of the UH-60 Black Hawk.
Similar data for the European makers is shown in Table
A-5. Again, the data have been rounded. Two trends are
apparent, firstly the increase in the European market share
over the last decade from about 30 percent to just over 50
percent, and, secondly and perhaps more significantly, the
increase in the market share of Aerospatiale of France to
over 20 percent of total free world production.
U.S. helicopter production is shown in Figure B-4 (Table
A-6). The data shown in this figure varies from the data
in Figure B-2, due in part to the different data source,
and in part to the fact that it does not include foreign
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military sales. What is significant, however, is the general
trend indicating the vast production to support Vietnam in
the mid 1960s, followed by a declining military production
and an increasing civil percentage. Also apparent is the
declining civil sales in 1981/82, due primarily to poor
economic conditions.
U.S. helicopter production in dollars is shown in Figure
B-5 (Table A-7) . The correlation between Figure B-5 and
Figure B-6 is good up until 1979. At this point, the dollar
value of military deliveries increases despite a declining
military unit production, reflecting the military requirement
for a fewer number of more sophisticated and hence more
expensive helicopters.
The U.S. manufacturers percentage of U.S. production is
indicated in Figure B-6 in cumulative form (the data are
presented in Table A-8 in absolute form) . The early dominance
of Sikorsky is apparent, with Bell rapidly gaining market
share in the 1950s. Boeing-Vertol ' s contribution to the
Korean conflict in the 1950s can be seen. The dominance of
Bell and the emergence of Hughes in the mid 1960s Vietnam
period is also apparent. In the early 1980s, Sikorsky,
Hughes and Bell have emerged as the major forces in terms
of unit production U.S. market share
Figures B-7 and B-8 (Tables A-9 and A-10) indicate the
relative movements of U.S. imports and exports. The graphs
show the general decline in civil helicopter sales in 1981
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and 1982 (the 1983 and 1984 figures are estimates and fore-
casts respectively)
.
The data in Figures B-9 and B-10 (Tables A-11 and A-12)
reveal the fact that Aerospatiale has the largest share of
foreign imports. Europe now accounts for 50 percent of the
free world production and Aerospatiale constitutes some 40
percent of that European market presence (Table A-6).
Figure B-11 (Table A-13) indicates that whilst all
segments of the civil helicopter market have shown steady-
growth since the 1960s, the dominant growth segment has been
the commercial helicopter. A contributing factor to this
growth has been the boom in off-shore oil rig support, air
ambulance, air taxi, news media gathering, and corporate/
executive transport.
E. THE GROWTH OF THE EUROPEAN THREAT TO U.S. MARKETS
This chapter would not be complete without a discussion
of the European intrusion into the U.S. civil market.
Figure B-9 shows the growth of European helicopters imported
into the United States. The degree of penetration by Aero-
spatiale of France has the most significance. This section
will consider the growth of Aerospatiale.
In the period 1940-1945, the Focke-Achgelis Company in
Northern Germany successfully produced helicopters but pro-
duction was halted by the cessation of World War II. Other
European efforts in Austria, Germany, France, and England
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were similarly disbanded in 1945. Beginning in 1945, the
French and English governments decided to promote new heli-
copter concepts. The French Government allocated funds to
the principal French aeronautical companies to design and
build rotary wing aircraft. In the period 1945 to 1952 the
Societe Nationale de Construction Aeronautique du Sud-Est
(SNCASE) evaluated the Focke-Achgelis technique, whilst the
Societe Nationale de Construction Aeronautique du Sud-Ouest
(SNCASO) became interested in the Doblhoff tip-jet technique.
The Societe Nationale de Construction Aeronautique du Centre
(SNCAC) , the Bregeut Company, the Societe Nationale de
Construction Aeronautique du Nord (SNCAN) , and the Societe
Nationale de Construction du Sud-Est (SNCASE) all produced
helicopters that flew during 1948, 1949, and 1950, but none
passed through the testing stage. The results were discon-
certing and the SNCAC, Bregeut, and the SNCAN companies
decided to halt expenditures and abandon helicopters. In
1950, only SNCASE and SNCASO remained competitive (in France)
to try and find more suitable techniques. [l:150]
In Britain, after some attention to autogiros, the
Bristol Aeroplane Company produced the first functional
European production helicopter, the Bristol Sycamore, of
which 200 units were produced. The Westland Company became
involved in building Sikorsky helicopters under license
(first the S-51, then the S-55), before joining forces in
1959/60 with the rotary wing activities of the English firms.
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Saunders-Roe, Bristol, and Fairey. SNCASE, prompted by
events in Algeria, acquired a license for the Sikorsky S-55
in 1952 and the Sikorsky S-58 in 1956. Sales and maintenance
contracts were signed by other French firms for Bell, Hiller,
and Piasecki aircraft, as the Europeans recognized that the
American products, being 5 to 10 years more advanced than
the European technology, were dominating the market. They
were joined by the Italian firm, Agusta, who bought a license
for the Bell 47 in 1952. [l:15l]
The period 1952-1959 marked the turning point of the
European industry and saw the arrival of turbine helicopters,
in a sequence of events that favoured the French industry,
leading to that nation's dominance of the European makers.
Of the two main French firms, SNCASO moved towards tip
jet helicopters, whilst SNCASE developed a Sikorsky type
single main rotor helicopter. The design teams of the two
firms were given the objective of producing light helicopters
weighing less than 800 kilograms empty. The SNCASO approach
led to the Djinn, which received French certification in
1957 and American certification in 1958. As mechanically
driven helicopters improved, the advantages of the Djinn
diminished, and it never achieved great success. In the
meantime, SNCASE developed the three-seat piston engined
Alouette I, which first flew in 1951. In 1953, it was
decided to mass produce this helicopter but the advent of
the turbine engine reversed this decision. In order to
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achieve market success, it was decided to develop a new
helicopter that would be competitive but superior in per-
formance to existing light helicopters. It would be a five
place helicopter, designed around the advantages of a turbine
engine, and basic in design and uncomplicated (making it
capable of being disassembled into sub-units to facilitate
production, maintenance, and sales). These requirements
led to the Alouette II that was first produced in 1956.
Previously, the American firms of Kaman, Bell, and Sikorsky
had all experimented with turbine power beginning in 1951,
but they had only limited success. The secret of the success
of the Alouette II lay in its sound design and ease of con-
struction leading to decisive advantages in performance,
safety, and maintenance [1:156]. This helicopter received
French certification in 1957 and American certification in
1958. By the end of 1959, more than 300 Alouette II heli-
copters had been produced [3:157]. Total production through
1975 (the end of production) was 1307 units.
In 1957, SNCASO and SNCASE merged to become Sud-Aviation.
This firm adopted a philosophy of continuous innovation and
incremental improvement in order to improve the commercial
position of the French industry. This approach has proved
very successful, as reference to Figure B-12 will reveal.
The graphs indicate sales, employment, and product introduc-
tion history for Aerospatiale. The planned expansion was
emphasized by a new prototype every two or three years.
[7:250]
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The Alouette II was rapidly followed by the Alouette
III which first flew in March, 1959. With seven seats, it
had no competition. A further innovation was the use of a
strongly "derated" engine (i.e., used below maximum power).
This meant that the helicopter still had a lot of power
available at maximum throttle at high altitude. Further, it
was readily adaptable for rescue operations and ambulance
operations [7:251]. The superiority of the Alouette III
was demonstrated when the first French military orders were
awarded to the company. Production amounted to almost 1400
units and continued until 1979 in France and 1981 in India
and Romania (licensed production) . Several product improve-
ments were introduced during the life of the model.
In 1969, the company merged with Nord-Aviation , to
become the Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale (or
Aerospatiale) . This year also marked the commencement of the
first real intrusion into the American market, with the
creation of Vought Helicopter Incorporated (VHI) by Ling-
Temco-Vought , who desired to become a new helicopter manu-
facturer. They held production licenses for the light
Alouette and Gazelle helicopters. These aircraft were
successful and led to Aerospatiale buying the helicopter
subsidiary from Ling-Temco-Vought and renaming it the
Aerospatiale Helicopter Corporation (AHC) . The acquisition
included the entire staff and was able to capitalize on the
tremendous early promotional work of the Alouette and Gazelle
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Today, the AHC is located in modern facilities in Grand
Prairie, Texas. Deliveries in 1980 represented 20 percent
of the North American commercial market. [7:249]
The Alouette III was rapidly followed by the Frelon (a
three turbine naval helicopter) in 1959, the Super Frelon
(a thirty place three turbine upgrade of the Frelon) in
1962, the SA-330 Puma (a French Army tactical helicopter
that subsequently enjoyed considerable commercial success
in Europe), the SA-340 (a high performance, five place, light
helicopter that employed newly developed fibreglass blades)
in 1968, and the SA-315 Lama in 1968. This was a combination
of the light Alouette II airframe and the rotary parts of
the more powerful Alouette III, especially designed for high
altitude work and still remaining without real competition
in this field.
The philosophy of modernization and improvement was
further applied in the 19 70s with the development of the
AS-360 Dauphin (a modern Alouette III with increased per-
formance and safety, decreased maintenance, and with ten
seats) . Aerospatiale recognized the market tendency towards
twin engined safety, and upgraded the Dauphin to the AS-365C,
for which commercial certification was received in 1978.
A further model improvement led to a successful bid in a
U.S. Coast Guard contract to modernize their fleet in 1979.
The Gazelle had been a successful military helicopter
but its high performance made it relatively expensive, and
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therefore, not competitive in the commercial field. Accord-
ingly, Aerospatiale set about designing a new six seat light
turbine helicopter with two prime objectives, reduction of
production cost and reduction of operating cost [7:255].
The consequent AS-350 Ecureuil was produced in two versions,
one for the European market (with a Turbomeca engine) , and
the AStar (specifically designed for the North American
market (with the Lycoming LTS 101 American turbine)
.
Aerospatiale entered the medium weight market in 1981
with the upgraded and stretched AS-332 Super Puma, aimed at
the emerging long distance off-shore oil rig support market
[7:252].
As they had for the Dauphin, the engineers returned to
the single engined Ecureuil AStar to transform it into a
twin turbine craft. The AS-335 TwinStar first flew in 1979.
A further upgrade of the TwinStar was certified in America
in 1981. The TwinStar has proved most popular in the corpo-
rate and emergency medical services (EMS) markets, with
eleven being employed in an EMS role by the end of 19 83
[11:34]. This aircraft competes with the MBB Bo-105 and the
Agusta 109 in the North American light twin market. Bell
is preparing a new model 400 TwinRanger, which will be made
in Canada and which is heralded as the first in a new line
of Bell single and twin light helicopters designed to combat
the French invasion. ^
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Leaving aside the Gazelle and the Lama, all the other
Aerospatiale helicopters are very modern and constitute a
very aggressive entry into the world and U.S. markets.
Without counting aircraft manufactured under license, Aero-
spatiale Helicopter Division had sold (by the end of 1981),
almost 7000 helicopters of all types to 520 customers spread
over 100 countries [7:256]. Reference to Figure B-9 quite
clearly indicates the very successful results Aerospatiale
has achieved in the North American market in the last five
years.
Despite the fact that Aerospatiale is the primary con-
tributor to the European penetration of the U.S. market,
the potential impact of the other European makers should not
be minimized. MBB has two subsidiaries in North America and
has become the first European manufacturer to plan produc-
tion operations in North America, with its announced intention
of producing the MBB Bo-105 in Canada for distribution through
its MBB Helicopter Corporation (MBBHC) subsidiary in West
Chester, Pennsylvania.
Agusta has also targeted the North American corporate
and public service markets with the Agusta 109 light twin
eight place helicopter.
Westland Helicopter, of England, has aimed a development
of the successful military Lynx series, the Westland 30, at
the American market (commuter, ambulance, off-shore, execu-
tive, and cargo roles), with three helicopters being in
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interline airline service in Los Angeles and two in New
York. They are also developing the EH-101 (for military
and civil markets), in collaboration with Agusta of Italy.
In summary, the European helicopter industry emerged
after World War II. The European companies had experimented
on their own, and all had contact with American manufacturers
in one way or another, ranging from design help to outright
purchases of licenses to manufacture. Once begun, progress
in the European helicopter industry was rapid. Today,
according to the Aerospace Industries Association of America's
November, 1983 report, "The U.S. Helicopter Industry",
European manufacturers account for over 50 percent of free
world production, and Aerospatiale accounts for about half
of that share. Many helicopters, American or foreign, have
both military and civil versions. While it appears that
the military/civil divergence is increasing, some of the
newest European designs are conceived with both civil and
military applications in mind. [12: 71]
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IV. COMPETITORS IN THE HELICOPTER INDUSTRY
A. INTRODUCTION
In its approximately forty year history, the helicopter
industry has spawned many participants. The successful firms
have generally survived through a combination of fortuitous
good luck and winning the right military competitions,
although in some cases, a firm has achieved great success
with a product line or concept after losing the contest it
was entered in. The survivors, at least those who dominate
the market, have one factor in common; they are all part of
a larger corporate or national organization.
The American participants have produced over two-thirds
of the free-world's helicopters over the last twenty years.
They are: Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., a subsidiary of
Textron Inc.; Boeing-Vertol Company, a division of the Boeing
Company; Hughes Helicopters Inc., a subsidiary of the McDon-
nell Douglas Corporation; and Sikorsky Aircraft, a division
of United Technologies Corporation. Other U.S. manufacturers
include Hynes Helicopters Inc., the Enstrom Corporation,
Hiller Aviation Inc. (recently acquired by Rogerson Helicopters
after running into financial difficulties), the Kaman Cor-
poration, and Robinson Helicopter Company Inc.
The balance of the free-world's helicopters have been
mainly manufactured by the four major European makers, namely:
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Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale of France;
Messerschmit-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB) of West Germany; the Agusta
Group of Italy; and Westland Helicopters of the United
Kingdom.
There are also several foreign makers who are predomi-
nately involved in licensed production of helicopters designed
by one of the eight major manufacturers. These firms include
Nurtanio of Indonesia, Helibras of Brazil, and Kawasaki,
Fuji and Mitsubishi of Japan.
The European and foreign firms, in general, gained their
entry to the industry through licensed production of U.S.
designs, buying design, manufacturing, production, and tech-
nical expertise.
This chapter will provide a brief profile of each of the
major competitors, as well as some comment on the minor




Igor Sikorsky is considered by many to be the father
of the helicopter industry. He initially experimented, un-
successfully, with helicopter designs in his native Russia
in 1909 and 1910. He was constrained by the lack of a suit-
able propulsion unit and surrendered his interest in helicopters
for a number of years. He came to America following the
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Communist Revolution in Russia in 1917 and founded his own
company, successfully producing fixed wing aircraft for a
number of years. In 1929, the financially troubled Sikorsky
Aviation Corporation became first a subsidiary of and then
a division of United Aircraft, now the United Technologies
Corporation.
In 19 38, after 10 years of research, he received the
go-ahead to proceed with the design and construction of a
direct lift aircraft. The subsequent first flight of the
VS-300 on September 14, 19 39, marked the birth of the heli-
copter industry. By 1941, Sikorsky aircraft were in service
with Army and Naval Air Forces around the world. No other
U.S. manufacturers then existed.
His early designs established the Sikorsky design
preference for a single main rotor/single tail rotor concept
and a penchant for a "bigger is better" philosophy. An
examination of the Sikorsky product line development over
the years will reveal that these philosophies have remained
with Sikorsky.
As with most helicopter manufacturers, Sikorsky has
approached commercial helicopter design by adapting designs
developed under military contracts. Following World War
II, Sikorsky developed helicopters aimed at both the military
and civil markets. These included the S-51, a derivative of
the early military VS-327 (military designation R-5), which
achieved quantity production of about 380 units in the late
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1940s, /early 1950s, and the S-55 (military designation H-19),
the first troop carrier, which achieved a production run of
approximately 1800 units through the 1950s, and the S-58
(military designation H-34) that reached a production total
of over 2200 units.
The late 1950s saw Sikorsky take advantage of the
available technology, and they entered the turbine powered
helicopter field with the S-61 (SH-3) , S-64 (CH-54A/B) and
S-65 (CH53A/D)
. These aircraft became progressively larger
as Sikorsky gained more design and production experience.
Over 1600 of these aircraft were built during the 1960s and
they saw service in a wide variety of civil and military
roles. The S-61 remains in military service in substantial
numbers around the world and its civil variants were and
still are highly successful in the emerging civil market at
that time; i.e., off-shore oil rig support.
In the early 1970s, Sikorsky went through some diffi-
cult times as their long running production lines began to
dry up, without the arrival of new production programs.
Sikorsky applied considerable company effort to winning the
Army Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft System (UTTAS)
competition with its Black Hawk entry. The program was won
in 1976 and has led to successful access to other military
derivative programs (Navy Seahawk and Air Force Night Hawk)
.
It also provided opportunity to develop a commercial derivative
and an overseas military version for foreign military sales.
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The successful S-65 program has also led to success in the
Navy and Marine Corps requirement for heavy-lift helicopters
with the triple turbined, 70,000 lb. CH-53E Super Stallion,
now the free world's largest helicopter.
Also in the 1970s, Sikorsky broke with tradition and
developed the S-76 purely for the commercial market (primarily
for the corporate, executive and oil rig support market).
This aircraft was sized between its perceived competition,
the Bell range of light helicopters and the medium-lift
helicopters produced by Boeing-Vertol . This helicopter has
not been as successful as Sikorsky would have liked, due in
part to the general decline in civil helicopter sales in the
early 1980s.
Sikorsky has licensed Agusta, Westland, and Mitsubishi
for overseas production of U.S. designs. In history up to
September 14, 1979, Sikorsky had produced a total of 5545
helicopters, with an additional 1672 units being produced by
foreign licensees.
Sikorsky has always been actively involved in ongoing
research and development, devoting considerable effort to the
Advancing Blade Concept (ABC) , believing it to be the answer
to developing high speed requirements. Other endeavors include
the Advanced Composite Airframe Program (ACAP) , an Army funded
program to develop a lighter all composite airframe, and the
Sikorsky-developed Rotor Systems Research Aircraft (RSRA) , a
joint NASA/Army program to develop new technology rotor systems,
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In terms of new military programs, Sikorsky will be
an entrant in the major new helicopter program, the Army
new Light Helicopter (LHX) program that promises substantial
production orders through the year 2000. Sikorsky sees this
program as a successor to the Black Hawk program in terms of
keeping its production shop floor busy.
2. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc.
Larry Bell launched the Bell Aircraft Corporation on
July 10, 19 35, with 56 employees. His company achieved
success in the war years, producing many fighters and bombers
for the war effort. By 1944, the company employed more than
50,000 people in four plants.
At the beginning of the war. Bell had hired Arthur
Young, an inventive engineer who was very interested in
helicopters. Young and his small staff were established in
a small garage in Buffalo, completely divorced from the war
efforts of the company. The Bell helicopter wasn't quite
ready at the end of the war but in September, 1945, Bell
announced that his company would enter the helicopter field.
His foresight paid off because after V-J day in August 1945,
almost all the company's business was cancelled. Bell's
business base dropped from $317 million in 1944 to $11 million
in 1946 and the workforce dropped to 2920.
Bell was confident of his helicopter development,
and, anticipating significant military and commercial appli-
cations, decided to build 500 units without orders. Commercial
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sales were slow, however, and it appeared that Bell might
have made a mistake. In the period to 1950, Bell only sold
175 helicopters. The Korean War intervened, however, and
the Army urgently required a large number of helicopters.
The advanced Sikorsky S-52 was not in a production-ready
stage, and Bell was able to win the competition on delivery
schedule with its now famous Bell 47 production line. This
win put Bell on the map, with the Bell 47 being phased out
of production in 1974 after a cumulative production run of
6263 units, with about fifty percent of these going to mili-
tary customers.
The next major event for Bell was the winning of a
design competition for the development of a utility helicopter
suitable for medevac, general utility and training purposes.
Bell won this competition in 1959 with the ubiquitous UH-1
"Huey" , the first production beneficiary of the newly developed
gas turbine engine. This win led to a production run of over
12,000 units of the various derivatives, marketed as the
UH-1 (military) and the Models 204, 205, 212, 214 and 412
(civil)
.
In 1962, the U.S. Army's Tactical Mobility Require-
ments Board issued a report that officially endorsed, for
the first time, the use of armed helicopters. The war in
Vietnam demonstrated this truth, and the armed UH-1 Huey was
pressed into service as an interim measure. Bell was initially
eliminated from the requirements design competition in early
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1965, but with a private-venture development of the Bell 209
was able to win the subsequent production competition. That
aircraft was born as the AH-IG Cobra. It also enjoyed a very
long production run of 1775 units and will remain in service
(product improved) until the year 2000.
Bell's business in recent times has been less prom-
ising. Whilst continuing to enjoy civil success with their
light derivatives. Bell entered and lost a number of military
competitions that provided good opportunities for competitors
to steal some of Bell's military business. These were the
Army Light Observation Helicopter (LOH) competition in 1961,
lost to the Hughes OH-6 (subsequently the very successful
Hughes civil 5-0); the Army Advanced Attack Helicopter (AAH)
in 1973-76 to the Hughes AH-64 Apache; and the Army Utility
Tactical Transport Aircraft System (UTTAS) to replace Bell's
Huey in 19 76 to the Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk.
These were significant losses to Bell, who is now
under considerable pressure for continued survival to win
either or both of the two major current military programs,
the Joint Services Vertical Lift Aircraft (JVX) , and the
Army's Light Helicopter Program (LHX) . Bell has been kept
alive in the military business by winning the recent Army
Helicopter Improvement Program (AHIP) against Hughes to
develop a near term scout helicopter. Bell was also selected
as one of two winners (with Sikorsky) to participate in the
Advanced Composite Airframe Program (ACAP)
.
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Perhaps Bell's most promising military work is its
teaming arrangement with Boeing-Vertol to participate in the
development of the JVX . Whilst the team is the only one under
contract for the development phase, it appears that the
government intention is to compete the two firms head to
head for follow-on production after initial production. Bell
has a head start in this program, having developed its tilt-
wing technology in an earlier (1951) Army-Air Force Program
that funded the development of the experimental XV-3 tilt-
wing convertiplane in 1955. This led to the XV-15 occurring
in 19 77 (under joint Army/NASA sponsorship)
.
Bell Helicopter has licensing arrangements with
Agusta of Italy; Mitsui of Japan and Nurtanio of Indonesia.
Bell Helicopter Corporation was founded as a wholly
owned subsidiary of the Bell Aircraft Corporation in 1957.
On July 5, 1960, Textron Inc. purchased the defense activities
of Bell Aircraft Corporation, setting up Bell Aerospace
Corporation as a wholly-owned subsidiary with three operating
divisions, the Bell Helicopter Company, Bell Aerosystems
Company, and the Hydraulic Research and Manufacturing Company.
Bell established itself as Textron ' s largest division and in
January, 1982, the company status was changed to Bell Heli-
copter Textron Inc. , a wholly owned subsidiary of Textron Inc.
Bell's philosophy throughout the years has been to
build helicopters for the light and intermediate market seg-
ments, relying primarily on military aircraft with civil
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adaptability. A significant effort has been applied to
developing civil derivatives that can be competitive regard-
ing price and operating costs, i.e., to build aircraft that
operators can make money with.
Bell, like Sikorsky, has recently developed a pure
commercial model, the Bell 222, also for the corporate,
executive and oil market. It is somewhat smaller than the
Sikorsky S-76, but its sales have not been impressive, again
due in part to the declining civil market in the early 1980s.
One of Bell's early competitive advantages was its
extremely simple and inexpensive two-bladed see-saw rotor
systems that helped to keep price and operating costs down.
It would appear that Bell was reluctant to progress from
this technology even though their customers wanted the extra
advantages of a four-bladed articulated rotor system. This
reluctance prevented them from capturing market share that
they might otherwise have obtained.
3. Boeing-Vertol
P-V Engineering Forum Corporation was incorporated
by Frank Piasecki in 1943. This organization designed and
built the PV-2, which first flew on April 11, 1943. It was
the second U.S. helicopter to be flown publicly. The company's
second aircraft was the PV-3, the world's first practical
tandem rotor machine that led to production of the "flying
banana" (the Navy HRP-1) in 1947. This success was a result
of a private-venture by Piasecki to build a demonstrator
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(the XHRP-X) in 1945. In 1946 the company changed its name
to the Piasecki Helicopter Corporation. The HRP-1 was improved
to the HRP-2 which was sold to the Air Force and the Army
as the H-21 (VJorkhorse and Shawnee) .
This aircraft saw considerable service in Vietnam
and was used by many foreign military forces. The original
armed helicopter trials were carried out with the Shawnee
but the concept never developed for Boeing-Vertol, the armed
helicopter battle being won by Bell with its armed "Huey"
and later the Cobra.
Piasecki also entered the Navy market in 1949 with
its smaller PV-14/18 (HUP Retriever or H-25 Army Mule)
.
This aircraft also had the traditional tandem rotor and had
a production run of about 270, with some of the Navy aircraft
being fitted with dipping sonar.
In 1950, Piasecki was contracted by the U.S. Air
Force to develop a long range rescue helicopter. The subse-
quent helicopter, then the world's largest, was unsuccessful
although the second of the two prototypes was credited with
being the world's first twin engined turbine helicopter.
The program was cancelled in 1954 after the crash of this
prototype.
In 1956, Piasecki adopted the name Vertol, and Boeing
Aircraft acquired Vertol in 1960 when it became the Vertol
division of the Boeing Company.
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Piasecki (or Vertol) conducted a private-venture into
a high speed compound helicopter in 1962, resulting in some
Army/Navy sponsorship for modifications to the 16H-1 Pathfinder
to achieve a speed of 230 mph. It successfully flew at 225
mph but did not enter production.
Boeing-Vertol continued the tradition of tandem rotor
design, developing the Model 107 as the H-46 for the Army as
a medium lift transport. This aircraft achieved quantity
production and entered service in 1962, serving with the
Marine Corps and the U.S. Navy and has been licensed over-
seas to Kawasaki as the KV-10 7. Boeing-Vertol production
was 666 machines when production ended in 19 71.
The very successful Boeing-Vertol 114 (CH-47) followed,
entering service in 1962 and becoming the western world's
standard for medium lift helicopters. It is flown world-
wide and continues to be modified and updated. This aircraft
also saw service during Vietnam when four were modified as
"heavy gunships", as another forerunner of the armed attack
helicopter requirement.
The Boeing-Vertol YUH-61A competed against Sikorsky
for the Army Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft System
(UTTAS) program, losing the competition on 23 December, 1976.
Boeing-Vertol then entered a modification of the YUH-61A in
the Navy's LAMPS III competition against a Sikorsky modifica-
tion of its UH-60B UTTAS winner and a Westland/Aerospatiale
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modification of their Lynx. The paper competition was lost
to the navalized Sikorsky SH-60B on September 1, 1977.
In November 1970, the U.S. Army requested industry
proposals for a heavy lift helicopter (HLH) able to carry a
load of 20 tons for a radius of 20 nautical miles. Boeing-
Vertol was selected to develop the concept, and built the
model 347 helicopter, based on their CH-47 design. The sub-
sequent development contract was cancelled in October, 1974,
when the program was experiencing high costs and when the Navy
and Marine Corps decided to pursue the Sikorsky CH-53E for
their heavy lift requirements.
The prototype was never completed, although recent
events indicate a re-awakening of interest, with Boeing-Vertol
being contracted to complete the development of the prototype
as a demonstrator of the heavy lift concept.
Commercially, Boeing-Vertol entered the market
initially with the Piasecki V-44 in 1956. This was replaced
with the turbine powered Model 107 (the commercial CH-47) in
1958. The Boeing-Vertol Chinook (CH-47) that first entered
service in 1962 and has sold over 1000 units worldwide was
developed commercially as the Model 234 Chinook, primarily
to service the long range oil rig market.
The bulk of Boeing-Vertol ' s current business is
modification of the CH-47 Chinook fleet, although the company
is working on research projects such as the heavy lift
helicopter, the Army/NASA X-wing project, and the private-
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venture high speed helicopter, the Model 360. They are also
involved, as a team member, with Bell Helicopter, in the
Navy/Marine Corps Joint Services Vertical Lift Aircraft
program.
Boeing-Vertol has licensed Kawasaki of Japan for
Model 107 production, Agusta of Italy for Chinook production
and itself had a license to market the German MBB Bo-105 in
Canada, Mexico and the United States until withdrawing from
that arrangement in 1978. The rotor system for Boeing-
Vertol 's UTTAS candidate was adapted from the MBB Bo-105, in
a unique Europe to United States licensed technology transfer
4 . Hughes Helicopters Inc.
Hughes Helicopters traces its origins to February
13, 19 34, when Howard Hughes Jr. launched the Hughes Tool
Company Aircraft Division. Howard Hughes had a passion for
aviation and the aircraft division was essentially his hobby
shop. At the end of the war, when nearly all military pro-
grams were cancelled, Hughes kept his California team busy
making proposals for new aircraft and missiles.
In 1946, Kellet Aircraft of Philadelphia was involved
in developing the XH-17, a derivative of a European jet
powered rotor machine. The advantage of this concept was
that no heavy transmission was needed, the rotor being driven
by compressed air feeding kerosene burning nozzles at the
rotor tips, much like a lawn sprinkler. This made it parti-
cularly attractive for very large heavy lift helicopters.
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The XH-17 had a rotor diameter of 130 feet and was to be
capable of lifting 40,000 lbs. gross weight.
By 1949, with design completed and fabrication
started, Kellet was in financial difficulties. Hughes, ever
on the lookout for new work and an aviation challenge,
purchased the XH-17 project and moved it to the Hughes Air-
craft Company plant at Culver City, California. The XH-17
first flew in October, 1952 and the flight test program ran
for three years. Whilst the program added to Hughes tech-
nology base, the advent of the Korean War shifted the emphasis
to large numbers of small helicopters rather than a few
very large helicopters.
Hughes then bought the rights to the very simple
design of a three bladed rotor system developed by a neigh-
boring firm, the McCulloch Motor Corporation, and focused
on the very light range of helicopters. By 1956, Hughes had
developed the Hughes 269, designed as a light, two place
commercial helicopter. This company program led to the
very successful Hughes 300 commercial helicopter.
In mid 1964 the U.S. Army selected the Hughes 269A
as the TH-55A Osage light training and utility helicopter.
A total of 2738 units of this model were built, with nearly
800 being delivered to the Army as the TH-55A. Hughes has
now licensed the Schweizer Aircraft Corporation to produce
the Model 300.
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In the early 1960s the U.S. Army held a design
competition for a turbine powered light observation heli-
copter. Hughes won the competition with its 0H-6A Cayuse
against proposals from Bell and Hiller. The Cayuse entered
service in 1966 and about 1450 units were produced for mili-
tary service, the aircraft being extensively used in the
Vietnam conflict. Simultaneously, Hughes developed a com-
mercial derivative, the Model 500 that has also become an
extremely successful entry into a wide range of civil
applications. The product line, including military and
civil derivatives, had sold some 3600 units by 1983.
The philosophy adopted by Hughes in both the Model
300 and Model 500 was to "simplicate and add lightness" and
to design for ease of maintenance and reduced operating
costs
.
Hughes has developed both the 300 and 500 models as
overseas military versions, using their position as the free
world leader in medium calibre cannon production to advantage
Through a long sequence of events, Hughes won the
Army competition for the Advanced Attack Helicopter in 19 76
in a fly-off between its AH-64 Apache and the Bell YAH-6 3.
These events followed the failure of the Lockheed AH-56A
Cheyenne in the Army's Advanced Aerial Fire Support System
(AAFSS) program in 1972. This success has led to production
contracts for the Apache.
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As a result Hughes is in the process of moving its
operations to Mesa, Arizona, where it has built a new plant.
Hughes has now been acquired by the McDonnell Douglas Cor-
poration as a wholly owned subsidiary. With the corporate
strength of McDonnell Douglas, Hughes will become a formidable
competitor in the Army Light Helicopter program (the LHX)
with its unique no tail rotor concept (NOTAR)
.
C. EUROPEAN COMPETITORS
1. Aerospatiale Helicopter Corporation
After World War II, the French Air Ministry, observ-
ing that France was lagging behind the U.S. in helicopter
development, signed several contracts for helicopter design
with the following companies: SNCASE, SNCAN , SNCAC , SNCASO
,
and Breguet. However, at the beginning of 1954, no French
helicopters were being produced, with helicopter require-
ments being satisfied by the imports of the Bell 47, Hiller
360, Piasecki HUP-2 and the Sikorsky S-55. The S-55 was
being produced by SNCASE under license. The Air Ministry
determined that, in order to establish a niche in the indus-
try, it was necessary to develop a helicopter that would not
clash head to head with the American products. This led to
the turbine powered Alouette II which first flew in March,
1955. This aircraft broke the international altitude record
and was especially suited to mountain work. As a five
seater, it occupied the segment between the three seat Bell
47 and Hiller 360 helicopters and the ten seat Sikorsky S-55.
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In January, 195 7, SNCASO and SNCASE merged to become
Sud-Aviation. Under Sud-Aviation
,
production shifted to the
Alouette III in 1959 (especially designed as a seven seater
for high altitude work) . The Alouette product line was a
commercial success.
The parent company of Aerospatiale Helicopter Division
(AHD) , Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale (SNIA)
,
was formed in January, 19 70, by a merger of three government-
owned companies, Nord Aviation (fixed wing aircraft and
tactical missiles), Sud-Aviation (fixed wing aircraft and
helicopters), and SEREB (space engineering). Thus, Aero-
spatiale is and always has been owned by the French Government,
Up until this time, Sud-Aviation had always concentrated on
light helicopters. In order to penetrate the medium and
heavy markets, Sud purchased Sikorsky technology, leading
to the Puma (twin engined 8000 lb. tactical transport)
,
and the Super Frelon (three engined 15,000 lb. antisubmarine,
passenger and cargo helicopter) . The Super Frelon is no
longer in production but about 100 remain in a variety of
civil and military uses. The Puma also stopped production
in about 1980, but is still in wide use. It has led to the
multi-purpose civil and military Super Puma now in use in
fourteen countries. The Super Puma competes head to head
with the Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk for troop transport con-
tracts. Aerospatiale is unique in both Europe and the U.S.
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in that it offers a range of light to heavy helicopters, in
civil and military variants, in simultaneous production.
Aerospatiale formed an arrangement with Ling-Temco-
Vought (LTV) in the United States in the early 1970s in
order to market Aerospatiale helicopters in the U.S., Canada
and Mexico. This arrangement was disastrous in the beginning,
with the main deficiencies being product support and inade-
quate customer credit investigation. In about 1974, manage-
ment changes were initiated, and the name was changed from
Vought Helicopters Inc. , (VHI) , to Aerospatiale Helicopter
Corporation (AHC) . The need to develop customer confidence
in product support was emphasized and the result has been a
significant penetration of the U.S. market by AHC.
Aerospatiale has been a consistent investor in
research and development, allocating about 9 percent of
sales to innovative technologies, particularly in the use
of composites.
Aerospatiale has a wide range of licensing arrange-
ments, including India (Alouette III and Puma), Yugoslavia
(Gazelle), U.K. (Gazelle, Puma and Lynx co-production),
Indonesia (Puma and Super Puma) , Brazil (Lama and Ecureuil)
,
and China (SA-365N Dauphin 2).
2 . Westland Helicopters Ltd.
The British company, Westland Aircraft Ltd. ^ (now
Westland pic), was formed in July, 19 35, to take over the
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aircraft branch of Fetters Ltd. , known previously as the
Westland Aircraft Works, which had been engaged in aircraft
design and construction since 1915. The Westland story is
the familiar one of a traditional European aviation company
moving into helicopters after World War II. Unlike its
European helicopter contemporaries, VJestland has also made
a large effort in the hovercraft business so that Westland,
with about 7,400 employees, is organized with British
Hovercraft Corporation's 1,500 employees into the Helicopter
and Hovercraft Group of Westland pic [12:77].
Westland is now one of Europe's leading helicopter
manufacturers, but from 1915 up to 19 46, the company mainly
produced fixed wing aircraft. It entered the helicopter
industry in 1947, by acquiring a license to build the Sikorsky
S-51, which Westland manufactured as the Dragonfly. This
decision was taken after Westland concluded that the future
lay in helicopters. The technical association with Sikorsky
has continued since that decision to concentrate on the
design, development and construction of helicopters [13:285].
Westland' s several other versions of the S-51 were produced
for the Royal Air Force, Royal Navy, civil operators, and,
eventually, foreign military and civil customers. Subsequent
and current Westland designs are heavily dependent on collabor-
ation with other companies [12: 81].
In addition to U.S. technology, Westland received
domestic design technology transfers through its government-
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enforced merger with other British helicopter firms in 1960.
Two of these, Bristol and Saunders-Roe , brought with them
existing programs already in production, and all brought
engineering expertise that led to the development of West-
land's first domestic model, the WG-13 Lynx. Two earlier
British designed models, the Wasp and the Scout, had been
produced by Saunders-Roe prior to the merger. This aircraft
was later included as part of a collaborative program with
Aerospatiale that also covered that firm's SA-341 Gazelle and
SA-3 30 Puma models.
Westland's links with Sikorsky were strengthened by
the license to produce the Sikorsky S-61 Sea King, originally
concluded in 1959. The Sea King still constituted some 20
percent of Westland's production output in 1980 [14:15],
although Westland has made considerable changes in the power
plant and specialized equipment, initially to meet a Royal
Navy requirement for an advanced antisubmarine helicopter
with prolonged endurance. The aircraft was also targeted at
secondary roles such as search and rescue, tactical troop
transport, casualty evacuation, cargo carrying and long
range self-ferry [13:285]. A total of 204 Sea Kings and
32 of its tactical transport version, the Commando, have been
delivered to the U.K., West Germany, India, Norway, Pakistan,
Egypt, Belgium, Saudi Arabia, and Australia [12: 81].
Westland's Lynx was one of the first products of
the European multinational helicopter co-operative ventures.
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Westland was the design leader and Aerospatiale the co-producer
The arrangement was confirmed in 1968 and the first aircraft
flew in 1971. The aircraft was targeted at the intermediate
weight range (7,000 to 15,000 lbs.) utility and naval roles.
Lynx is a highly successful military program with approxi-
mately 70 percent of the production being performed by West-
land and 30 percent by Aerospatiale [8:93]. Westland offered
the Lynx to the U.S. Navy in the LAMPS II antisubmarine
helicopter program competition before that program was can-
celled. An improved Lynx was also offered in the U.S. Navy
LAMPS III competition against the Boeing-Vertol and Sikorsky
bids. The competition was eventually won by Sikorsky in
1977 with its Black Hawk derivative, the SH-60B Seahawk.
From the successful Lynx program (more than 310 unit
sales to the U.K., the Netherlands, Qatar, Denmark, Norway,
West Germany, and Nigeria) emerged a civil derivative, the
Westland 30 (which retains 85 percent of the proven Lynx)
.
The Westland 30 is an intermediate weight (12,000 lbs. plus)
with 19 places, targeted to compete with the Sikorsky S-76,
both worldwide and in the U.S. and the Aerospatiale SA-330
Puma. The Westland 30 was developed after Westland decided,
in 1978, that all the military Lynx needed to become success-
ful commercially was bigger internal volume. The subsequent
derivative is aimed at ambulance, off-shore, VIP/executive
and cargo versions [12: 81].
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The Westland 30 aircraft are in service in the U.S.
with Airspur Helicopters Inc. (a southern California interline
airline) and Omniflight Helicopter Services of New Jersey
(one for Pan American as an inter-airport service and one
as a Westland demonstrator)
.
Westland is a publicly owned company, with head
offices at Yeovil, Somerset, England, and receives the support
of its government through military development programs and
through government grants for international co-development
programs
.
For the future, Westland is developing the Lynx 3,
a Lynx derivative dedicated to the anti-tank military heli-
copter market, although a follow-on naval series is also
envisioned. First flight for the Lynx 3 is scheduled for
1985/1986.
Westland had a good year in 1983, with orders for
the year totalling about $562 million, compared to $194
million for 1982. This business included orders for 34 Sea
Kings (Britain and India), 12 Lynx, and 2 Westland 30s.
Deliveries for the year included 11 Sea Kings, 33 Lynxs , 5
Westland 30s and 22 Gazelles.
As a not insignificant footnote, Westland, in 1983,
established Westland Inc., as its U.S. office in Crystal
City, Virginia, completing the formal entry into the U.S.




Willy Messerschmidtt formed his aircraft company in
1923 in plenty of time to deliver the ME-109 of World War
II fame. A former Messerschmidtt employee, Dr. Ludwig
Boelkow, later founded his own company, developing, in 1964,
a hingeless rotor system with fibreglass rotor blades which
led to the prototype of the MBB Bo-105 in 1967. In 1968,
Boelkow and Messerschmidtt merged to become MB, and in 1969,
MB merged with Blohm's Hamburger Flugzenbau to become MBB,
thus making MBB the largest aerospace concern in Germany
with about 38,000 employees, of which about 3000 are in
helicopter activities [12:75].
The ownership of MBB is complex. It is a private
firm in organization, its stock not being traded on the
stock exchange. Stockholders include a variety of German
banking interests, the Messerschmidtt Foundation, the State
of Bavaria, a German holding company, and an industrial
holding company that includes Aerospatiale of France. Of
the total, 58 percent of shares is held by private industry
[12:76].
The MBB series of helicopters began with the Bo-102,
a non-flying trainer machine for the West German Army Air
Force in 1957. This was followed by the Bo-103, which
reached prototype flying stage in 1961, but did not go into
production, owing to the limited interest in single seat
helicopters, although the development gave MBB valuable ex-
perience in the construction of fibreglass blades [15:95].
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Using this experience, the Boelkow development team
commenced work on a hingeless rotor system in 1961. The
initial study was for a two seat agricultural helicopter
(designated the Bo-104), but this soon gave way to the five
seat Bo-105, which incorporated the technological advantages
of the hingeless rotor system and was the world's first
light helicopter to be powered by twin turbines. These
factors gave the Bo-105 real competitive potential. Spon-
sorship from the German Federal Ministries of Economics and
Defense (loans to be fully repayable upon commercial success)
was obtained, and work on the world's first light twin turbine
engined helicopter commenced [15:97].
The Bo-105 was developed with adaptability and com-
mercial use objectives, being certified to enter the American
market in April, 1970. In 1974, it was selected by the
German government as a light observation helicopter and a
year later won approval as Germany's first generation anti-
tank helicopter, designated the PAH-1.
The success of this aircraft in the international
civil market can be attributed to its twin engined flight
safety (it is marketed as the "twin jet"), reliability and
its multi-purpose concept. More than 50 optional kits are
available, making it readily convertible to off-shore oil
support, police and rescue missions, executive transport
and utility missions [15:98].
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Through 1983, MBB had produced 649 Bo-105 civil
variants, 189 Bo-105 VBH Army light observation helicopters,
and 152 Bo-105 PAH-1 helicopters, making it a successful
helicopter by any standards. Further development is planned
to widen its market applicability, particularly powerplant
development to increase its high altitude, hot temperature
use.
A milestone in MBB's helicopter history was estab-
lished in 19 83 with the market introduction of the MBB/
Kawasaki BK-117, a twin jet multi-purpose helicopter at the
top end of the light helicopter range (about 6,300 lbs.).
This was the result of a joint development venture which
had originally involved Boeing-Vertol , who withdrew from
discussions in 1975. From the outset, MBB and Kawasaki
Helicopters Inc. (KHI) agreed on a multi-purpose concept and
both contributed technical knowledge. Production is by the
single source method, whereby each company makes the parts
of its own design, and then exchanges parts to supply parallel
production lines (one at MBB and one at KHI in Japan) . The
aircraft is designed for maximum market appeal and is certi-
fied throughout most of the western world for a wide range
of civil uses (including that of passenger carriage in
scheduled airline service). The BK-117 offers more usable,
unobstructed space than any other helicopter in its class
and can carry 11 passengers in its high density configura-
tion [15:99]. Again, a wide range of optional equipment
kits is offered to suit a broad spectrum of missions.
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MBBs ' interests in the U.S. were handled by Boeing-
Vertol from 1972 until 1978 and during that time 68 3o-105s
were delivered to American customers. Boeing-Vertol ' s with-
drawal from this arrangement in 19 78 led to the formation,
in 1979, of a wholly owned subsidiary, MBB Helicopter Corpor-
ation (MBBHC) , in West Chester, Pennsylvania. MBBHC maintains
a complete inventory of spares and exchange components and
claims to be able to fill 98 percent of parts requests on
the same day. Strong customer support is provided through a
network of regional technical representatives, service stations
and component repair centers. MBB ' s aggressive entry into
North America continued in May, 1984, with the incorporation
in Canada of another MBB subsidiary, 9 5 percent owned by
MBB and 5 percent by Fleet Aerospace Corporation. Uniquely,
and perhaps ominously for the U.S. helicopter industry,
this subsidiary plans to be the first European firm to
manufacture helicopters (the Bo-105) in North America [12:76].
This firm will not, however, compete with MBBHC, but will
complement it, supplying Bo-105s to MBBHCs ' U.S. customers
as needed.
Meanwhile, in Europe, a long period of indecision
came to an end on May 29, 19 84, when the Ministers of Defense
for Germany and France signed a Memorandum of Understanding
that gives "systems leadership" responsibility to MBB and
"co-contractor" responsibility to Aerospatiale for the
production of the second generation Franco-German PAH-2
100
dedicated anti-tank helicopter. The two companies agreed
to set up a joint company, Eurocopter, headquartered in
Paris, to manage the program, which is expected to produce
about 400 helicopters for both companies. The co-operation
program consists of one basic design to satisfy the three
variant requirements (French scout, French anti-tank and
German anti-tank) . Deliveries should commence in about
1992 [12:82].
MBBs ' helicopter sales in 1981 amounted to $152
million, whilst sales for 1982 were $193 million. Total
worldwide sales of the Bo-105 are about 1040 (through
September, 1984), of which 156 have been sold in North > ,:'
America. MBB has determined that it will penetrate the
North American market and is emphasizing its product support
and distribution, its products technical attributes, twin
engined safety and wide ranging civil adaptability to enhance
its market share prospects.
4 . The Agusta Group
Giovanni Agusta commenced his interest in aviation
in 1907 when his efforts centered around the development of
a novel biplane design. During the early 1920s, the firm
specialized in fixed wing ultra light aircraft and sailplanes,
as well as developing a solid reputation as a subcontractor
for other manufacturers as a result of good quality work at
its plant at Casina Costa, Italy [16:67].
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Giovanni Agusta died in an accident in 1927, but his
family continued to operate the business. The firm matured,
and by 1951 was producing fixed wing aircraft (such as the
CP-110, a four place, 170 mph aircraft) that were considered
to be state-of-the-art at that time.
Domenico Agusta, the then president of Construzioni
Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta, brought helicopters into the
company's business portfolio in 1952 when he acquired a
license from the Bell Helicopter Company to produce the Bell
Model 47. The terms of the license included the right to
make Bell Model 4 7G parts for the European market. The
total production of the Bell 4 7 reached over 600 for the
period 1955 to 1973, when it ceased Agusta production.
By 1961, Agusta had commenced licensed production
of its first turbine aircraft, the AB-204, again under license
from Bell. This licensed version of the successful Bell-204
was followed by licensed production of the Bell-205 in 1965,
the Bell-206 Jet Ranger in 1966, and the legendary UH-1
series, the Bell 212. The AB-206 Jet Ranger has been pro-
duced in numbers exceeding 850 from 1967 to the present
time [12:76].
Similar licensing agreements with Sikorsky and
Boeing-Vertol brought licensed production of the Sikorsky
S-61, SH-3D, HH-3F models and the Boeing-Vertol CH-47C to
the Agusta plant in the period from 1967 to 1970 [16:67].
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Although all the four major European manufacturers received
American technology transfer, it can be seen that Agusta
carried the concept further than the others.
The first indigenously designed helicopter to be
produced was the A-IOIG. It was a three engined (turbine)
heavy lift transport helicopter designed for the Italian
Armed Forces. The helicopter first flew in October, 1964,
but never entered production, although three prototypes were
built and subsequently tested by the Italian Air Force.
[8:97]
The Agusta A-106 was a single seat light ASW heli-
copter that was produced in small numbers for the Italian
Navy. It was an original Agusta design, taking many design
features from the earlier piston engined Agusta experimental
helicopters (the A-103 and the A-104). Turbine powered,
it first flew in 1965 and was introduced to the market in
1969. Marketing efforts failed, the helicopter being one of
the few single seat helicopters ever to enter service, and
the 23 ASW variants built for the Italian Navy constituted
the total production [8:98].
Agusta used the many years of licensed production
and indigenous design experience to develop the Agusta A-109
Hirundo helicopter. This is a high speed, twin turbined,
eight place helicopter that competes more than favorably in
the light twin jet helicopter market. It has been developed
in the standard commercial configuration as well as
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experimental military and naval variants for evaluation by
the Italian Armed Forces. It is suitable in the civil field
for most of the desired functions, including executive
transport, off-shore operations, and ambulance operations.
Total sales of all A-109 models are reported to approach
300, an impressive figure considering that the first year of
significant market penetration was 1978, following its intro-
duction into service in 1977 [12:77].
Agusta used the A-109 dynamic components to develop
the A-129 Mongoose, the first European helicopter designed
specifically as an anti-tank helicopter. First deliveries
for the Italian Army are scheduled for 19 86 and the program
is reportedly on schedule [8:77],
Agusta estimates a worldwide requirement for about
1,000 light attack helicopters and is establishing a strong
marketing effort to ensure a viable market share. As with
other light attack helicopters, the emphasis is on heavy
armament and battle survivability [8:102].
Agusta has established two marketing organizations
in the U.S., the Agusta Aviation Corporation in Philadelphia
(commercial sales and product support) , and the Italian
Aircraft Corporation of Arlington, Virginia (military heli-
copters) . Agusta claims a twenty-four hour parts and service
availability in the U.S. and its latest commercial offering,
the 109 Mk II (one of the fastest light commercial helicopters
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available) is targeted specifically at the corporate execu-
tive and emergency medical service markets.
Agusta has manufactured over 4000 helicopters, and,
according to the Italian Aircraft Corporation, Agusta 1983
helicopter sales totalled 94 units at a value of $530 million
[12:77]. Agusta is now 80 percent owned by the Italian
government, with the remaining 20 percent being owned by
the Count Corrada Agusta, who serves as chairman of the
board.
D. SOVIET COMPETITIONS
Soviet helicopter technology had its roots in the decade
before the outbreak of the Second World War when the first
flightworthy Soviet helicopter was developed. Four Soviet
designers had a significant and lasting influence: Bratutchin,
Yakovlev, Kamov and Mil.
J. P. Bratutchin entered the Central Institute, ZAGI,
and from 1933 to 1939 headed the "helicopter brigade". In
1940 he took over the so-called OKB-3 (Test Design Bureau
No. 3) which developed a range of helicopter types, some of
which were produced in small numbers. This design bureau
ceased to exist in 1952, having designed and built the Omega
series of helicopters and their derivatives, the G-3 and G-4.
These aircraft never entered production, but a small number
of prototypes reached the flying stage. These led to the
design of the B-5, B-9 , B-10 and the only design to reach
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flight test stage, the B-11. Problems of excessive vibration
could not be cured, and after a fatal crash in 1948, the
program was cancelled in May 1950 and the Bratutchin 0KB was
disbanded the following year [7:149],
A. S. Yakovlev started the construction of his first
experimental helicopter in 1944, featuring a co-axial rotor
system, a concept later adopted by Kamov. While test flying
was in progress in 1947, the first state request for tenders
for a light helicopter was issued, leading to the first flight
of the Yak-100 in November 1948 and recognition by the State
Acceptance Commission of suitability for series production
in the summer of 1950 [17:1310]. The Yak-100 was copied
from the Sikorsky S-51, however, the Mi-1, of the Mil design
bureau was competing with Yakovlev and, because of its superior
performance, was selected for production over the Yak-100.
In 1951, Yakovlev was tasked to develop a heavy transport
helicopter, intended to gain a lead over Anglo-U.S. helicopter
construction. This program was only partially successful,
with the tandem rotor design experiencing technical problems
and being terminated after the production of only 40 units
[17:1311].
N. J. Kamov started work on helicopters in the 1920s.
Before and during the Second World War, Kamov headed the
"design brigade" in ZAGI . In 1945, he started to build the
Ka-8 light helicopter, based on the Yak co-axial design.
This work led him to form his own design bureau. His first
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production aircraft was the Ka-15, developed for the Soviet
Navy as a light, two place utility helicopter which entered
service in 1955. It was mass produced in large numbers for
the Navy, and for civil applications as the Ka-15M. This
success led to the Ka-18, larger and more powerful than the
Ka-15, that commenced series production in 1956. This in
turn led to the turbine powered Ka-20, a prototype for the
Ka-25 ASW and missile targeting helicopter that has been the
mainstay of the Soviet Navy's ship based helicopter fleet
since the 1960s [17:1311, 8:114].
Closely linked to the success of Soviet helicopters is
N. L. Mil who headed an independent design bureau from 1947
onwards. His first helicopter, the Mi-1 won the light heli-
copter competition against the Yak-100. The Mi-1 success
led to the larger commando transport Mi-4 , which after some
initial technical problems entered service in 1953 and was
produced in very large numbers (exceeding 5000). It has
been used by both the military and the civil markets. Apart
from specialized equipment, the military and civil versions
are identical. They have been exported to almost every
country that has received military assistance from the Soviet
Union and to the Warsaw Pact nations [8:125].
In 1957, the Mi-6 was the largest operational helicopter
in the world. Some 800 were subsequently completed for civil
and military use, the civil versions being used in fire
fighting, flying crane, passenger and general lift cargo
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operations. These aircraft led to a stream of successful
aircraft, including the Mi-8 (the most numerous Soviet
helicopter, that entered service in 1967 and seeing vast
service worldwide), the Mi-10 (60,000 lbs. heavy lift heli-
copter) , the Mi-14 (shore based ASW derivative of the Mi-8
and introduced in 1975), the Mi-24 (the first true assault
helicopter to be developed by the Soviet Union, and designed
to be offensive in a hostile air/land battle environment
and introduced in 1972) , and the Mi-26 (at maximum gross
weight of 123,000 lbs., the world's largest heavy lift
helicopter)
.
Since the early 1950s, the helicopter has been widely
used by both the military and civil sectors as a means of
transport in Russia, particularly in those regions having
long periods of adverse weather where the helicopter is
often the only functioning means of transport. As a result,
the number of helicopters operated by Aeroflot is almost as
large as the military inventory, with the helicopters of the
two fleets having almost the same configuration. The large
production runs make for economies of scale and unit costs
are about one-fourth those of comparable western helicopters.
This advantage is offset by the Soviet practice of return-
ing equipment for complete renovation after three overhauls,
leading to high operating costs [17:1314].
In addition, the Soviets are proving to be difficult
competitors, especially in the heavy helicopter field,
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through their ability to grant financing terms that their
western counterparts cannot match [18:344].
E. OTHER U.S. COMPETITORS
1. Kaman Corporation
The Kaman Corporation was founded as Kaman Aircraft
in 1945. Over the years Kaman has developed into a widely
diversified company. Kaman has a broad expertise in rotary
wing technology and is currently producing the SH-2F ASW
helicopter for the U.S. Navy. Kaman also produces composite
rotor blades for the U.S. Army's AH-1 Cobra and major sub-
assemblies for the Sikorsky civil S-76 helicopter. Kaman is
potentially a significant force as a sub-contractor in the
current JVX and LHX military helicopter programs. '
2. Robinson Helicopter Inc.
The Robinson Helicopter Company was formed in 19 73
to produce light civil helicopters. Current production is
restricted to one model, the R-22, an ultra light, low cost,
two place helicopter that has established a strong position
as the prime civil trainer helicopter.
3. The Enstrom Helicopter Corporation
The R. J. Enstrom Helicopter Corporation was formed
in 1959 to develop a light helicopter, leading to the Enstrom
F-28 (first produced in 1966 and achieving a production run
of 537 through 1983). In 1968, the company was acquired by
the Purex Corporation. The Purex shares were acquired by
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F. Lee Bailey in 1971. These shares were purchased by Bravo
Investments BV of the Netherlands, the current owner of
Enstrom, in 1980. Current production is the F-28, and the
F-280 light civil helicopters [14:42].
4. Hiller Aviation, Inc.
Hiller Aviation was formed in January, 1973 by acquir-
ing the design rights, production tooling, and spares of the
Hiller 12E light piston engined helicopter from Fairchild
Industries. Initially, the company provided support for
the Hiller UH-12 (commercial designation Hiller 360) which
had been produced in numbers amounting to 2,530 units up to
1983. In 1980, Hiller purchased all rights in the produc-
tion of the FH-1100 turbine light helicopter from Fairchild
Industries and delivered their first model in late 1981
[14:42].
In January, 1984, Hiller filed for protection under
Chapter 11 of the Federal bankruptcy regulations, having
failed to achieve satisfactory sales in the generally declin-
ing civil market [19:26].
Subsequently, the assets of Hiller Aviation were
purchased by the Rogerson Corporation of California, with
activities continuing under the name of Hiller Helicopters,
as a Rogerson subsidiary, with deliveries of the UH-12 expected
to commence in July, 1984, and the FH-1100 in January, 1985
(at production rates of one and a half, and one per month,
respectively). [2:6]
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5 . Hynes Helicopter Inc.
Brantly Helicopters began commercial deliveries of
its B-2 helicopters in 1959. From 1966 to 1968, Brantly was
an independent division of Lear Jet Industries. The firm's
type certificates, tooling and parts were bought by Michael
K. Hynes in May 1971. This new corporation, the Brantly-
Hynes Corporation, was involved in the reconditioning of
Brantly helicopters, spare parts manufacture, operation of
a flight school and the resale and servicing of used helicopters
Hynes now has available the H-2 and H-5 series (two,
three and five place turbo-piston, and jet-engine five-place
twin-jet models in the light weight range)
.
F. SOME COMPETITORS WHO DID NOT SURVIVE
1. Competitive Situation in 1945
When the war ended in August, 1945, the U.S. heli-
copter industry consisted of four major competitors. Sikorsky
had already produced 580 R4 , R5 and R6 helicopters. Bell
was just completing its third prototype, the Model 30 (the
first prototype of the Bell Model 47) . Piasecki was flying
the PV-3, the tandem rotor forerunner of the U.S. Navy HRP-1
"flying banana". Hiller had developed the first co-axial
helicopter in the United States, the XH-44. Several other
firms, including Platt-LePlage , Kellet, Bendix, Firestone
and GCA were developing prototypes. Sikorsky, Bell, Piasecki,
Hiller, and later, Kaman survived. The other firms either
disappeared or stopped their helicopter activities [7:154].
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2. Platt-LePage
The Army Air Corps, after their contract with Platt-
LePage for the XR-1 in 1940, wanted a larger machine in 1944.
Platt-LePage proposed a twin engined machine, twice as big
as the XR-1 but lost the contract to Reliefs XR-10. McDon-
nell absorbed Platt-LePage in the latter part of 1945 and
developed the Platt-LePage losing design as the XHJD-1 for
the Navy as an experimental ASW helicopter. The aircraft
had significant control and stability problems. Flights with
the XHJD-1 continued until 1950, including some hoist rescue
tests in November, 1949 by the Arctic Rescue Helicopter
Evaluation Board. The McDonnell Company eventually proposed
the Model 65C, but were unable to win a contract and the
project was abandoned [7:155].
3. Bendix
Bendix was created in 1944 and built an aircraft
with two co-axial rotors, the K model, which flew in June,
1945, as an experimental model. They subsequently developed
and flew the larger five place co-axial J model in 1947. In
anticipation of rapid development and commercialization, Bendix
built a 10,000 square meter factory in Stratford,, Connecticut,
for production of 200 units per month. In 1947, Bendix ran
into serious financial problems and the Model J prototype
was destroyed in a crash. The company changed hands in 1948,
becoming Helicopter Inc. Later, the firm was acquired by
Gyrodyne Co. of America [7:156].
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4.
Gyrodyne Company of America (GCA)
GCA was created in 1946 and bought the five place
Model J from Helicopters Inc. They also built a number of
experimental compound helicopters, but finally developed the
XRON-1, a single seat "aerial motorbike" for the U.S. Navy.
The program was not commercially successful and the compa-
ny's only significant production was the QH-50 unmanned Drone
Antisubmarine Helicopter (DASH) for the U.S. Na-^/y.
5. Kellet
Kellet produced their first helicopter, the XR-8 in
1944. They then produced the ZR-10, the first U.S. effort
at developing a tv;in engined helicopter in 1947. Failure
to v/in significant military contracts, untimely deaths, and
financial difficulties led Kellet to give up its helicopter
activities in 1951. Part of the solution to Kellet 's finan-
cial problems was the sale of the Kellet XH-17 (a military
heavy lift requirement) project, to Howard Hughes in 1949.
The aircraft became the Hughes ZH-17, and though unsuccessful
in its ov;n right, it allowed Hughes Helicopters to enter the
industry. Hughes Helicopters is now one of the four major
U.S. manufacturers [7:156].
6 Firestone
The Firestone Company built the XR-9 for the ".£.
Army in 1945. Developed as a battlefield liaison helicopter,
it led to a civil version, the ZR-9E, v;hich was never certified.
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This was followed by the Model XR-14, a larger twin seat
helicopter which flew in 1946. Firestone was unable to win
any military production contracts and stopped doing business




Doman Helicopter Inc. was formed on August 31, 1945.
After early efforts with the LZ-lA and the LZ-4, the Doman
LZ-5 (an eight place utility helicopter) was evaluated by
the U.S. Army as the YH-31 in 1953. The military version
was unsuccessful and the company had limited success with
its commercial LZ-5, with a production run of 60. Doman
then proposed the LA-5 in Europe and despite evaluation by
the Marcel Dassault Company in France in 1956—57, was again
unable to win contracts. Doman Inc. ceased doing business
in 1961 [7:186].
8. Seibel-Cessna
Charles Seibel started his own company in 1946 after
leaving Bell Aircraft. He developed several small helicopters,
intended for the U.S. Army, but was unable to win military
contracts or civil business and in 1951, he became the
General Manager of the Helicopter department created by Cessna.
There he designed the Cessna CH-1 Seneca, which obtained
civil certification in 1951. Despite breaking several alti-




The Rotorcraft Company obtained a U.S. Army contract
to develop a tandem twin seat helicopter called the XR-11.
The aircraft flew in 1948 but crashed in October that year.





Other U.S. companies that attempted unsuccessfully
to enter the helicopter business included the Hoppi-Copter
Inc. (created in 1945), De Lackner Helicopter Company (created
in 1945), the American Helicopter Company (created in 1947),
Jenson (created in 1948), the Helicopter Engineering Research
Corporation (created in 1948) , Benson (created in 1953) ,
and Convertawings Inc. (created in 1954).
All these companies were unable to convert their
designs to successful production. The most significant
contribution to their failure was their inability to win
military contracts.
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V. DEVELOPMENT OF THE HELICOPTER ENGINE
A. INTRODUCTION
In the 1480s, Leonardo da Vinci's efforts to achieve
flight with his clockwork-powered helix failed, partly due
to lack of power. In the early 1800s Sir George Cayley
failed to generate enough power to fly his helicopter design.
Many other early attempts at vertical flight shared this
common drawback, i.e., lack of a suitable source of propulsion,
In 190 3, the Wright brothers dramatically proved that
man could, with adequate power, fly in a heavier-than-air
vehicle. Five years later, in 1908, Louis Breguet, from
France, achieved vertical flight in a powered helicopter.
Sikorsky's first attempts in Russia in 1909 also failed.
His attempt flew, but without a pilot. Again, the limiting
factor was the lack of power. In 1921, the de Bothezat
helicopter, powered by a 180 hp LeRhone engine became what
many consider to be the first successful helicopter, but the
Army cancelled what was its first attempt to develop a mili-
tary helicopter.
Vertical flight in the 1920s and the 1930s was marked
by the successful development of the autogiro. These free
wheeling rotor aircraft used conventional piston aircraft
engines (up to 160 hp) for forward power. Not requiring
power for vertical lift, these simple aircraft did not suffer
the same power restrictions as the genuine helicopter.
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B. PISTON ENGINES
All the early successful helicopter pioneers, Louis
Breguet of France, Igor Sikorsky of the United States,
Henrich Focke and Anton Flettner of Germany, recognized
that, with the arrival of more powerful piston engines,
rotary winged aircraft could become practical for military
and civil use. They each used a common source of power,
the air-cooled reciprocating engine, this being considerably
lighter than the water-cooled engine. Air cooled engines
were mechanically less complex and also less vulnerable to
ground fire (when used in the military role)
.
In Europe in the 1930s, a number of designs successfully
incorporated larger* piston engines into helicopters, but
the power-to-weight ratio continued to delay the progress
towards a helicopter capable of being put into full produc-
tion. This was not to occur until Igor Sikorsky successfully
installed a 75 hp engine in his VS-300 prototype in 1939.
Whilst this aircraft was underpowered, it was sufficiently
successful to convince the U.S. Army to fund further develop-
ment, leading to the more powerful XR-4. Wartime requirements
and advancing technology led to the relatively rapid develop-
ment of even more powerful and successful piston engines
that were installed in the Sikorsky XR-4 in 1943, the Sikorsky
S-55 in 1945, the Bell 47G in 1949, and the Piasecki H-21
in 1952.
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Although piston engine power increased by a factor of
seven between the mid 1930s and the early 1950s, the designers
of helicopters continued to be aware that the practical
development of rotary wing craft was essentially constrained
by engine size, weight, and total power output [1:119].
The advent of the Korean War saw the introduction of the
helicopter into real military service, demonstrating only
too well the applications of the helicopter to tactical and
logistic roles. But the power plant problem continued to
plague the designers. The quest for more power resulted in
heavier engines which required more space, which in turn
required a heavier airframe, which led to a further require-
ment for extra power. As the power levels increased so did
the level of airframe vibration, a highly undesirable side
effect for helicopters. Helicopters were still, at that time,
unable to carry anything other than a very small pay load.
C. FIRST GENERATION TURBINE ENGINES
The end of this frustration was in sight in the mid
1950s, however, and helicopters entered a new generation
following the successful results of propulsion development
derived from more than thirty years of experience with piston
engine turbo-superchargers. The gas turbine engine produced
by this development was proved in fixed wing aircraft during
and after World War II, offering the additive advantages of
increased power and reduced weight. The helicopter engine
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designer faced the challenge of harnessing this engine power,
the result being the gas turbine turboshaft, with a shaft
geared from the turbine rotor to the helicopter rotor. This
event was reported, in 1955, to be a "spur to the helicopter"
[21:1]. This Wall Street Journal article recognized that
the new engine could reduce helicopter operating costs (at
that time a significant factor restraining helicopter com-
mercialization)
, add to helicopter safety (through the ability
to use twin lightweight engines), and significantly increase
helicopter performance capability.
In addition, gas turbines ran more efficiently at high
power, (the normal operating environment of the helicopter),
and were more reliable, having less moving parts. The net
result was the ability to achieve both a significant increase
in helicopter pay load, and a better, more reliable, more
fuel efficient engine.
In the early 1950s, U.S. gas turbines were installed in
the Kaman-225 (which made the first gas-turbine-powered
helicopter flight in history) and the Kaman HTK-1, a Synchropter,
The French, however, made history with the world's first
turbine powered helicopter to be produced in quantity, the
SNCASE 3130 Alouette II, which flew in March 1955, powered
by the 400 hp Turbomeca Artouste II engine, and which con-
tinued in production for twenty years.
In the U.S., General Electric, the Allison Division of
General Motors, Lycoming, and Pratt and Whitney (Canada)
119
became the dominant producers of gas turbines for helicopters,
whilst in Europe, Bristol-Siddely , Rolls-Royce, and Fiat were
heavily involved. The gas turbine led to the highly successful
second generation of military and civil helicopters.
The Bell UH-1 Huey was the first significant U.S. turbine
success, being powered by the Lycoming T-5 3 engine that
eventually had a production run of more than 17,000 units.
In 1960, Lycoming was successful in powering the Boeing-
Vertol CH-47 Chinook helicopter with the 2,200 shp T-55
engine.
Allison achieved success with its 250 hp T-63 turbo-shaft
engine, first developed in 1958, and subsequently installed
in a wide range of light observation helicopters and small
civil helicopters.
Pratt and Whitney of Canada developed the PT6 family of
small gas turbines in 1964, ranging from 1,020 shp to 1,875
shp. Its unique PT6-T Twin Pac (a twin engine single drive
unit) is widely used in many applications. [1:123]
General Electric (G.E.), after considerable experience
in direct power derived from gas turbines for land based
applications, responded to a 1952 U.S. Air Force request
for proposals for the development of a 600 hp helicopter gas
turbine engine. The contract was awarded to Lycoming, but




A Navy contract award to G.E. for the development of an
800 shp turbo-shaft engine led to the successful T-58 (weigh-
ing only 250 lbs. but producing 1,050 shp), with a dramatic
4.2 to 1 power-to-weight ratio, compared to the early piston
engines that weighed more than their power output [1:125].
The T-58 was successfully tested in 1955 and first flew in
a Sikorsky S-58 in February 1957.
Sikorsky also recognized the potential for gas turbine
powered helicopters and designed the highly successful HSS-1
(commercial variant, S-61) around the T-58. The T-58 has
subsequently been continually modified to meet a variety of
applications. Power output increased from 1050 shp to 1870
shp, whilst weight went from 250 lbs. to only 443 lbs. and
the specific fuel consumption (fuel used as a ratio of power
output) was reduced by 20 percent. The T-58's commercial
derivative, the CT-58, was the first U.S. gas turbine to
achieve civil certification in July 1959.
D. SECOND GENERATION TURBINE ENGINES
In the late 1950s, and sponsored by the U.S. Navy, G.E.
commenced a development program that led to the T-64, which
powers the Sikorsky CH-53 family of heavy lift helicopters,
as well as Short Take Off and Landing (STOL) aircraft and
conventional fixed wing aircraft. Newer models of the T-64
produced 4,855 shp but, through advancing technology, the
specific fuel consumption and weight figures have both been
reduced.
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E. THIRD GENERATION TURBINE ENGINES
During the Vietnam experience, the U.S. Army saw a need
for a new generation of helicopters and engines, and, in
1967, funded a competitive program for the development of a
new, lightweight, fuel efficient, low maintenance turbo-shaft
engine. The competition was won by G. E. in 1972, leading
to the development of the T-700 which powers the Sikorsky
UH-60A Black Hawk, SH-60B Seahawk, and HH-60H Night Hawk
;
the Hughes AH-64 Apache; the Bell AH-IT Cobra; and several
international aircraft [1:127]. G. E. was awarded a produc-
tion contract for 1554 T-700 engines in 1983. This govern-
ment funded research and development led in turn to the
development of a civil derivative, the CT-7, which has been
certified in both the U.S. and Europe. The CT-7 was selected
to power the Bell 214 ST and the Westland 30-200 civil heli-
copters in the early 1980s.
The rapid development of the gas turbine engine has, to
a great extent, driven the evolution of the helicopter
industry. The engine milestones have permitted the helicopter
to transition from one generation to the next and the con-
tinued technological improvement against the commonly accepted
measurement criteria of fuel efficiency, maintainability and
reliability, and weight has permitted an ever increasing
spectrum of civil and military uses and capabilities. For
example, helicopters can now be used in a wide range of
temperature and altitude conditions, from freezing cold icing
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conditions to hot and high mountainous conditions; operating
costs are decreasing, making transportation and public service
more viable; and speed has increased, spurring one of the
emerging markets, the air ambulance.
As in the case of airframe technology, the government
has played a key role in advancing engine technology, through
its funding of military development programs.
F. CURRENT ENGINE PROGRAMS
The involvement of the government is being continued
with research and development programs sponsored jointly by
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and
the U.S. Army's Aviation Systems Command (AVSCOM) . These
are the advanced compound turbine diesel engines, the 5000
shp modern technology demonstrator engine (MTDE) , destined
for the Bell/Boeing Joint Services Vertical Lift (JVX) pro-
gram, and the 800-1, 200 shp Advanced Technology Demonstrator
Engine (ATDE) destined for the Army's proposed LHX family of
light helicopters.
The Army narrowed the MTDE development competition to
the General Electric G. E. 27 and the Pratt and Whitney PW3005
turbo-shaft engines in 1983. Development is expected to be
completed in mid 1987, with full scale engineering develop-
ment of the winning design to be completed in 1990. The
first flight of the JVX, scheduled for mid 1987 will be with
an interim power plant, the G. E. T64 [20:117].
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The Army's increased emphasis in the development of the
LHX family of helicopters elevated the importance of the
ATDE program. Two configurations, the AVCO Lycoming PLT34A
and the Detroit Diesel Allison GMA500 turbo-shaft engines
were tested in the development phase, completed in 19 81.
The ultimate performance requirements of the ATDE engines
will have to wait until the Army decides on the required
speed range of the LHX, according to the deputy chairman of
the LHX trade-off determination board, but:
the engine must be able to adapt to different vehicle
configurations that include conventional helicopter,
rigid rotor and tilt-rotor designs. Top speeds from
180-300 knots are still under consideration at this
time for the LHX. [21:123]
Engineering development for a production ATDE engine is
scheduled to begin early in Fiscal Year 19 85. The Army's
intention is to compete 40 percent of the LHX program, and
following a competitive teaming arrangement for development,
to qualify two sources, commencing with the first production
buy. [22:64]
With the Army forecasts indicating a requirement for at
least 5,000 LHX vehicles, the program ensures long term
production of the winning engine design, with opportunity
for the development of very cost competitive turbo-shaft and
turbo-prop versions for the commercial market [20:123].
Whilst not formally reported, it appears that the two
teams for development may be Allison/Garrett and PW Canada/
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Lycoming. A possible foreign entrant may include a version
of the Turbomeca TM333, marketed in the U.S. by the General
Electric Company. [20:123]
While the Western World's market for high power engines
is basically shared between four companies, there are eight
manufacturers competing in the medium power turbo-prop/
turbo-shaft field (i.e., 500-2,500 shp) . Supplier/customer
relations have tended to become established along national
lines, with Turbomeca supplying Aerospatiale, Rolls Royce
supplying Westland and U.S. manufacturers in general relying
on the American engine makers. Allison's Model 250 has
dominated the light end 400-500 shp market, due in large
part to large orders from the U.S. military which allowed
the company to break into the civil market with hard to beat
prices [23:1000].
This segment of the engine industry has some complica-
tions. Unlike the big engine industry, they do not share
that industry's economies of scale. The price that can be
charged for an engine is largely a function of its size, but
this relationship does not hold for new engine development.
This requires a substantial re-investment of sales to research
and development (higher than the industry norm) and makes
the contribution of military development funding crucial.
[23:1000]
In Europe, advanced European helicopter turbo-shaft equip-
ment programs are focused on developing more powerful, lighter
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engines. Many of these new engines are being developed
under multinational programs to meet the political and
industrial requirements of their parent joint helicopter
programs, thus allowing producers to share the technical
tasks and financial costs.
These programs involve arrangements between Turbomeca
and Rolls Royce, Turbomeca and Motoren and Turbinen Union
(MTU) , and Turbomeca as a sole developer. Work is focused,
as in the U.S., on improving engine fuel efficiency, increasing
the use of electronic engine controls, decreasing the number
of engine components and upgrading maintainability [23:125].
In the United Kingdom, Rolls Royce is also running four
demonstrator engine programs to provide the technology needed
for helicopter developments in the late 1980s and 1990s.
Two of these are with Turbomeca, and the other two funded
by the British Department of Trade and Industry [20:125].
The early pioneers, da Vinci, Cay ley, Breguet and de
Bothezat all experienced the limiting factor of power, which
prevented them from lifting a helicopter off the ground with
a profitable payload. The gas turbine removed that constraint
and the turbo-shaft helicopter now performs useful work at




Little more than 40 years after Sikorsky and Focke
Achgelis first made helicopters that worked, the machine is
beginning to attain a level of technological development in
which it can respond to customers' specific requirements.
Up until recently, the military customer has taken the best
the manufacturer could provide, and the civil operator has
made do with civilianized versions of the military helicopters
Hence the Sikorsky S-61, the Boeing-Vertol 234, the Bell
205, the Bell Jet Ranger and Long Ranger, and the Hughes
500E, to name but a few. Four notable exceptions are the
Agusta 109, the Aerospatiale Ecureuil, the Sikorsky S-76,
and the Bell 222, all specifically designed for civil markets.
But the helicopter is still a weakling by the standards of
the fixed wing industry, struggling to reach a comparable
level of dependability and simplicity of operation. [24:523]
This chapter will address some of the main differences
between the European and American approaches to helicopter
technological development. Much of the material has been
drawn from a report prepared under the auspices of the AIAA
by representatives of the four major U.S. helicopter
manufacturers. [Ref. 14]
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B. COMMERCIAL VS MILITARY DEVELOPMENT CYCLES
The development of a new helicopter model is both expen-
sive and time-consuming. New models are generally introduced
about every 15 years. Between models, companies generally
improve existing models through incremental modifications
to discrete parts of the helicopter. These may be manifested
either as new "derivative" models, or as upgrade kits to
existing models. In this way, high start-up costs are
recouped, and companies are better placed to respond to a
quickly changing market.
When a new helicopter is designed, the first step is the
development of the design specification, followed by engi-
neering development, where the design is prepared for quantity
production. For civilian helicopters, company test plan,
and flight programs are approved by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) . The FAA must also certify the heli-
copter before any civil sales can be made [14:19].
Military helicopters are more expensive to develop than
civil helicopters and require a much longer development
cycle. Contributing factors are the greater sophistication
of military requirements, the more rigorous nature of mili-
tary specifications, the requirement for more stringent test
and evaluation, and the inevitable time penalty of the
government competitive selection, approval, and funding
process. These factors can cause a military program to
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stretch out to 8 to 10 years, whereas a comparable civil
development program may only take 4 to 5 years. [l4:20]
As previously stated, most helicopter development in the
U.S. has had military origins, and it is widely apparent in
the published literature that the U.S. helicopter industry
considers itself disadvantaged with respect to the European
industry because of this fact.
C. U.S. VS EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACHES
Any helicopter manufacturer must remain abreast of tech-
nology advances in order to retain or improve market share.
The technology intensive nature of the industry demands the
expenditure of large sums of money to advance the state-of-
the-art. History has shown that, in general, major technolo-
gical advances have been brought about by military funding
and that these technologies have been incorporated into
commercial models at a later date. Most of the successful
commercial helicopters have their roots in a military funded
program. In the seventies, largely as a result of the expand-
ing civil market, particularly in the commercial oil explora-
tion segments, U.S. manufacturers, for the first time,
developed specific commercial designs (the Bell 222 and the
Sikorsky S-76). Whilst these development programs used
company funds, they incorporated technology that had been
developed and funded in previous military programs. [14: 21]
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Military and civil programs have a fundamental differ-
ence relating to program and business risk and it is this
difference that makes incremental improvement built on mili-
tary funded technology a necessity for commercial programs.
For commercial programs, a company is faced with beginning
an expensive development program, with an uncertain and
fickle market projection extending 20 years into the future.
As a result, industry funded commercial programs are driven
to shorter development lead times and the use of concurrent
rather than advanced technology [14: 21].
The AIAA report on the U.S. helicopter industry stated
that:
....the objective of government-funded programs is to
advance the state-of-the-art, while the objective of
commercial programs is to reduce these advances into
economical practice and achieve rapid introduction to
the commercial market place. [14: 21]
The European helicopter industry is fundamentally differ-
ent from the U.S. industry. Each European company is a
heavily subsidized sole source supplier to its own govern-
ment, heavily dependent on exports for survival, and particu-
larly heavily dependent on civil exports. The U.S. dependence
on exports has not been so heavily pronounced, with the
preponderance of U.S. military orders, but the civil market
and the export market is becoming increasingly important.
A key difference is that in the United States, there are four
major manufacturers who must compete for all requirements.
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Whilst this protracted military competition is occurring
in the United States, the technology is also available to
overseas manufacturers through the relatively liberal
dissemination of research results by the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) . The European dependence on
civil exports, combined with government objectives of full
employment and industrial development, has led to a much
greater awareness of the need to develop helicopters with
the civil market in mind and results in the American developed
technology being fielded in European civil helicopters before
it is able to be fielded in U.S. civil helicopters. This
technology transfer also permits the European companies to
concentrate their Research and Development (R and D) efforts
on specific and fruitful areas of key technology, such as
composite structures. [14: 21]
Whilst the European manufacturers are recognizing civil
requirements in their initial designs and designing specifi-
cally for the civil market (e.g., the Aerospatiale Ecureuil,
the Agusta A-109, and the MBB-Bo-105), a reverse trend is
occurring in the United States. In the past, military tech-
nology was relatively easily transferred into commercial
models. In recent years, however, military requirements
have become so specialized that the designs are not incorpor-
ating the qualities required for commercial success. Military
requirements are stressing survivability, low life-cycle
cost, stealth, and maneuverability, leading to highly
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specialized and expensive helicopters such as the Sikorsky
UH-60A Black Hawk and the Hughes AH-64 Apache. In contrast,
the commercial buyer is demanding reliability, safety,
comfort, low acquisition costs, and productivity [14:22].
These factors are making it increasingly difficult for U.S.
manufacturers, who are optimizing their designs to win U.S.
military competitions, to compete against the civil oriented
designs of the foreign competitors.
D. FUNDING OF HELICOPTER DEVELOPMENT
U.S. helicopter development requires a substantial invest-
ment of R and D funds. In terms of direct funding, the
military development programs are the major recipient, with
very little, if any, direct funding provided to commercial
programs. A company can benefit in one of two ways. The
government can provide direct funding support in the form
of direct dollars for rotorcraft technology development
contracts. The bulk of these funds are provided for U.S.
Army and Navy development programs (such as the Navy/Marine
Corps JVX program and the Army LHX program) . Each of these
sources has provided more funds for rotorcraft R and D than
has the NASA budget over the six-year period from 197S. It
is apparent from Table 2 that the U.S. Army has been the
primary sponsor of military funding for rotorcraft technology
development over this period.
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TABLE 2
U.S. ARMY/NAVY RDT & E - HELICOPTERS
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83
CURRENT DOLLARS
303.1 293.3 291.6 298.1 290.2ARMY 327.7
NAVY 4.0 113.0 224.0 154.0 95.0 50.0
CONSTANT DOLLARS (1)
ARMY 205.0 179.4 163.9 152.6 138.8 149.3
NAVY 2.7 69.1 125.9 78.8 45.4 22.8
(1) Fiscal Year GNP Deflator
A company may elect to conduct Independent Research and
Development (IR and D) . U.S. manufacturers can recoup some
of their R and D investment in commercial programs if the
technology has military potential. The government may allo-
cate a certain percentage of the company's self-initiated and
self-funded IR and D to products and services sold to the
government in the year of incurring those costs, the amount
of allocation being a negotiated percentage of the firm's
approved IR and D program. Significantly, if the firm has
no ongoing program with the DoD in that year, no IR and D
cost allocation is possible. This latter factor makes it
important for a company to have defense contracts in order
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to recoup such expenses. From 1974 to 1980, the portion of
IR and D allocated to all DoD contracts fell from 40 percent
to 30 percent, whilst the figure has increased to 38 percent
in 1982. In general, this means that for each IR and D dollar
charged to defense contracts (in 1982), $2.65 of contractor
IR and D was performed, i.e., defense contractors must
invest in R and D out of profits or commercial sales to main-
tain their technological position. [14:22]
Both American and European governments fund Research and
Technology (R and T) by providing funds to research activi-
ties. A comparison of U.S. and European funding is provided
in Table 3, revealing that the total level of funding is
similar.
TABLE 3
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The major recipient of such funding is NASA. Even though
NASA's individual budget is larger, the European R and D
contribution is comparable. Observing that any technology
transfer has historically (with few exceptions) been one way
from the U.S. to Europe, the European community has benefited
from U.S. funded R and D and so their total available R and
support may well exceed the U.S. -funded R and D. The trans-
fer of substantial R and D technology (through licensing,
co-production, and offset agreements) permits the European
research community to focus on commercially beneficial
research areas such as fuel efficiency and maintenance
reduction, giving the European manufacturers a further
advantage in civil helicopter development.
NASA's R and T budget since 1978 is shown in Table 4.
In real terms, aeronautics R and T funding increased between
1978 and 1980, decreased in 1981 and 1982, and improved
again in the 1983 and 1984 estimates. In percentage terms,
the NASA rotorcraft R and T funding increased from 7 percent
of the total agency aeronautical funding in FY 1978 to 17
percent in the proposed FY 1984 budget. The FY 1984 budget
is double the FY 1978 budget in real terms, primarily as a
result of the emphasis on advanced technology projects, such




NASA RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT BUDGET AUTHORITY
AND THE AERONAUTICAL COMPONENT
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)




TOTAL NASA 3102 3477 4088 4336 4738 5543 5709
R&D
AERONAUTICS
R&T 228 264 308 271 265 280 300
ROTORCRAFT




R&D 2064 2127 2298 2220 2266 2525 2469
AERONAUTICS
R&T 152 161 173 139 127 128 130
ROTORCRAFT
R&T 11 13 18 16 20 20 22
(1) Estimate
(2) Fiscal Year GNP Deflator
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E. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ISSUES
A prevailing theme through much of the literature has
been the view that the U.S. helicopter industry is threatened
by the liberal approach of the U.S. Government to the question
of technology transfer. As shown earlier in this thesis,
every major European helicopter manufacturer was connected
in some way (either by licensing agreements, co-production,
or off-set agreements) with the U.S. helicopter industry.
There is no question that the European industry was able to
take advantage of the U.S. preoccupation with its commitment
to the Vietnam conflict and to use licensed American tech-
nology to work its way down the learning curve. Allegations
have been made by American manufacturers, associations, and
writers close to the helicopter industry that the European
manufacturers enjoy an unfair advantage in the market place.
The alleged advantages include the view that U.S. industry
and the U.S. Government are too open with respect to sharing
technical data of a non-sensitive military nature with other
countries and companies, leading to a reduction of R and D
costs and development periods. [12:72]
Technology dissemination has always been encouraged by
the United States through professional societies and forums.
The U.S. helicopter industry, however, has expressed concern
over the "much more intimate dissemination" taking place as
a result of government-to-government Memoranda of Understand-
ing (MOUs) . These MOUs are intended to eliminate NATO system
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development effort duplication (with its consequent resource
wastage) . The MOUs provide for government-to-government
technology exchange agreements in order to share the common
military technology base. The U.S. industry claim is that
while these MOUs originated to facilitate the exchange of
information in highly specialized technical areas, they have
in reality, often been vaguely defined and broadly interpreted,
Since the data concerned is applicable in general, to both
military and commercial applications, the technology trans-
ferred via MOUs is transferred to the European civil heli-
copter technology base (since European helicopter development
centers are contained largely within nationalized companies).
This technology transfer process, it is claimed, has permitted
the Europeans to concentrate research efforts in key areas
(where good returns are indicated) whilst relying on U.S.
technology to provide broad-based technology advances. The
U.S. industry is concerned more with basic research than with
developed technology since it is the basic research of today
that provides the competitive advantage of tomorrow [14:25].
U.S. manufacturers have found that, if they are to sell
helicopters overseas, they must be prepared to commit to
licensing, co-production, or co-operative efforts. By this
method, many overseas countries are demanding the transfer
of technology in order to develop organic manufacturing
capabilities and helicopter technology. In this way manu-
facturing is gradually diffusing away from the high-technology
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countries and the traditional aerospace manufacturing
companies. [24:526]
As previously stated, the European industry has achieved
success partly as a result of many bilateral MOUs and tech-
nology transfer agreements between the U.S. and Europe. A
more recent development has been the growth of technology
transfer within Europe, as evidenced by the ever-increasing
number of intra-European collaborative development projects
(e.g., Westland-Agusta, Aerospatiale-Westland, and Aerospatiale-
MBB) . These arrangements have stimulated a number of exchange
programs having a similar organizational structure and
purpose as the American MOUs, but include not only government
agencies, but also manufacturers and universities, and are
truly multilateral. [26:39]
The net result of these factors is a general feeling
throughout the industry that the U.S. helicopter industry
is coming under increasing pressure from overseas competition,
not only in the overseas markets, but perhaps more ominously,
on its home ground, the domestic U.S. market. The statistics




From a reading of the earlier chapters, it will be
apparent that the U.S. military requirements played a sig-
nificant role in the developmerat of the helicopter industry,
particularly in its formative stages. The Korean War and
the Vietnam War provided a military demand that resulted
in the concept of such confrontation being drastically
altered. There have been many military procurements in this
first forty years. This chapter will briefly describe those
procurements that are judged to have had a pronounced effect
on the industry, in that they either enhanced or degraded
the competitive position of the contenders.
B. THE EARLY REQUIREMENTS
The early requirements of the military have already been
well addressed in Chapter II. Sikorsky was the first to
take advantage of military requirements when he successfully
produced the R-4, R-5, and R-6 helicopters that were evalu-
ated in many roles. This contract award established Sikorsky
as the early world leader in helicopter production.
Bell was able to respond to the Army Air Corps require-
ments for an observation helicopter brought about by the
Korean conflict in the late 1940s, after making several
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hundred Bell Model 47s for a civil market that did not
eventuate. Through fortuitous good timing. Bell was able
to satisfy the Army requirement for in excess of 300 helicop-
ters at short notice. The only viable competitor, Sikorsky,
was not production ready with the advanced S-52 (a develop-
ment of the earlier R-6) and could not deliver. This win
established Bell as the leader in the light helicopter busi-
ness and led to a long line of civil derivatives.
Piasecki also entered the business by building a demon-
strator, the PV-2, followed by the tandem rotor PV-3 (the
tandem rotor design enabled greater lift with the available
engines and avoided center-of-gravity problems that troubled
the early Sikorsky designs)
.
Following the end of World War II Sikorsky had developed
the R-5 to the S-51 as a private-venture and won military
contracts with Navy, Air Force, and later the Coast Guard.
The S-51 was significant for Sikorsky in that it saw the
beginning of licensed overseas production and the beginning
of commercial scheduled airline use. [1:33]
At the same time, Piasecki had convinced the Navy to
contract for the 10 place HRP-1 and the 14 place HRP-2
helicopters, both developments of the tandem rotor PV-3.
Thus by the late 1940s Piasecki, Sikorsky and Bell had
used private funding to develop helicopter models sufficiently
successfully to win the first exploratory military contracts.
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C. THE S-51 REPLACEMENT COMPETITION
Sikorsky had improved its early R-5A helicopter with
private funds to the S-51, which was subsequently procured
by the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard as the H0 3S and the Air
Force as the H-5D. It was used in the rescue role. In 1946,
the Navy conducted a design competition to replace this
helicopter, looking for more lift and performance and a five
to six place helicopter. The Piasecki XHJP-1 tandem rotor
helicopter (developed from the privately funded PV-3, HRP-1)
was selected. The configuration, overlapping and inter-
meshing rotors, was unconventional and untried and the Navy
ordered a back-up program. This was the Sikorsky XHJS-1,
which was a development of the Sikorsky S-51. The resulting
fly-off led to production of the Piasecki contender as the
HUP-1, owing to center-of-gravity problems that troubled the
Sikorsky helicopter. During this time, the Air Force had
cancelled its last five Sikorsky H-5 rescue helicopters and
modified the associated contract in order to obtain funding
to build the H-19 (Sikorsky S-55) to meet a requirement for
a larger, higher-performance helicopter. This approach
enabled the Air Force to acquire an advanced state-of-the-art
helicopter without the long wait associated with funding
approval and formal competition requirements for new
procurements
.
It also enabled Sikorsky to apply funding to resolve its
earlier center-of-gravity problems of the S-51. The S-55/H-19
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was now acceptable to the services and the Navy and Air
Force ordered the helicopter as the H04S and the H-19, with
deliveries beginning in 1950 [l:33]. This sequence of events
favored Sikorsky as the HUP lagged behind in delivering and
orders from the Air Force and Navy were increased. The S-55
became the first ASW helicopter to operate from aboard ship
and achieved early use in scheduled airline service. A
total of 1067 S-55s was built for military customers by
Sikorsky, in addition to 547 built under foreign license
[8:290]. Notwithstanding the HUP production difficulties,
it was still produced in substantial numbers, being popular
with Navy for the Vertrep function (since the tandem rotor
design made them relatively insensitive to wind direction)
.
The production run of 321 enabled Piasecki to survive this
period.
D. AIR FORCE RESCUE HELICOPTER COMPETITION - 19 50
In 19 50, the Air Force conducted a competition for an
air-rescue helicopter. Again, Piasecki won the competition,
this time with the H-21 Workhorse, which was another, larger
development of the HRP-1 that had spawned the HUP. The
H-21 was a 12 to 20 place tandem helicopter designed as a
rescue helicopter for the Navy and as a troop transport/
medical evacuation helicopter for the Army and Air Force.
The production run eventually amounted to 727 helicopters,
as the H-21 was to become the Army's Vietnam workhorse.
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However, in a pattern that was becoming familiar, the Air
Force again issued a contract modification to the Sikorsky
H-19 production contract, reducing the quantity by five to
fund a back-up for the Piasecki H-21. This action funded
Sikorsky to produce the H-34 (S-58) , a 13,000 lb. twenty
place helicopter. The H-21 program experienced production
problems and delays, leading to increased military orders
to Sikorsky for H-34A (Army) , HSS-1 (Navy) for ASW, and
the HUS-1 (Marines) [1:37]. Again this opportunity was
significant for Sikorsky, as the S-58 commercial production
was 329 units, and military deliveries of the H-34 amounted
to almost 2000 units [8:296], It saw wide civil service
after being certified in 1956 and was produced widely over-
seas by license.
Thus, whilst this phase of competitions was going on,
Piasecki had twice won the competition but, owing to produc-
tion lags and some technical difficulties, Sikorsky was
able to play catch-up and won the greater share of produc-
tion, although Piasecki 's experience was sufficient to keep
his design approach competitive.
E. MARINE CORPS ASSAULT REQUIREMENT - 19 51
The Navy conducted a design competition for a large
assault helicopter for the Marine Corps in 1951. Sikorsky
was chosen to build the Sikorsky S-56 (Navy HR2S, Army H-37)
[1:39]. Piasecki at this time was committed to an Air Force
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contract for a large, general purpose transport and rescue
helicopter, the YH-16, which was ultimately cancelled, owing
to technical difficulties) . The S-56 was not dramatically '•
successful but provided an opportunity for Sikorsky to
develop heavy lift technology. A total of 154 were eventu-
ally produced but the helicopter was the progenitor of a
line that was to lead to the Sikorsky success in the heavy
lift and heavy assault helicopter roles.
F. THE NAVY INTERIM ASW REQUIREMENT
In April 1950, the Navy decided to procure ten H-19s
(being developed for Air Force evaluation) equipped with
dipping sonar for evaluation and initial ASW capability.
This helicopter was designed the H04S-1. Engine problems
resulted in some Piasecki HRP-1 helicopters being diverted
for evaluation. The Navy preferred the tandem rotor design
because of its superior hovering efficiency and greater
center-of-gravity range. The Piasecki HUP (developed from
the HRP-1) was therefore developed as the interim ASW heli-
copter. The HUP also ran into engine difficulties, allowing
Sikorsky to re-enter the competition with a re-engined
H04S-1, which was subsequently developed as the interim ASW
helicopter. The HUPs ' engine problems were resolved by
engine derating, eliminating any prospect for the ASW mission
due to pay load requirements. At this stage Sikorsky had '
only to withstand one more challenge before dominating the
ASW helicopter market [27:72].
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G. THE NAVY ASW MISSION REQUIREMENT
While the interim development was proceeding, the Navy
held an industry wide competition for a new helicopter
specially designed for ASW. In June 1950, the development
contract was awarded to Bell for the HSL. Bell chose to
adopt the preferred tandem rotor configuration, but chose a
single engine configuration, instead of the two engine
layout desired by Navy. At 18,000 lbs., the HSL was the
largest free world helicopter of the time.
Sikorsky again benefited from military lack of confidence
in risky programs. The Navy ordered the HSS-1, similar in
layout to the H043/H-19 as insurance. It was specially
designed for shipborne use, with a folding tail boom and
folding main rotor blades. The HSL, as feared, experienced
technical problems whilst the smaller Sikorsky helicopter
proved equal to the specified ASW task and was more shipboard
compatible. The HSL program was cut back to 50 and the HSS-1
became the Navy's standard ASW helicopter. It operated as
a hunter rather than a killer, since the carriage of torpedoes
restricted the fuel load [27:73].
H. THE ARMY UTILITY HELICOPTER REQUIREMENT
The turbine engine raised the helicopter's already high
price tag by a large margin, this being the main reason why
the civilian turbine helicopter market was slow to take off.
But its efficiency and relative ease of maintenance made large
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scale military usage a reality. Although over 2000 heli-
copters were purchased by the military during the Korean
conflict, most military men considered that the helicopter
would be useful for little else than an aerial ambulance.
When the Army sought industry proposals for its first turbine
powered helicopter in 1954, its main requirement was a cabin
large enough to carry three litter patients and a medic.
Bell Helicopter won the contract in 1955 with the turbine
engined UH-1 Iroqucis (the "Huey"). This was a new class
of helicopter, larger than the two seat observation heli-
copters (the Bell 47 and the Hiller 360) but smaller and
cheaper than a full scale transport. The product positioning
was both shrewd and responsive to the Army requirements.
Bell delivered the first Iroquois in 1959 and slowly intro-
duced improvements that satisfied the Army and blocked any
competitors. The absence of any military contracts (which
could help to underwrite development costs) prevented other
competitors from building similar models. [28:124]
The Huey production run (inclusive of military and civil
variants) amounted to more than 10,000 units, remaining in
production until 1981. This win reinforced the position of
Bell in the light/intermediate transport/utility helicopter
market and provided access to a valuable potential civil
market, as well as developing a basis for derivative develop-
ment into the interim attack helicopter requirement that was
to eventuate as a result of the Vietnam conflict.
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I. THE ARMY HELICOPTER TRANSPORT REQUIREMENT
In 1958, the Army decided tc replace its Sikorsky and
Vertol piston powered transports with a larger and faster
turbine helicopter. The Boeing Model 107 was developed in
the late 1950s for evaluation by the Army as a medium lift
transport. Ten were ordered by the Army in 19 5 8 as the
YHC-lA but this order was cut back to three when Vertol
produced its Model 114 the next year. Five Model 114s were
purchased as the YHC-13 and were considerably larger than
the 107 [8:193]. Vertol won the Army contract in 1959 with
the huge, 51-foot long CH-47 Chinook (developed from the
Model 114). Potential sales were promising enough to con-
vince Boeing to purchase Vertol in 1960. At the outset, the
Chinook was designed as an aerial truck, its size and shape
being dictated by the Army requirement to carry the Pershing
I missile system. [28:124]
At this time, the Army attitude to helicopters was
changing and the Marine Corps had totally revised its tactics
to take advantage of the mobility and speed of helicopter
units. In late 1959, the Army decided to standardize on two
helicopters already on order (the Bell Huey and the Boeing
Chinook) and a new observation helicopter.
Whilst the Army (and to a lesser extent, the Air Force)
settled on the Chinook, the Navy and the Marine Corps chose
the Model 107/H-46 as their light transport/medium assault
helicopter. At this time, with Boeing's production capacity
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being stretched to the limit, the Navy/Marine Corps require-
ment fcr a heavy assault helicopter was satisfied by the
Sikorsky initiative to internally fund the Sikorsky S-60,
which in turn derived from the military contract for the
Sikorsky S-56 Marine Corps assault helicopter in 1951. The
CH-53A was in fact a hybrid helicopter, employing the dynamic
corr.pcrents of the S-64 Flying Crane and an enlarged version
of the S-61/H-3 Sea King fuselage [8:309]. Yet again,
Sikorsky was able to take advantage of the DoD ' s cautious
approach to the ability of Boeing-Vertol to produce on
schedule. This contract win for Sikorsky led ultimately,
in the early 1980s, to a further contract for the free
world's largest helicopter (the Sikorsky S-65A/H-53E Super
Stallion) . The Sikorsky CH-53 series was chosen as the
basis for the Navy/Marine Corps requirement for a heavy lift
helicopter capable of lifting 16 tons in 1973, as the original
S-65 design had a provision for the addition of a third
engine [8:314]. The S-65A was chosen over the Army proposed
Boeing-Vertol Heavy Lift Helicopter (HLH) design.
J. THE ARMY LIGHT OBSERVATION HELICOPTER REQUIREMENT
.^ ,;
This was one of the most interesting and significant
military competitions. An industry-wide competition to
build the Army's new Light Observation Helicopter (LOH)
started in the winter of 1959/60. It was a critical contract,
for the potential order was about 4000 units. It was also
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apparent to the makers that a modified version of the high
speed, rrair tainable aircraft would have a good civil market.
The three main bidders were Bell, Hiller, and Hughes. Bell
already had the successful Bell 47 in the Army inventory and
were confident of success. Hiller had built all the remain-
ing Army LOHs (the Hiller 360/H-23 Raven) and also appeared
to have a good chance. However, the prospects were so good
that 44 companies submitted 119 design concepts (including
conventional light planes and other types of vertical take-
off aircraft) . Hughes had previously developed the 269A
light piston two place helicopter with company funds, but
did not immediately win any military contracts. In May of
1961, the competition was narrowed to Hiller and Bell. How-
ever, Hughes was invited back into the competition (the
basis for that decision not being clear) and each company
was contracted to build five prototypes around a new Allison
turbine engine. The Government funding was $6 million for
each company but $2 million of private funding per company
was required to complete the delivery of the prototypes.
In 1964, the Army eliminated the Bell contender, as a
result of testing, and announced that a decision between
Hiller and Hughes would be made on price. All three heli-
copters (the Bell OH-4, the Hiller OH-5, and the Hughes OH-6)
were remarkable helicopters but it appeared that Bell may
have suffered from complacency.
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In its request for design, the Army had indicated that
it would not increase the helicopter performance or capa-
bility by later design modification. Hiller apparently
decided that every other military helicopter had been suc-
cessively improved whilst in production and designed a sturdy
helicopter that could accept a later performance improvement
without major airframe changes.
Hughes, on the other hand, offered the Army what it
wanted, a stripped down optimum design, lighter by 400 lbs.
and much faster than the Hiller bid. The Hiller helicopter
was sturdier and more reliable but the Hughes helicopter
was a much better performer. The choice was made on price,
with both makers bidding to take a loss on the first produc-
tion run of 714 helicopters. Hiller 's cost was reported to
be about $35,000 and their bid was $29,000. Hughes, who
wanted to get into the business, underbid Hiller with a bid
of $19,680. This "buy-in" bid was successful. [28:124]
Shortly after the LOH competition was finalized, Hughes
consolidated its position by winning another contract away
from Hiller for a $5.5 million order for 215 primary heli-
copter trainers. This sequence of events spelt doom for
Hiller, who lacked the corporate strength to commercialize
its unsuccessful LOH contender. Bell, with substantial
financial reserves, was faced with the potential loss of its
traditional light helicopter market. To prevent this, the
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OH-4 dynamic components were used to develop the highly
successful Bell 206 Jet Ranger, which sold 3729 units through
April, 1984.
This competition gave Hughes the start it needed. After
winning, Hughes reportedly stated that, after the initial
order, the price would be based on cost plus reasonable
profit [28:124]. After Congressional interest in this com-
petition, the subsequent re-procurement in 1968 was re-opened
to competition and Bell and Hughes both bid (Hughes with its
production LOH helicopter and Bell with its Bell 206 Jet
Ranger as the OH-58A) . On this occasion. Bell was successful
and the Army has since procured over 2200 units. Hughes had
been able to enter the industry, however, and, through the
military funding, had achieved success with the OH-6. They,
in turn, commercialized the OH-6 as the very popular Hughes
500 that has sold 3651 units through 1983, in many different
variants
.
This win was important to Bell in that it gave them good
access to a later contract, the Army Helicopter Improvement
Program (AHIP) that selected the OH-58D over the Hughes OH-6.
K. THE ARMY ATTACK HELICOPTER REQUIREMENT
The story of the attack helicopter is a saga in itself.
In the beginning, when helicopters began to be shot at in
combat, aviators developed improvised defensive measures.
This started with hand held weapons but evolution brought
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weapons systems that the pilot could fire by aiming the heli-
copter. The French began this development in Algeria in
the 1950s.
Once a defensive capability had been validated, it was
a quick logical extension to ground force support, troop
helicopter escort, and for independent attack missions.
Initially, available helicopters were used (e.g., the UH-1
Huey) , but these rapidly evolved to the narrow bodied
streamlined fuselage that is now typical [1:133].
United States attack helicopter development pursued two
objectives. The first, escort and soft target suppression
(as in Southeast-Asian jungle warfare) , was satisfied by
quickly modifying existing helicopters into suitable attack
helicopters. The second, the capability to combat heavy
armoured tanks (for which Europe is the most likely theatre)
was addressed by the development of purposely designed heli-
copters, such as the Lockheed AH-56 Cheyenne and the Hughes
AH-64 Apache [1:133].
1. The Early Attack Helicopters
The Bell Sioux Scout was built by Bell to demonstrate
the firm's concepts in attack/gunship helicopters. This
helicopter incorporated a number of features found in subse-
quent armed attack helicopters and was used as a test bed
for several advanced devices (e.g., a "hands-off" tracking
gun sight that could be directed by movement of the pilot's
head). Developed from the Bell Model 47, it set many standards
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for future armed helicopter design. It first flew in 1963
but did not itself gain production status, serving primarily
as a company-funded conceptual demonstrator. [8:178]
Meanwhile, in 1962, the Army's Tactical Mobility
Requirements Board (the Howze Board) officially endorsed,
for the first time, the use of armed helicopters in the
escort role. The Vietnam War demonstrated the validity of
this concept, and armed Bell UH-1 Hueys were pressed into
the gunship role. This was an emergency measure only, and
the Army issued a requirement for an attack helicopter in
1964. Alternatives examined included the Boeing-Vertol
CH-47, the Sikorsky S-61, the Kaman UH-2, and the Bell D-262
(a radical new design). Initially, Bell was eliminated frcm
the competition on the basis of technical risk. [8:179]
The Kaman UH-2 gunship option had earlier been con-
sidered for the escort role, and Congressional approval for
a procurement of 220 UH-2s had been given in 196 3. The pro-
gram was dropped in favor of the Bell UH-1 Hueys from Texas,
five days after the assassination of President Kennedy and
the succession of Lyndon B. Johnson to the Presidency. [1:98]
After being eliminated. Bell continued to develop
their attack helicopter concept as a private-venture under
the Bell designation, the Model 209. The Bell 209 was resub-
mitted to the Army in August, 1965, when it became obvious
that the Vietnam War did, in fact, require a radical new
concept. The development start gained by Bell was invaluable
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and the Army were sufficiently impressed that they ordered
an initial buy of 100 209 Cobra gunships in April, 1966.
Series production followed, and Bell continued with their
well proven philosophy of offering continual product improve-
ments to keep the customer happy and to block competition.
Such improvements included twin engined ccnfigurations for
reliability (for marine applications), a rotor brake, and
improved armour and armament, including the fitting of the
Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided (TOW)
missile system.
Sikorsky did attempt to dislodge the Cobra with the
Sikorsky S-67, which was a high speed helicopter gunship
developed as a private-venture in response to the Vietnam
combat experience. It was derived in part from the S-66
(Sikorsky's paper entrant in the AAFSS contest; see next
section) and used the dynamic components of the S-61 Sea
King. Sikorsky obtained several Government contracts to
evaluate specific S-67 features, but customers were not
attracted, as the Huey Cobra was proving quite adequate for
the immediate task. [8:316]
2 . The Purpose -Designed Attack Helicopter
The 1962 Howze Board report recommended that an
attack helicopter be developed to provide close-ir support
and anti-tank capabilities. This led, in 1964, to an Army
Request For Proposal (RFP) for an Advanced Aerial Fire
Support System (AAFSS) . Besides seeking out and destroying
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enemy tanks, it was expected to provide escort for the Army
Boeing-Vertol Chinooks, while making quick sorties from the
line of flight, and to clear landing zones. To do this,
the aircraft required performance characteristics on the
remote edge of the state-of-the-art, particularly with respect
to high dash speed, hover capability, and ferry range.
[1:138]
The AAFSS contract quickly came down to a choice
between Sikorsky and Lockheed, who both submitted designs
for winged helicopters using a conventional rotor for lift
and a tail propeller for high speed forward flight. Lockheed
offered the AH-56 Cheyenne and Sikorsky the S-66 for the
paper competition. Lockheed appeared to have the performance
edge necesscry to satisfy the demanding requirements of the
Army and was contracted for ten development prototypes.
Lockheed had entered the helicopter field cnly a
few years before, with a radical concept involving the combi-
nation of a hingeless rotor and a rotor-mounted control gyro,
which gave excellent results on two small helicopter designs.
It was this radical concept that attracted the Army selec-
tion board [1:139]. Unfortunately, the concept did not
transfer readily to the larger prototype Cheyenne and the
program ran into serious technical difficulties. Simultane-
ously, the Army changed the concept of the combat helicopter.
The Vietnam experience indicated that high speed was not
essential, but that survivability was, leading to a twin
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engine requirement. These two factors destroyed the Cheyenne
program, and with it, any hopes Lockheed had of entering the
helicopter business. The Cheyenne program was cancelled in
August, 1972, and a new competition for the Advanced Attack
Helicopter (AAH) was commenced in November, 1972. Although
Lockheed submitted a proposal for the AAH, it was too late
to play catch up. Development contracts went to the Hughes
AH-64 Apache and the Bell AH-63 [1:139], following bids
from Bell, Boeing-Vertol , Hughes, Lockheed, and Sikorsky.
Bell had earlier been eliminated from the Utility
Tactical Transport Aircraft System (UTTAS) design competition
in the early 1970s (see next section) . During interviews.
Bell indicated that they may have lost that competition
following a rather casual and complacent approach to the
proposal, in much the same way that they had lost the earlier
initial LOH contract. Their approach to the AAH competition
was apparently an overkill reaction to that loss, with the
result that their contender, the AH-63 was heavier and did
not perform as well as the Hughes AH-64 Apache. A signifi-
cant difference was the approach to development and produc-
tion. Bell relied on their own manufacturing capacity
whereas Hughes teamed with firms of proven expertise in
various fields, with Hughes acting as responsible integrator
of systems and assembler. This enabled Hughes to bring the
best technology together, to build a better, faster, higher
performing helicopter than Bell, and to quote a cheaper
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price. Bell also insisted on providing a two bladed rotor
design. This design had served the company well throughout
the years, but Bell failed to recognize that, in spite of
the relative technical merits of the two bladed versus four
bladed systems, the customer had a preference for the four
bladed system [1:140].
After fly-offs, the contract was awarded to Hughes
in December, 1976. The Apache program offers a long produc-
tion run for Hughes and was sufficiently attractive to
prompt McDonnell Douglas to acquire Hughes in January, 1984,
in a move that makes Hughes a formidable competitor in
future competitions
.
L. THE ARMY UTILITY HELICOPTER REPLACEMENT
Bell, Boeing-Vertol , Hughes, and Sikorsky all submitted
paper designs for the Army RFP for the replacement of the
Bell UH-1 utility helicopter. The Bell and Hughes proposals
were eliminated and contracts awarded in August, 1972 to
Boeing-Vertol and Sikorsky to design, build, and test three
prototypes. Both entries shared many characteristics, an
indication of the increasing emphasis the DoD was placing
on driving the specifications to meet military requirements.
This competition was critical for Sikorsky. The loss
of the AAFSS contract to Lockheed had left Sikorsky with
only bits and pieces of the military market, mostly the
production of the CH-53As for the Marine Corps. In 1966,
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Sikorsky's president estimated that his plant was at 40
percent capacity [28:124]. Thus, success in this UTTAS
competition was essential for the survival of Sikorsky.
Their approach was to take a meticulous and rigorous approach
to the Army requirement, together with a continuous dialogue
with the Army on the specifics of the requirement. Their
product, the S-70 (UH-60) was very close to the specification
Boeing-Vertol did not have the experience of Sikorsky
in this helicopter configuration (the single main rotor
that Sikorsky had pioneered) and was not able to play
"catch up", despite using an innovative rotor design adapted
from the MBB Bo-105 (Boeing-Vertol had obtained the American
license for the MBB Bo-105 in order to rapidly gain small
helicopter innovative technology and experience) . [8:200]
The contract was awarded to Sikorsky on 23 December,
1976 and the UH-60 Black Hawk has given Sikorsky wide access
to a range of further contracts (e.g., the Navy ASW heli-
copter contract, won by the Sikorsky SH-60B against a
Boeing-Vertol re-entry of its losing UTTAS contender and a
modification of the Westland/Aerospatiale Lynx)
.
M. SUMMARY
The preceding list of procurements is by no means
exhaustive but it does provide an indication of how and
where the major competitors won and lost. Bell's position
was established by the Bell 47 and Huey successes and later
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by the initiative of the private-venture Cobra. Sikorsky and
Piasecki fought out the heavy helicopter segment, with
Sikorsky probably emerging with the greater share of the
spoils. However, Piasecki (later Boeing-Vertol) was able
to win enough contracts to survive. Kaman was moderately
successful but never succeeded in competing on equal terms
with the big four U.S. makers and restricted its efforts
initially to crash/rescue helicopters before achieving
moderate success with destroyer based ASW helicopters for
the Navy
.
Hughes entered the market with an aggressive pricing
strategy and was able to drive Hiller out of the military
business, grab light helicopter market share from Bell (in
the LOH program) and seize the initiative in the anti-tank
attack helicopter market.
The common thread in all the competitions was the abso-
lute necessity for a company to bid on military requirements
in its chosen segments. On occasions, this tactic required
corporate strength to fund the private development of
product offerings. Design also had to be such that, even
if the military competition were lost, the design could be
commercially adaptable (e.g., the Hughes OH-6 leading to
the Hughes 500 and the Bell OH-4 leading to the Jet Ranger)
.
160
VIII. MANUFACTURER/GOVERNMENT RELATIONS AND MARKETING
ISSUES
A. INTRODUCTION
A prevalent view held throughout the U.S. helicopter
industry is that the U.S. manufacturers are at a disadvantage
when compared to their European competitors as a result
of the differing European government approach to industry
development. This chapter will explore the nature of the •
U.S. industry view, as reflected in a recent report on the
U.S. helicopter industry [Ref. 14], and will specifically
address the comparative nature of the manufacturer/government
relationships, government support of product marketing,
foreign military sales, and financing issues. It will also
briefly examine the impact of early licensing agreements
provided to European firms by the leading U.S. firms and a
more recent phenomenon, the overseas collaborative helicopter




In the United States, the DoD is the major purchaser of
privately produced helicopters. In contrast, the European
governments either own or control their helicopter indus-
tries. There are, therefore, some differences in the
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manufacturer/government relationships that dictate the way
the helicopter business is conducted.
In Europe, where nations seek to pursue independent
foreign policies, reliance on imported military equipment
is seen as a potential constraint to that nation's freedom
of action. Foreign policy issues (e.g., that nation's influ-
ence over less developed countries) are critical in developing
an industry that becomes increasingly dependent on exports
for survival. For example, in France, over 85 percent of
the helicopters produced are exported. Thus, a successful
industry can be a major factor in assisting the achievement
of a favorable balance of payments. Aerospace, being a high
technology industry, is also a definite stimulus to the
development of associated technologies, with further benefit
accruing to the overall technology base of the country
concerned. [14:27]
Accordingly, in the government owned or controlled com-
panies of Europe, factors that contribute to the criticality
of the aerospace industry are taken directly into considera-
tion. These factors include the support of foreign policy
initiatives, the contribution to the balance of trade,
advancement of the national technology base, enhancement of
national prestige and increased employment opportunities
for the labor force. Thus, when such a company approaches
new business, bid and pricing decisions are based on a
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"national accounting system", rather than the much narrower
"profit accounting system" of a pure commercial enterprise,
and embrace the spectrum of national socio-economic and
foreign policy issues that can and are set against the purely
business concepts of monetary profit. [14:28]
By contrast, the aeronautical industry in the United
States has developed primarily within the private sector.
Product line and business decisions are based on two objec-
tives, firstly, the need to offer products that are suffi-
ciently competitive with regards to price and performance
to win competitions, and secondly, to bid a price that will
cover costs and reasonable commercial profit. The second
objective may sometimes require a conscious decision to
either not bid in a competition, to bid low (and take a
loss) or to bid with the objective of using government
funding to achieve R and D applicable to other lines of
business. In other words, the U.S. market is characterized
by fierce competition in both the military and civil sec-
tions [14:27]. This competitive environment dictates that
U.S. companies must be able to sustain sometimes lengthy
attacks on their market share by other competitors . History
has shown that only those firms with substantial financial
reserves have been able to survive. All the major U.S.
firms are now parts of much larger corporate empires. Those
firms without large corporate financial reserves have fallen
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by the way (e.g., Hiller, who was all but eliminated by
Hughes in the LOH competition in the mid 1960s)
.
New helicopter introduction is a lengthy process and
requires a substantial investment in development. The return
on investment is extremely difficult to predict, particularly
in the civil sector, being dependent on market forecasts
that stretch fifteen to twenty years into the future.
Helicopter related R and D is funded from a number of sources;
equity, debt, retained earnings, government funds provided
under contract, and from operating income. These sources
are used by both American and European firms in differing
proportions [14:28]. U.S. helicopter manufacturers raise
much of their funds in the equity and debt markets, where
the perceived degree of business risk dictates the rate
of return required by the investor. This rate will always
be higher than the yield rate on risk-free U.S. Government
Treasury Bills and could be as high as 20 - 30 percent on
a risky helicopter program. R and D is perceived as a
particularly high risk investment, with the possible returns
being derived many years after the investment, leading to
a very high cost of capital for R and D financing. This
factor again makes it important for the modern U.S. heli-
copter manufacturer to achieve military funding for R and
D efforts. In the absence of military funding, the company
has to justify to the parent corporation that the combination
of risks and returns for the project in question is superior
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to that which can be achieved elsewhere in the diversified
product line of the corporation [14:28]. With the helicopter
business being so technology intensive, continual R and D
investment, regardless of source, is necessary in order to
remain in a sufficiently competitive position to be able
to bid on RFPs
.
The AIAA maintains that this is significant cost disad-
vantage for American industry, claiming that the cost of
government furnished funds to the European companies is
essentially zero, leading to a gradual erosion of U.S.
technological leadership, particularly in an era of high
interest rates. In support of this view, the AIAA states
that there are several ways that foreign governments contri-
bute to the funding of their state controlled firms. Acting
as a stockholder, the government can and does provide
infusions of equity funds (e.g., such funding was provided
to Aerospatiale in the period 1970 to 1978 when Aerospatiale
was suffering a continuing series of losses; $70 million
was provided in 1970, $14 million in 1973, $108 million in
1974 and $124 million in 1976). [14:29]
Government owned or controlled firms may have difficul-
ties in attracting equity financing, being perceived as
less profitable than private firms. However, because of the
implication of government protection against default, the
firms can carry a higher debt-to-equity ratio, and at a
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less punitive interest rate, leading to a reduction in their
cost of capital. [14:29]
An alternative form of subsidy available to the European
firm is the government loan or loan guarantee which allo-
cates to the government a share of future revenues generated
from the program being funded. These loans may be repayable
only if the program is commercially successful, with the
AIAA maintaining that payments are not required until break-
even point is reached, with the French industry being a
major recipient of this type of funding. The Puma helicopter,
developed by Aerospatiale, was funded in a program where
the government participated to the extent of 50 percent in
the development program and shared in the subsequent revenue.
Aerospatiale also has access to financial aid aimed at pro-
moting exports and programs displaying economic or social
value. [14:29]
The AIAA draws two further distinctions between European
and U.S. practice in relation to financing practices. First,
the U.S. DoD is concerned solely with the development of
helicopters to meet pure military requirements, there being
no direct intent to develop products or technology for
commercial application. This situation does not prevail in
Europe, where developmental aid is provided for the funding
of commercial programs (e.g., the British/Italian EH-101
and the MBB/Kawasaki (BK-117) intermediate sized utility
helicopter). Second, U.S. military procurement policy is
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concerned with meeting a threat to the national security
and, as such, is often funded on a stop-go basis, as the
perceived threat shifts. On the other hand, foreign govern-
ments, particularly the French, fund their programs as part
of a long term industrial policy, with a twenty year planning
horizon. The U.S. short term policy approach is, therefore,
both a constraining factor to commercial helicopter develop-
ment and a business risk exacerbating factor. [14:29]
The U.S. helicopter industry points to the existence
of four competitive firms in the U.S., compared to Europe,
where each major firm is the sole supplier in that country
and deduces that this leads to a competitive disadvantage
for the U.S. firms. This deduction stems mainly from the
position of the U.S. Government as the sole buyer for the
military helicopter output. Helicopter manufacturers must
devote considerable effort and resources to the competition.
Foreign military sales may permit recovery of some of those
costs, but they do not constitute an acceptable substitute
for the large production base of U.S. military orders [14:30]
These factors are compounded by the business risk of military
helicopter program development time, often unpredictable,
lengthy and subject to cyclical policy change. The longer
the development time, the longer the manufacturer must wait
before earning profits and before being able to commercialize
the product. For eight U.S. military helicopters introduced
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from 1960 to 1982, the average development period was nearly
eight years. [14:30]
Civil helicopter program risks have much in common with
military business risk already discussed. In addition, the
civil craft must be designed to fit into long term market
forecasts highly susceptible to the risk of unpredictable
events. For example, the events that boosted civil helicopter
applications were the rapid rise of petroleum price in the
1973/74 timeframe (leading to the requirement for more fuel
efficient helicopters) and the oil embargo during the same
period that spurred off shore oil exploration in remote areas
(leading to a requirement for long range, high capacity
helicopters) . Because of the long development times required,
the helicopter industry is now producing those purpose-designed
helicopters (the commercial Chinook, the Bell 222 and the
Sikorsky S-76) at a time when the civil market has slumped,
and the helicopters are now being reconfigured as utility,
corporate/executive and commercial vehicles in order to
boost sales. [14:30]
C. GOVERNMENT SUPPORT OF PRODUCT MARKETING
All nations with organic helicopter industries have
established government agencies to support the sales efforts
of those countries' firms. In France, the Delegation Generale
pour L'Armement (DGA) has overall responsibility for the
production and sale of French weapons . The Direction des
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Affaires Internationales, an office within DGA, is responsi-
ble for maintaining growth in French weapons exports, with
arms deals being managed at the highest levels of government
and supporting major foreign policy initiatives (e.g., half
of the French arms exports in recent years have gone to the
Middle East, upon which the French are so dependent for
their future oil supply) . [14:31]
In similar fashion, England has established the Defense
Sales Office (DSO) within the U.S. Ministry of Defense to
promote the export of arms. This organization not only
assists British manufacturers in the sales of arms overseas,
but advises the Defense Ministry of overseas requirements
during the initial design of British products, so that they
can be modified where appropriate, to enhance overseas
sales prospects. [14:31]
The AIAA reports that, in contrast, the U.S. approach .
has been "vacillating and at times restrictive" . Legislation
introduced in 1976 was framed to reduce the number and size
of military assistance groups in foreign countries and
instructed government personnel to "refrain from any activi-
ties that would stimulate overseas requests for U.S. supplied
arms" . [14:31]
The legislation was expanded to curtail if not eliminate
the promotion of arms sales by government officials and '
private firms. This same legislation also forbade U.S. firms
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from making any significant modifications to U.S. arms in
order to enhance overseas sales, restricted the initiation
of co-production arrangements with foreign firms, and re-
affirmed and strengthened the restrictions on sales to
countries alleged to be consistently involved in human rights
violations. As a result of this policy, according to the
AIAA, "614 requests from 92 countries totalling more than
$1 billion were turned down in the first fifteen months
of the Carter Administration". [147:31]
These issues have been softened somewhat by the Reagan
Administration, but the earlier restrictions on overseas
trade have, it is alleged by the AIAA, permitted the Euro-
pean firms to gain .a foothold in many emerging overseas
and third world markets. Further, the inconsistency in
the United States' arms export policies is a possible deter-
rent to overseas arms sales which require a reasonable
assurance of stability in both policy and deliveries . This
is provided as a contributing reason for the rapid growth
of French military exports, since France views such trans-
actions as being purely commercial and "less dependent on
the recipient nations meeting some ill-defined moral standard"
.
The example of the speed with which France resumed arms
shipments to Argentina after the Falklands dispute is given
to support this view. [14:32]
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D. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES
The helicopter has become an integral part of the battle-
field strategy of almost every developed nation. The U.S.,
with its heavy emphasis on quick reaction and rapid deploy-
ment, has an especially critical need for helicopter
production capability. Helicopter unit costs are greatly
influenced by the length of the production run and the quan-
tity ordered. The associated learning curve is quite steeply
sloping, so as the production run is lengthened, the marginal
unit production costs and average unit costs decrease.
Overseas military sales can have a significant effect on
the cost of domestic military sales, and thus the denial of
foreign military markets, either through increased competi-
tion from overseas firms or through restrictive U.S. Government
policy can be detrimental to the U.S. helicopter industry.
[14:33]
The existence of healthy military export markets also
adds to the surge and mobilization capability of the industry,
a vital aspect of national security readiness. The increasing
tendency of the European nations to close their doors to
American imports through European collaborative programs has
potentially serious repercussions on both the costs of
domestic helicopter production and the level of national
security preparedness.
In further criticism of the U.S. Government involvement,
the AIAA maintains that the involvement of the U.S. DoD in
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Foreign Military Sales (FMS) tends to lengthen and complicate
the already complex process with potential customers, enhancing
the competitive position of the foreign producers. In a
quoted example, a company (unnamed) that initiated a poten-
tial procurement and did much of the lead up work, eventually
lost the sale to a competitor during the open competition
required under the FMS program, although the marketing effort
had been started as a direct sale. [14:34]
E. FINANCING
The U.S. helicopter industry, already troubled by falling
sales as a result of the world economic recession, is also
feeling the impact of foreign sales practices and incentives
that are not able to be matched by domestic producers. In
recent years, high interest rates have made sales financing
a critical factor in closing sales. In general, available
financing programs have not been as competitive as those of
other nations. Whereas U.S. private lending institutions
are reluctant to make loans on aviation products for foreign
customers at competitive rates, foreign governments are often
more than willing to make those loans, in line with their
national goals of developing industrial capability, promoting
domestic goods in world markets, and creating domestic
employment. For those nations, entering into potentially
high risk loan agreements is an acceptable expense when
offset against the achievement of long term national policy
objectives. [14:36]
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For U.S. firms, the alternatives are to finance a short-
term five to seven year loan through the firm's corporate
structure, or to work through the Export-Import Bank (Eximbank)
The former is usually as unacceptable as a private institu-
tion, with competitive interest rates being too low to be
commensurate with the degree of risk. The Eximbank, however,
has not been heavily involved in financing helicopter sales.
Eximbank funds have generally been channelled to high value
products which have made more substantial contributions to
the U.S. balance of trade, and are more widely available
to large commercial jet transport manufacturers. In 1981,
the Eximbank reported to Congress that its medium-term credit
support "did little good for U.S. exporters facing subsidized
competition, except that it gave them a fixed base from
which to reduce the rate further". [14:36]
Comparative figures for medium-term fixed export credit
effective interest rates are provided in Table 5. [14:36]
As can be seen, U.S. rates were generally well above those
of European competitors, being roughly double those of
England and France. However, the Eximbank, in late 1982,
announced a new medium-term loan program for aircraft
costing less than commercial jet transports. Under this
program foreign purchases of helicopters may be financed
with the aid of Eximbank loan guarantees to financial insti-
tutions, who in turn can arrange fixed rate financing with
the foreign buyer. Such financing is limited by the bank's
charter to commercial sales. [14:37]
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TABLE 5















(a) Face rates adjusted up to effective rates by accounting
for insurance, guarantee, and commitment fees in the
following amounts: France (0.75), Germany (0.8), Japan
(0.60), and United Kingdom (0.60).
(b) Line (1) represents effective rates assuming only a
0.25 percent discount loan commitment fee. Line (2)
assumes a 0.25 percent discount loan commitment fee
plus a 1.25 percent fee for optional insurance.
Many of the countries with which the U.S. competes have
signed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
,
which prohibits signatories from offering low-cost, below-
market loans or other subsidies in order to make a sale.
The impact of GATT has been weakened, since interest rates
in other countries have generally been lower than in the
United States. As a result of an export credits "war"
centering on sales of commercial jet transports, the major
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industrial nations, through the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) , concluded a "standstill
agreement" in 1976 on terms of aircraft export financing.
This agreement defined a "commonline" (a minimum export
financing rate and a maximum loan term), however, as interest
rates fall in the U.S. the interest rate has become of less
significance than the market "term". Currently, the "common-
line" agreement does not cover general aviation or helicopters,
and, without the inclusion of rotorcraft, the U.S. helicopter
manufacturers will continue to compete at a disadvantage
against the low-cost packages offered by foreign firms.
The GATT agreement does not apply to transactions involving
military helicopters and U.S. military helicopter manufac-
turers must compete against foreign manufacturers offering
prices or financing (subsidized by state support) that
feature very low initial downpayments and/or interest rates
far below market. In terms of price, the U.S. manufacturers
must set a price that includes a proportionate share of
development costs in addition to production and administra-
tive costs in order to show a profit. Foreign firms that
are government owned and supported have much more flexibility
in pricing, since they are not so constrained by the need
to recover costs and make a profit. [14:37]
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F. INTERNATIONAL LICENSING
It is widely recognized throughout the helicopter indus-
try that the European industry achieved its technological
start by virtue of production licensed from U.S. firms.
Aircraft firms license their products for a number of reasons
In some cases, a licensed production agreement enables a
firm to get into a market that would otherwise be unavaila-
ble to it; in other cases, licensing enables the developer
to obtain added income from his design when he is already
producing to capacity (e.g., when Bell licensed Dornier to
build the UH-ID in Germany in 1965, Bell could not support
any helicopter production beyond their commitment to the
U.S. Army); in yet other cases, licensed production satisfies
a political objective. [29:15]
The Sikorsky S-61 is the generic identifier for a family
of large turbine powered helicopters, comprising nine civil
and fourteen military versions. The S-61 evolved from a
Navy contract issued in 1957 for an ASW helicopter. Produc-
tion for the Navy began in 1959, and in April, 1960, Sikorsky
issued the first S-61 license to Mitsubishi in Japan. It
was then licensed to United Aircraft in Canada in 1963, and
to Westland Aircraft in England and Agusta in Italy in 1966.
By the end of 1973, over 200 S-61s had been produced by
Sikorsky licensees, and by 1980, 371 had been built. Sikor-
sky's earlier licensing experience had included an agreement
with Westland in 1947 for the production of the S-51
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helicopter, agreements with Westland, Mitsubishi, and
Aerospatiale for production of the S-55, and with Westland
and Aerospatiale for production of the S-58. A total of
1217 helicopters were produced under these agreements.
Through September, 1979, the total Sikorsky production was
5545 helicopters, whilst Sikorsky's overseas licensed produc-
tion was 1672 helicopters. [29:31]
In December, 1969, Sikorsky entered an agreement with
the government of the Federal Republic of Germany for licensed
German production of the large CH-53D/G. Sikorsky had tried
to sell the helicopters to Germany, but the Germans wanted
a share of the production. Under the agreement, the final
contract specified that at least 40 percent of the purchase
price, including fees and royalty payments, would be spent
in the U.S. [29:51]
Bell Helicopters sold a production license in 19 52 to
Agusta for production of the Model 47 piston engined heli-
copter, and to Kawasaki of Japan in 1953 for production of
the same helicopter. In 1960, a license was issued to
Agusta to build the Model 204B, followed by a further license
to Agusta for the Model 205A in 1963. The second Model 205A
license went to Dornier of Germany in 1965, the third to
the government of the Republic of China in August, 1969,
to be followed by a further license to Fuji as a follow-on
to an earlier Model 204B license. [29:37]
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The Boeing-Vertol Company had been in the helicopter
business since shortly after World War II (under its earlier
names of the Piasecki Helicopter Corporation, and the Vertol
Aircraft Corporation). Vertol 's first experience with
licensing was in 1954 when they licensed the HUP and H-21
rotor blades to firms in the United States and France. In
1956, they licensed the H-21 in France, and in 1959, they
licensed their first turbine powered helicopter, the CH-46,
to Kawasaki in Japan. In March, 196 8, Boeing-Vertol concluded
an agreement which led to the production of the CH-47C in
Italy by Agusta. Boeing-Vertol decided on this licensed
program because they had not been able to penetrate the
helicopter markets in Italy, the Near East, the Middle East,
and the African countries, areas in which Agusta had been
successful with license built helicopters for many years.
[29:45]
It can be seen that, although each of the major European
manufacturers is now producing its own designs to fill world
wide markets, achievement of their present level of competi-
tiveness would have been substantially delayed were it not
for the early assistance, both in design and manufacturing
technology, provided by the leading U.S. manufacturers with
whom they now compete. [14:15]
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G. CO-PRODUCTION
A different kind of business environment and development
outlook is now emerging in the free world helicopter indus-
try external to the U.S., and is reflected in the increasing
number of collaborative arrangements between manufacturers
in several countries in the development of new models.
These arrangements enhance the partner's competitiveness
by the merging of complementary strengths, the elimination
of major home competition, and, through sharing, reduce the
risk in product introduction. The AIAA concludes that it
is not unlikely that the American helicopter manufacturers
will face a multinational threat similar to that presented
by Airbus Industries to the U.S. commercial jet transport
industry. The AIAA also maintains that American firms are
at a disadvantage in initiating or participating in such
arrangements amongst themselves, owing to uncertainties
with respect to the interpretation of anti-trust statutes.
[14:38]
The major teaming effort in Europe is the recently
announced program that joins MBB and Aerospatiale in the
development and production of one basic helicopter to satis-
fy the requirements of the French and German military. The
PAH-2 attack helicopter is being arranged by government-to-
government MOU and is receiving substantial government
funding. The U.S. firms (especially Hughes, with the AH-64
Apache) attempted unsuccessfully to enter this program.
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The second major teaming effort is that between Westland of
England and Agusta of Italy, again with government funding
support, to produce the EH-101 helicopter with both civil
and military objectives. These types of international co-
operation agreements will aid the European firms in reducing
the risk in developing new aircraft. In particular, financial
risks will be cut and the agreements give the European firms
the chance to benefit from shared technology. [30:11]
John Zugschwert, Executive Director of the AHS , suggests
that the U.S. Government may have to change its tactics as
current U.S. firms are being excluded from profitable inter-
national cooperative programs. Besides the European team-
ing efforts already mentioned, MBB is teaming with Kawasaki
of Japan and Hindustan of India (the BK-117 and a new advanced
light helicopter respectively), and other subsidiaries and
joint programs are being established in Japan, the Peoples
Republic of China, Indonesia, India, Australia, Canada,
and South America. [30:11]
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IX. THE FUTURE OF HELICOPTERS
A. INTRODUCTION
The growth of all sectors of aviation in the last fifty
years has been dramatic. The growth of the helicopter
sector has lagged behind the fixed wing sector by about
thirty-five years, mainly because of the initial difficulties
in achieving stable vertical flight. Significant investment
in R and D by both national industries and governments has
brought the helicopter to the verge of the fourth generation
of hardware. Reliance on design evolution by experimenting
with modest incremental departures from proven designs also
slowed the early development of the rotary wing sector.
The indications are that the fourth generation will entail
a quantum step forward in technology applications, ranging
across the entire range of aerodynamic and electronic disci-
plines. This chapter will address the future of the heli-
copter industry by examining the activities of some of the
agencies involved in helicopter technology and will comment
on how these activities will provide a basis for creating
a wider market for helicopter use. [l:22l]
B. TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES
The way ahead in the 1990s has been largely clarified
by the R and D budget passed in the U.S. Congress in 19 78,
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from which stemmed the Rotorcraft Task Force created by
NASA to assess the state of helicopter technology, determine
needs, and develop a research program for the future devel-
opment of advanced civil and military rotorcraft. In its
Task Force Report on Advanced Rotorcraft Technology dated
15 October, 1978, [Ref. 31] NASA proposed a $398 million
U.S. dollar, ten-year research program, with eight goals;
noise reduction, vibration reduction, reliability and main-
tainability improvements, safety improvements, flying quali-
ties improvements, productivity improvements, and reduced
fuel consumption. The Task Force identified four major
program elements, aerodynamics and structures, propulsion,
flight control and avionic systems, and vehicle configura-
tions. R and D under these program elements involves NASA,
DoD, and the FAA in a number of broad, technology developing
programs. [10:155]
1. Aerodynamics and Structures
In the aerodynamics and structures element, the
focus is on three areas: acoustics, vibration, and composites
The goal is to develop a method for future helicopter design
that reduces external noise by 5-10 decibels, improves
hover efficiency by 10 percent and improves cruise efficiency
by 20 percent. An important program in this area is the
U.S. Army Advanced Composite Airframe Program (ACAP) in
which Bell Helicopter and Sikorsky Aircraft are building
competitive demonstrators of composite technology (using
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the Bell 222 and the Sikorsky S-76 designs) . These should
yield a 20 to 30 percent weight reduction, a 15 to 20 percent
reduction in cost, with additional benefits in improved
aerodynamic performance and dynamic response, and better
field repairs and lower maintenance costs. [1:225]
2. Propulsion Systems
The propulsion systems elements' main objectives are
to improve engine and power transfer technology, reliability
and maintainability, reduce engine fuel consumption, and
reduce power-plant manufacturing and operating costs. The
propulsion technology programs now underway promise signifi-
cant improvements that will be attained in production engines
in about ten years. They include the 800 horsepower Advanced
Technology Demonstrator Engine (ATDE) that will contribute
to the LHX program and the 5000 horsepower Modern Technology
Demonstrator Engine (MTDE) that may well find a home in
many applications (e.g., the CH-47, the P-3 Orion and the
JVX) . Both these programs were the subject of competitive
development contracts awarded by the U.S. Army. Two other
engine concepts are notable. The first is the convertible
engine that provides shaft power to rotors at hover and low
speed and then converts to a turbo-fan mode for high speed
cruising. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) and NASA' are funding a Convertible Engine Systems
Technology program that has possible applications in high
speed rotorcraft concepts, such as the Advancing Blade
183
Concept (ABC) aircraft, the Folding Tilt Rotor aircraft and
the X-wing aircraft (discussed later in this chapter) . The
second is the Compound-Cycle Turbine-Diesel Engine (CCTDE)
that has many potential applications for future rotorcraft
programs that will require 500 to 1500 horsepower [1:228],
High operating costs of current helicopters are
largely due to the maintenance rate of the transmission com-
ponents; therefore, much of the propulsion program is aimed
at improving transmissions in order to achieve reductions
in noise, weight and cost, while improving reliability and
maintainability and achieving longer life. This combined
effort should bring a 20 to 50 per cent increase in the mean
time between removal. [10:156]
3 . Flight Controls and Avionics
The flight controls and avionic systems element
involves the applications of advanced technology and includes
improvements in fuel efficiency, maneuverability, flying and
ride qualities, precision flight-path control, and decreases
in pilot workload. Additional benefits include reduction
of vehicle weight by the substitution of fly-by-wire or
fly-by-light control systems. The avionics thrust will mean
that multiple, identical, self-healing digital electronic
systems can be used, and mission adaptability and role versa-
tility will improve dramatically. The pilots workload will
be able to be reduced to the point where the single pilot
cockpit will become a reality. Flight control systems will
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be self-adaptive and mission reconfiguration will be achieva-
ble by module changing. One such program is the U.S. Army
Advanced Digital/Optical Control System (ADOCS) Flight
Demonstrator Program. Under this program, Boeing-Vertol is
designing a new computerized helicopter flight control system
that will be tested in a Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk and will
have future application in the LHX program. [l:230]
Higher Harmonic Control (HHC) for vibration suppres-
sion has also been demonstrated in a funded program involving
the U.S. Army, NASA, and Hughes Helicopters (with the Hughes
0H-6A configured with HHC flying in 1983) . The new control
technologies and the electronic cockpit will allow the
helicopter to be linked to advanced guidance and navigation
systems, such as the Navigation system using Time and Ranging
(NAVSTAR) . This will allow much more effective use of air-
space, particularly in congested terminal areas. The FAA's
CH-53 research and development helicopter has demonstrated
in-flight helicopter navigation using NAVSTAR, and NASA is
exploring low-cost civil guidance systems that can use
degraded signal inputs from military global positioning sys-
tem satellites now being put into operation. [l:230]
4 . Advanced Rotorcraft Configurations
The fourth and last major element of the program is
the advanced rotorcraft configuration element, in which
advanced technology developed at the systems level is
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integrated into a demonstration vehicle for full scale in-
flight proof-of-concept. There are four active research
and development rotorcraft flight programs; the Model 360
Advanced Technology Helicopter, the Advancing Blade Concept
(ABC), the Tilt-Rotor Research Aircraft, and the Rotor Systems
Research Aircraft (RSRA) /X-Wing Rotor Program.
The Model 360 program involves a Boeing-Vertol effort
in developing an all composite aircraft that will feature
a number of advanced systems in order to achieve a payload
capacity increase of 25 per cent, improved hover performance,
and a greater cruise efficiency to speeds greater than 200
knots. The Sikorsky ABC aircraft has successfully demon-
strated forward speeds of more than 250 knots in a research
program sponsored by the U.S. Army and involving Sikorsky,
the U.S. Navy, and NASA. The aircraft uses counterrotating
main rotor blades to overcome the problem of retreating
blade stall and may have potential as a small, compact,
quiet, public service helicopter for operations in residen-
tial areas.
The Tilt-Rotor aircraft also attacks the high speed
requirement and has been successfully demonstrated in the
Bell Helicopter XV-15 Tilt-Rotor Research Aircraft. Two of
these aircraft were built under a joint NASA/U . S . Army pro-
gram. The potential benefits of the tilt rotor include the
ability to conduct missions at twice the speed and range
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of the conventional helicopter using a given quantity of
fuel. The implications for military and civil use are
significant, and the program has found military funding as
the Navy JVX program (with Bell and Boeing-Vertol being
teamed for development)
.
The last and most ambitious configuration program
is the X-wing configuration, which has a design speed goal
of 400 to 500 knots. The X-wing rotor acts like a helicop-
ter rotor in hover and low speed flight and is then locked
in a fixed position while accelerating to high speed forward
flight with an auxiliary propulsion system. The design
incorporates Circulation Control Rotor (CCR) technology that
enables the rotor to perform the dual function of a helicop-
ter rotor when rotating and a fixed wing when stopped. The
X-wing rotor will be investigated in a joint NASA/DARPA
proof-of-concept flight program using the RSRA, with the
primary objective being the investigation of the conversion
from rotary-wing flight to fixed-wing flight. [l:23l]
C. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
In the past, military requirements have led to the in-
troduction of new capabilities into the civil market place,
notable examples being the Bell UH-1, the Bell OH-58, the
Hughes OH-6, and the Boeing-Vertol CH-47. It is likely
that the current UH-60 Black Hawk and CH-53 Sea Stallion
series will present civil opportunities, although operating
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economies have not yet justified that transition. Emerging
military programs, however, may have a much greater signifi-
cance for the future of civil helicopters.
1. The Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft
(JVX)
The JVX is multimission vertical-take-of f-and-landing
tilt-rotor aircraft. The design uses the advanced, mature
technology proven in the Bell Helicopter XV-15 program sup-
ported and managed jointly by the Army and NASA. Bell is
teamed with Boeing-Vertol for preliminary design and develop-
ment. It is expected to go into operation in 1992 with a
production of over 500 aircraft. It will have a gross
weight in excess of 40,000 lbs., a maximum cruise speed of
350 knots at an altitude of 17,000 feet, and the capacity
to move thirty assault troops on missions with up to a
250 mile radius. This vehicle will have twice the speed,
range and altitude of the conventional helicopter of today,
and will be self-deployable throughout the world. The
design of the JVX incorporates a number of advanced tech-
nologies (composite materials, advanced digital flight
control systems and aerodynamic, aeroelastic, and crash-
worthiness design methods demonstrated in other government
and industry research and development programs). This pro-
gram could well lead to the development of civil transport
configurations in the late 1990s (e.g., to transport 30
passengers 300 nautical miles in one hour, execute a vertical
landing and take-off and return with thirty passengers with-
out refueling) . This capability also creates many opportu-
nities for further applications, including off-shore oil
rig support (where new fields are beyond the range of current
helicopters), and inter-city and regional transportation.
[1:235]
2. The U.S. Army Light Helicopter LHX Family
The LHX program is part of a U.S. Army program to
reduce its inventory of operational helicopters from in
excess of 22 aircraft models to 7 aircraft models by the
year 2000. The LHX family involves replacement of four
U.S. Army helicopters (the Bell 0H-5S Kiowa Scout helicop-
ters, the Bell AH-1 Cobra gunships , the Bell UH-1 Iroquois
utility transports, and the Hughes OH-6 Cayuse Scout heli-
copters) and is intended to be deployed progressively from
the late 1990s. It will be developed in two basic con-
figurations: a light utility version designated the LHX-UH,
and a scout/light attack version designated the LHX-SCAT.
It will complement the Bell AHIP Advanced Scout Helicopter
(a significantly modernized OH-58 designated the Model 406
by Bell and the OH-58D by the Army) , the Sikorsky UH-60
Black Hawk assault transport helicopter, and the Hughes AH-64
Apache helicopter, all of which will remain in service into
the twenty-first century. [32:585]
Initial studies have focused on the feasibility of
the single pilot cockpit, and a significant feature is the
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emphasis being placed upon avionics architecture and subsys-
tems integration. The LHX will be able to perform scout and
attack missions with a one man crew by automating communica-
tions, navigation and target acquisition, identification,
radar warning, missile detection, fire control and flight
control. An Advanced Rotorcraft Technology Integration (ARTI)
program initiated in 1983 is addressed to the many issues
related to the integration of the available technologies
into a cost effective aviation weapons system. If the ARTI
and the LHX programs are successful, the sophistication of
rotorcraft will be advanced dramatically, and this new tech-
nology base will provide a spring board for other military
and civil applications, such as a wide variety of public
service applications. Many police, fire, and emergency
medical needs could be satisfied with a civil derivative of
the LHX, demonstrating rapid guidance, navigation, communi-
cation and control in an all-weather environment with a
one-man crew. [1:236]
This program is extremely significant for the U.S.
helicopter industry, since projections are that the U.S.
Army alone requires approximately 5000 units. A driving
factor in the program is the Army speed requirement, yet to
be finalized. All indications are that the speed requirement
for cruise or dash could be as high as 250 - 300 knots.
Should this be the case, the program will be driven to an
190
advanced high speed configuration (e.g., a downsized Bell-
Boeing tilt-rotor or an appropriately sized Sikorsky ABC
aircraft)
. A lower speed requirement would permit the sub-
mission of more conventional designs. [32:586]
3. The Advanced Cargo Helicopter (ACH-XX)
The Advanced Cargo Helicopter (ACH-XX) is in the
concept definition stage. This is envisioned as a follow-on
to the Boeing-Vertol CH-47 Chinook and a possible alternative
to the Boeing-Vertol XCH-62 Heavy Lift Helicopter. The
ultimate size and payload could well be greater than the
CH-47, and its required radius of operation could well dictate
a configuration other than that of a conventional helicopter.
D. THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (FAA)
The increased attention of the FAA to rotorcraft matters
is a good indication of the growth potential of the helicopter
industry. The FAA has established a Rotorcraft Program
Office in Washington, D.C. and has recently issued a compre-
hensive Master Plan [Ref. 33] that outlines the many activi-
ties being performed by the FAA in its efforts to achieve
acceptance of the rotorcraft as a viable means of civil
aviation transport. [1:237]
The essential elements of the plan are threefold; firstly,
to improve the National Airspace System to permit the rotor-
craft to take maximum advantage of their unique capabilities;
secondly, to provide for an adequate system of heliports,
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and thirdly, to improve safety by means of more exacting
criteria and technology in the airworthiness and certification
process. [33:5]
Part of the program is the development of the National
Prototype Demonstration Heliport program, launched with the
initial selection of four large cities (New Orleans, New
York, Los Angeles, and Indianapolis) where central business
district prototype heliports will be built. These heliports
will serve as models in the development of procedures and
equipment to demonstrate the feasibility and desirability
of urban area all-weather heliports, with the plan envision-




Corporate and business rotorcraft represent a grow-
ing segment of the helicopter market. Currently, helicopters
perform adequately for ranges of 10 to 30 miles, and fixed-
wing aircraft suffice for 200-400 mile trips. The growth
of the extended-range, more cost-effective helicopter may
well fill the ill-defined range from 30 to 200 miles. The
development of scheduled rotorcraft services will depend on
aggressive operators, the availability of reliable equipment,
and, most importantly, the achievement of a significant
reduction in operating costs. The spin-offs from the emerging
military technology could well provide these benefits.
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Continued development of quiet, economical, all-weather,
extended-range vehicles could permit the growth of civil
helicopter transportation by the turn of the century.
[31:11-1]
2. Forestry and Agriculture
As timber costs have risen, it has become more cost-
effective for timberland owners and managers to invest in
helicopters to perform a wide range of forestry tasks.
Helicopters are more efficient and more precise than fixed-
wing aircraft and the Forestry Service alone now employs
more than 140 helicopters to fight forest fires. Because
of their superior performance, helicopters are expected to
make greater inroads into the agricultural market (especially
as operating costs are reduced by the introduction of more
efficient technology. [31:11-2]
3. Resource Exploration and Development
This is perhaps one of the most promising areas for
future market development. Most of the natural resources
of the world are located in remote areas where access by
ground transportation is difficult. The helicopter is a
vital link in the search for and production of oil, and can
be used for delivering men and equipment to rigs , construct-
ing and servicing pipelines, and moving entire rigs. As
the search for oil moves farther off-shore, the development
of the extended-range helicopter being promised by current




Helicopters are used in half the power line construc-
tion in Canada and about ten percent of that in the United
States. The potential for reducing the costs of installing
heavy equipment is considerable, particularly in remote
locations. The technology has not been well developed in
the free world but recent military developments, such as the
refunding of the XCH-62 Boeing-Vertol Heavy Lift Helicopter
and the planned development of the ACH-XX Advanced Cargo
Helicopter may well bring that technology to the market
place.
5 Public Service
More than sixty-five cities and twenty states use
helicopters for police work because their response time is
less and their surveillance capabilities are greater than
those of ground units. More and more communities are using
a helicopter ambulance service in connection with emergency
medical care. Helicopter teams with heliports at trauma
centers are now being supported by those communities.
The potential users of such helicopters specified
high speed, long endurance, modular design, and low levels
of noise and vibration among the many attributes desired in
a public service helicopter. All these criteria are apparent
in the technology thrusts outlined earlier in this chapter.
[1:242]
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F. THE FUTURE MARKETS-FORECASTS
Considered by many as the low point of a helicopter
sales slump, 1983 saw civil deliveries by U.S. firms fall
to 415 units, arresting the rapid rise that ended with a
1980s peak of 1,366, whilst the value of those shipments
declined from $656 million in 1981 to $283 million in 1983.
What hit the industry hard in that period was an unprecedented
downturn in helicopter usage, due in large part to the world
wide recession but also affected by other diverse factors
ranging from fuel conservation to the U.S. Department of
Agriculture's payment in kind program. As 19 84 began, the
economic indicators all pointed to a strong recovery from
the difficulties of the first three years of the decade but
with perhaps a more controlled growth rate than that experi-
enced in the 1970s [34:5].
Many annual projections of helicopter sales are produced,
but perhaps the most respected is from Allison Gas Turbine
Operations of General Motors. A recent projection by Allison
predicted free world helicopter sales of 22,500 units during
the next ten years, compared with 19,000 units for the pre-
ceding decade, with almost two-thirds of the sales being
commercial. (See Table 6) According to the Allison fore-
cast, commercial deliveries will increase 29.2 percent in
1984 through 1993 (13,700 units compared to 10,600) while
military deliveries will increase 4.7 percent (8,800 units
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TABLE 6
FREE WORLD HELICOPTER DELIVERIES (UNITS)
1974-1983 1984-1993






compared to 8,400). Allison also predicts North American
unit sales to increase by 62.5 percent compared to a decade
ago, while predicting that foreign sales will decline by
13.6 percent. Allison maintains that the continued growth
in helicopter sales will be driven by a number of factors,
including the desire of operators to re-equip with new
technology aircraft, a change from piston to turbine power
plants, and the increasing desire for twin turbine helicopters
[34:6]
In a further forecast, Bell Helicopter produced a
"consensus" forecast, developed from an aggregation of a
number of industry forecasts. This forecasts predicts that
between 20,000 and 24,000 units will be delivered between
1982 and 1991, with values ranging from $59.9 billion to
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$69.4 billion. It can be seen that these figures are reason-
ably consistent with the Allison forecast. [34:6]
Essential to these forecasts are predictions and trends
for a number of industries. Principal among these is the
oil industry. A study by the Hughes Tool Company [34:6]
demonstrated a good correlation between the "annual U.S. oil
rigs operating" count and the number and value of civil
helicopter shipments by U.S. firms. In their annual fore-
casts, oil industry trade magazines have indicated considera-
ble potential for growth in Indonesia, China, India, and
Ireland, where off-shore oil was discovered in 1983. Explor-
ations in Norway is also moving farther northward, with wells
in 1983 above 71 degrees latitude. [34:6]
Corporate usage is assessed somewhat more confidently.
Interest rates, once a major stumbling block, have come down
to more manageable levels, and the overall upturn in the
economy may lead to corporations previously concerned about
stockholder reaction to a proposed helicopter purchase now
determining to consider such an acquisition. The availability
of twin engine helicopters has also made this market more
promising owing to the increased safety margins. [34:6]
Sikorsky Aircraft, in a press release dated 20 January,
1984, forecast a robust 23 percent increase in the world
helicopter market for the period 1983-1993, compared with
the previous ten-year period. Sikorsky predicted that,
despite the forecast of an almost even split (military/
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civil) in terms of units sold, the revenues from the mili-
tary market will be almost three times those of the civil
market, indicating that future military procurements will
involve heavier and more sophisticated helicopters than the
civil sector. The military market will be driven by the
replacement of the aging military helicopter fleets of the
world with newer, more capable aircraft, plus the growth of
rapid deployment forces and a heightened awareness of the
capability of the helicopter in various military roles.
Sikorsky further predicted the greatest production growth
in the intermediate weight category, where much of the
demand will come from a rebound of the off-shore oil market,
the corporate/executive market, and the public service
market, the growth being facilitated by performance improve-
ments and the FAA's efforts to create a nationwide heliport
system. They also predicted that the light helicopter
market will grow by ten percent a year during the next ten
years, with over 8,000 units being sold (both single and
twin engined) and with the average price increasing from
$600,000 to $750,000 in constant 1983 dollars (reflecting
the increased helicopter sophistication requirements of




SIKORSKY TEN-YEAR PROJECTION - CIVIL HELICOPTERS
(UNITS)




(0-7000 lb.) 4,700 3,500 8,200
INTERMEDIATE
(7-15,000 lb.) 1,000 1,200 2,200
MEDIUM/HEAVY
(Above 15,000 lb.) 200 300 500
TOTAL 5,900 5,000 10,900
G. COMPETITIVE SITUATION
It is no mistake that the major survivors in the U.S.
helicopter industry are Bell, Boeing-Vertol, Sikorsky, and
Hughes. All have achieved considerable success through the
years and all apart from Hughes were involved in the U.S.
industry from its birth in the 1940s. Sikorsky and Hughes
have full military order books with committed and approved
programs for the Sikorsky Black Hawk series and the Hughes
AH-64 Apache attack helicopter, respectively. Bell and
Boeing-Vertol both have modernization programs for the
OH-580 (AHIP) and the CH-46/CH-47 transports, and are teamed
for development and production of the JVX program for the
U.S. Navy/Marine Corps. On the civil side, Bell and Hughes
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have successful helicopters in the light and intermediate
corporate/executive/EMS/public service helicopter markets
and are continuing to target those sectors with model
upgrades to their existing range. It is interesting to note
that of the major world helicopter manufacturers, Agusta,
Bell and MBB are currently each involved in two development
programs committed to production. Three others, Aerospatiale,
Boeing-Vertol , and Westland, are each involved in one.
Sikorsky and Hughes, having just entered production with
major new military programs, do not have any current develop-
ment programs committed to production. [35:66]
According to John Zugschwert, the Executive Director of
the American Helicopter Society, research airframe programs
are important when forecasting the future of the helicopter
industry. Of the major U.S. manufacturers, Sikorsky has
three (Rotor Systems Research Aircraft, Advancing Blade
Concept, and Advanced Composite Airframe Program) , Bell has
two (XV-15 tilt rotor and Advanced Composite Airframe Pro-
gram) , Boeing-Vertol has one (the Heavy Lift Research
Vehicle) , and Hughes has one (the No-Tail-Rotor (NOTAR)
concept) . [35 : 67]
Zugschwert also points out that there will not be a
major new program entering production until the Agusta A-129
in 1988, some seven years since the Sikorsky Black Hawk and
the Hughes Apache in the early 1980s. The one possible
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exception to this is the Bell AHIP which is in reality a
major OH-58 modification which also signals the introduction
of the first new commercial production since the MBB BK-117
in the early 1980s (the AHIP technology will be used in the
production of the Bell 400 series light twin commercial
helicopter to be built in Canada). [35:68]
A period of some import for the industry will be the
1990/91 timeframe when a number of new production starts are
planned, including the Aerospatiale/MBB PAH-2 Franco-German
anti-tank helicopter, the Agusta/Westland EH-101 civil/
military helicopter, the U.S. Marine's JVX developed by the
Bell/Boeing-Vertol team, and possibly the MBB/Hindustan
Advanced Light Helicopter. These starts indicate the strength
of the participants, and the long term implications of the
European cooperative programs should not be overlooked.
Finally, the LHX program for the U.S. Army is scheduled
for production in the mid 1990s and is currently being com-
peted for by Bell, Boeing-Vertol , Hughes, Sikorsky, and
IBM. The presence of IBM in this competition should be
no surprise, as they were the successful prime contractor
in the U.S. Navy Sea Hawk ASW helicopter competition, with
Sikorsky (the airframe manufacturer) being relegated to the
position of sub-contractor.
It is further apparent that every development program
is government funded and designed solely for military use,
with the exception of the EH-101 (being designed from the
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outset as a civil and military helicopter) , and possibly the
MBB/Hindustan Advanced Light Helicopter. The current
research programs all started back in the 1970s and their
technology will be spent by the 1990s. [35:68]
John Zugschwert finally states:
On the civil side, it appears that 1950 airframes will
still be around at the turn of the century. While
many new helicopters entered development in the 19 70s,
i.e., the complete Aerospatiale line, the Bell 412, the
Bell 214ST and 222, the Boeing-Vertol 234, the Hughes
500 series, the MBB BK-117, the Sikorsky S-76 and S-70,
and the Westland W-30 series— it appears that civil
users and operators are waiting again for a lead from
the military to find the markets to support commercial
production of commercial-designed helicopters. The
only new production appears to be the Bell 400 series
and the EH-101. The fact that the military has initi-
ated major production programs should indicate that
the major commercial fall-out should take effect by
the mid 1990s. [35:68]
Remembering that the major programs referred to are the
LHX and the JVX, it is easy to see that the relative future
positions of the major U.S. helicopter firms will be deter-
mined by the contract awards of these two programs. Bell
and Boeing-Vertol have already secured the final two places
in the JVX program. The LHX program, with all the major
U.S. firms anxious to bid, appears to be the determining
factor in the future structure of the U.S. helicopter
industry.
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X. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this thesis has been to determine the
critical factors that have influenced the evolution of the
U.S. helicopter industry. The research indicated that the
most significant influence on the industry was the involve-
ment of the U.S. DoD in providing both R and D funds and
quantity production contracts. The Korean and Vietnam
conflicts played a large part in generating the military
requirements in the 1950s and 1960s and provided the basis
for the emerging generation of military helicopters in the
1980s.
The increasing competition from the European helicopter
manufacturers has had a considerable impact on the recent
nature of the industry. The U.S. helicopter market has
moved from a predominantly military market to one that is
being increasingly penetrated by civil helicopters and the
U.S. manufacturers are being threatened in the domestic
civil helicopter market by Aerospatiale.
The most significant technological influence has been
the introduction of the light turbine engine that opened
the market for the small commercial helicopter, particularly
in response to a market demand for economical and productive
helicopters for oil rig support.
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The following sections summarize, in some more detail,
the main conclusions of the research effort, in a format
that corresponds to the research questions listed in Chapter
I. The chapter concludes with some recommendations for
further study.
B. CONCLUSIONS
1. U.S. Military Customers/Markets
a. The U.S. military helicopter market was estab-
lished in the Korean War. The French experience in Indo-
china and Algeria demonstrated the viability of the combat
helicopter but the real transition from logistic support
and rescue helicopters to military combat helicopters occurred
with the Vietnam conflict in the 1960s when the American
industry expanded dramatically to produce the huge surge
of requirements that peaked in 1968.
b. U.S. military orders declined rapidly in the
post-Vietnam period as the DoD re-developed strategy in
the light of the Vietnam combat experience. Military orders
did not appear in any substantial quantity until the late
1970s with the introduction of a new range of assault,
anti-tank, and ASW helicopters emphasizing survivability and
integrated avionics systems.
c. The next generation of military helicopters will
be replacements for much of the existing helicopter inventory
and will involve substantial quantity production of the JVX
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Vertical Lift Helicopter and the LHX Light Helicopter, both
due to enter service in the 1990s.
d. The military market has proved to be highly
volatile and cyclical, with major new programs emerging on
average about every 10 to 15 years, with each contract
being subject to the competition requirements of the DoD.
A new military program can take more than eight to ten years
from conception to production. The stakes, therefore, are
high, as are the risks.
2 . U.S. Commercial Customers/Markets
a. The early applications of the helicopter were
confined to military tasks. The first civil helicopter
certification was awarded to Bell Helicopters in 1946. All
the early U.S. manufacturers developed helicopters for an
anticipated civil market that did not immediately eventuate.
b. Even after the Korean War, all commercial heli-
copters were direct derivations of military types, and civil
growth was very shallow for twenty years, owing to high
capital costs, high operating costs, poor pay load, lack of
public acceptance and awareness, and lack of all-weather
capability.
c. The Vietnam War provided technological spin-offs
to the civil sector. In particular, the introduction of
the turbine into small 4/5 seat helicopters opened a new
era in commercial helicopters.
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d. The year 1970 marked the beginning of commercial
helicoptering in its own right with the onset of new designs
aimed at the civil market, mainly in the small single turbine-
engined 4/5 seat executive helicopter. The private market
began to expand at the same time.
e. Technology derived from military programs advanced
the civil helicopter both in design and economics of opera-
tion, and manufacturers embarked on aggressive marketing
tactics to develop new markets.
f. As a result of these tactics, civil market growth
has been steady in the corporate, commercial, and public
service applications. A major emerging market for the light
and intermediate helicopter has been the oil rig support
market, following the oil exploration boom of the 19 70s.
g. Whilst civil sales declined in the early 1980s
due mainly to the worldwide recession, the prognosis is for
continued civil helicopter market growth, although the major
U.S. market thrust continues with technologies derived from
military programs.
h. Medium and heavy helicopters have not yet achieved
cost-competitive acquisition and operating economics, and
therefore, civil helicopter market penetration has been
achieved by makers of light and intermediate helicopters.
For this reason, airline usage of helicopters has not devel-
oped, and is not likely to do so in the immediate future.
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3 . Military Requirements
a. U.S. military requirements have historically
been the source of R and D funds for the helicopter industry.
b. The U.S. military has become increasingly specific
in stating helicopter requirements. In the past, military
requirements have dictated the commercial helicopter product
line as the manufacturers have sought to minimize the busi-
ness risk associated with civil helicopters by deviating
minimally from military designs.
c. In the U.S., civil and military technology is
and will continue to diverge, with military systems stressing
maneuverability and survivability technologies whilst civil
technologies will stress economy and comfort. Military
funded technology is becoming less applicable to civil
developments, requiring manufacturers to seek other sources
of funds for civil R and D. These factors are particularly
applicable in the medium and heavy markets where the heli-
copters are highly specialized and sophisticated. Thus,
the heavy helicopter manufacturers are more dependent on
military contracts for continuing workload whereas the light
helicopter manufacturer can more easily produce a civil/
military mix.
d. The military requirements are volatile and
cyclical in nature. A changed military strategy can spell
doom for a manufacturer who is committed to a unique state-
of-the-art design concept (e.g., the Lockheed Cheyenne
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AAFSS helicopter program was destroyed by changing Army
Strategy)
.
e. Military acquisition cycles are long and bureau-
cratic and usually involve intense competition. A military
helicopter manufacturer must be able to sustain a substantial
resource investment over a long period in order to survive.
4 . U.S. Competitors
a. The major surviving U.S. firms are Sikorsky,
Boeing-Vertol , Bell, and Hughes. Sikorsky and Boeing-Vertol
(then Piasecki) focused on medium and heavy helicopters,
with Sikorsky producing single rotor helicopters and Boeing-
Vertol tandem rotor helicopters. The Sikorsky approach has
been more successful and became the worldwide standard con-
figuration. The Boeing-Vertol tandem rotor design had
unique advantages for certain applications, however, and it
has secured a niche in the medium/heavy lift transport heli-
copter market.
b. Bell and Hughes have concentrated on the relatively
simple and inexpensive light and intermediate helicopters
that are easier to commercialize from military designs.
Whilst the profit margins on these helicopters are not as
great, the access to the civil market gives a greater sales
volume potential and provides some protection against the
cyclical DoD workload by providing low overhead civil work.
c. In general, the surviving firms have possessed
most of the following characteristics:
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(4) Ability to bid on DoD R and D contracts.
(5) Ability to win DoD R and D contracts.
(6) Ability to win military production contracts.
(7) Ability to commercialize helicopters from their
military product lines.
(8) A willingness to invest corporate funds in company
funded R and D, noting that between 30 and 40 percent
of IR and D expenditures are currently being recovered
on DoD contracts.
(9) Ability to perform on development and production
contracts
.
(10) Ability to keep abreast of technology.
(11) An awareness of the intricacies of the military pro-
curement system and an empathy with military strategy
and requirements.
d. All the survivors are part of larger corporations
and therefore, have substantial corporate backing, a critical
factor for survival. The majority of the firms who either
failed or did not succeed dramatically did not have the
financial resources to weather sustained attacks on their
market share by more powerful competitors.
e. Sikorsky has assumed the dominant position in
the ASVJ and assault helicopters whereas Hughes has secured
the valuable U.S. attack helicopter market. Bell and Boeing-
Vertol have no new military production, but are teamed for
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the JVX tilt rotor development and will compete for produc-
tion. All the four will compete for the LHX Army program,
along with IBM, the only non-airframe manufacturer to bid.
With the heavy emphasis on systems integration and given
that IBM is now prime contractor for the Navy Seahawk LAMPS
III ASW helicopter program, IBM's prospects should not be
discounted.
5 . Global Situation
a. The European firms took advantage of the American
commitment to the Korean and Vietnam conflicts and bought
U.S. technology through licensed production of American
designs. Europe quickly caught up and developed indigenous
designs
.
b. The U.S. industry is facing increasing competi-
tion from the European manufacturers. France's Aerospatiale
is producing about half of the foreign delivered helicopters.
In terms of production units, deliveries by foreign manufac-
turers exceeded those of the U.S. manufacturers in 19 82
for the first time.
c. European subsidies of helicopter manufacturers
are based on objectives of creating and supporting domestic
industry capability in order to achieve defense independence.
d. European domestic helicopter consumption is insuf-
ficient to sustain the industry (about 80 percent of the
industry output is exported) and therefore the respective
governments provide financial subsidies, favorable loan
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conditions, and export subsidies in order to target the
North American and third world markets (both civil and
military). In the U.S. the Export-Import Bank, whose finan-
cing is available only for commercial sales, does not provide
competitive rates. All four major European firms (Westland,
Aerospatiale, MBB, and Agusta) have U.S. subsidiaries and
MBB has announced the intention of building light helicopters
in Canada for the U.S. market.
e. The European industry is virtually shutting the
door on U.S. competition by embarking on a series of collabor-
ative production arrangements (e.g., Westland/Agusta and
MBB/Aerospatiale) in order to share technologies, share risks,
and reduce costs. American firms have not had any signifi-
cant success in breaking into the European cooperative
market. The European firms are also actively entering coop-
erative agreements with a number of non-European countries
(e.g., India, Indonesia, and Japan).
f. In order to ensure adequate export markets, the
European governments subsidize civil R and D and emphasize
both civil and military applications at the outset of a
new model development.
6 . Technology
a. The technology that has set the pace for industry
development is that of the helicopter engine. The late
development of suitable engines placed the helicopter indus-
try some 30 to 35 years behind the fixed-wing industry.
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The full capability of the helicopter was not realized until
the introduction of the turbine engine in the 1950s follow-
ing military development programs. This technology widened
the range of military applications and opened up the most
significant market, that of the small, light commercial/
corporate helicopter.
b. Aerospatiale was first to the market with a
production turbine helicopter, establishing an early position
that has never been lost. Aerospatiale has continued to
attack the worldwide market with a range of helicopter
weights, types, and technologies.
c. The rapid expansion of the electronics industry
in the 19 70s led to U.S. military development programs that
incorporated technologically advanced avionics systems into
the turbine-powered helicopter, permitting all-weather
operation and further widening the range of civil and mili-
tary applications.
d. As engines became lighter and more powerful, it
became possible to incorporate two turbines into the light
helicopter, adding considerable safety to helicopter opera-
tions and opening the corporate market substantially.
e. Technology is not cheap. As the world helicop-
ter market becomes more diversified and as more sophisticated
equipment is incorporated to attract customers, a company
must commit large investments for the extended period of
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new product development. Technology advances rapidly and it
is a necessity for survival to remain abreast of the state-
of-the-art and to be able to apply that technology to quantity
production.
f. The U.S. industry and the U.S. Government have
liberal regulations regarding dissemination of non-strategic
technical information. This often permits European manu-
facturers to bring those technologies to market in advance
of the American manufacturers. The ready availability of
U.S. technology has permitted the European firms to concentrate
their R and D funds in key areas (e.g., fibreglass blades
and rotor heads).
g. The value of the military R and D dollar to U.S.
civil helicopter development is diminishing as the U.S.
military helicopter becomes more highly specialized and
as the DoD continues to press for state-of-the-art improvements,
regardless of their potential applicability to civil deriva-
tives. This implies a threat to the U.S. helicopter industry,
since the R and D funds need to be obtained from sources that
attach a higher cost of capital to their funds.
h. The European and the U.S. Governments both fund
domestic military development programs. The European govern-
ments, in addition, subsidize commercial helicopter develop-




i. The increasing cost of R and D and technology
emphasizes the earlier conclusion that corporate and finan-
cial strength are necessary prerequisites for survival in
the U.S. helicopter industry.
C. REC0r4MENDATI0NS FOR FURTHER STUDY
This research effort addressed the range of issues
influencing the evolution of the U.S. helicopter industry.
During the course of the study, it became apparent that
most of the areas researched are deserving of further indi-
vidual and detailed study.
In particular, the following areas are recommended as
being worthy of a more focused research effort on an indivi-
dual basis:
(1) the future of helicopters in civil airline usage,
(2) the U.S. helicopter industry participation in
international cooperative development and produc-
tion agreements
,
(3) the impact of military procurements on the U.S.
helicopter industry,
(4) the developing threat from third world and non-
European helicopter manufacturers, and
(5) the impact of Soviet helicopter production on the
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U.S. HELICOPTER PRODUCTION HISTORY-UNITS
BOEING OTHER







1949 9 76 14
1950 8 19 80
1951 28 87 105
1952 120 309 192
1953 199 323 172
1954 54 217 110
1955 135 269 52
1956 180 391 132
1957 207 466 100
1958 73 423 151
1959 29 206 234
1960 13 162 244
1961 201 267
1962 15 232 350
1963 50 247 235
1964 86 140 280
1965 147 124 351
1966 280 159 84
1967 310 181 77
1968 212 146 77
1969 144 106 67
1970 69 124 37
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TABLE A- 3 Contd.
1971 25 46 38
1972 12 40 66
1973 34 41 74
1974 11 21 90
1975 33 44 112
1976 24 19 121
1977 32 25 136
1978 10 29 143
1979 16 78 100
1980 19 166 178
1981 37 185 232
1982 9 179 138
1983 2 191 104




FREE WORLD MARKET SHARE OF U.S. MANUFACTURERS
BOEING OTHER TOTAL





1950 34 4 9 38 85
1953 32 17 28 15 92
1955 19 19 39 8 85
1960 25 1 15 23 64
1965 49 6 7 5 16 83
1968 46 5 29 4 2 87
1970 63 2 9 4 1 79
1975 47 2 10 2 5 66
1980 37 1 18 7 8 71
1981 28 2 16 9 11 64
1982 18 1 11 11 8 49
1983 16 1 10 14 8 49
Source: See Text, Chapter III.D
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TABLE A-5
FREE WORLD MARKET SHARE OF EUROPEAN MANUFACTURERS
YEAR
AERO-









1950 - - - 15 - 15
1953 1 - - 6 1 8
1955 - 3 - 10 2 15
1960 20 7 - 7 2 36
1965 4 3 - 6 4 17
1968 3 3 - 1 6 13
1970 10 4 - 1 6 21
1975 15 7 3 3 6 34
1980 11 5 3 4 6 29
1981 14 7 5 3 7 36
1982 26 8 5 4 8 51
1983 20 9 9 4 9 51




YEAR CIVIL MILITARY TOTAL
1961 378 366 744
1962 407 554 961
1963 504 672 1176
1964 579 1007 1586
1965 598 1470 2068
1966 583 2164 2747
1967 455 2448 2903
1968 522 2880 3402
1969 534 2165 2699
1970 482 1944 2426
1971 469 1587 2056
1972 575 1312 1887
1973 770 808 1578
1974 828 506 1334
1975 864 601 1465
1976 757 348 1105
1977 848 273 1121
1978 904 166 1070
1979 1019 158 1177
1980 1366 189 1555
1981 1072 158 1238
1982 587 168 755
Source: Aerospace Facts and Figures - Various Years




U.S. HELICOPTER PRODUCTION-DOLLARS MILLIONS
MILITARY
CIVIL FLY-AWAY
YEAR VALUE VALUE TOTAL
1965 39 490 529
1966 40 749 789
1967 43 962 1005
1968 57 905 962
1969 75 845 920
1970 49 694 743
1971 69 469 538
1972 90 396 486
1973 121 268 389
1974 189 206 395
1975 274 359 633
1976 285 384 669
1977 251 316 567
1978 328 225 553
1979 403 219 622
1980 656 516 1172
1981 519 825 1404
1982 365 894 1259
Source: Aerospace Facts and Figures - Various Years




U.S. MANUFACTURERS' SHARE OF U.S. PRODUCTION
BOEING OTHER





1947 40 3 57
1948 43 6 51
1949 25 7 57 11
1950 41 4 11 44
1951 47 7 21 25
1952 41 11 30 18
1953 35 19 30 16
1954 32 10 38 20
1955 23 23 45 9
1956 22 20 43 15
1957 23 21 46 10
1958 29 8 46 17
1959 33 4 30 33
1960 38 2 24 36
1961 31 2 29 38
1962 26 2 9 25 38
1963 41 4 14 21 20
1964 54 6 12 9 19
1965 57 8 10 7 18
1966 67 11 13 6 3
1967 71 11 9 6 3
1968 55 6 33 4 2
1969 68 5 21 4 2














































































YEAR $ MILL $ MILL
1963 - 9.8
19 6 4 - N/A
1965 - 16.2





















Source: Aerospace Facts and Figures - Various Years
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TABLE A- 11
CIVIL HELICOPTERS IMPORTED BY ORIGIN-UNITS
YEAR FRANCE GERMANY ITALY OTHER TOTAL
1977 42 11 2 - 55
1978 61 - 7 1 74
1979 81 5 4 - 90
1980 167 9 1 - 177
1981 193 12 8 - 213
1982 167 15 1 1 184
Source: Aerospace Facts and Figures-Various Years
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TABLE A-12








YEAR FRANCE GERMANY ITAL
1977 13. 4.0 1.1
1978 22.8 - 4.9
1979 17.3 1.3 3.0
1980 48.4 4.4 1.1
1981 92.4 6.9 6.1
1982 74.2 8.9 1.1
Source: Aerospace Facts and Figures-Various Years
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TABLE A- 13
CIVIL HELICOPTER USAGE (U.S., CANADA, PUERTO RICO)
CORPORATE CIVIL
YEAR COMMERCIAL EXECUTIVE GOVT. TOTAL
1960 705 134 97 936
1961 882 • 173 124 1179
1962 994 213 112 1319
1963 1157 218 122 1497
1964 1333 311 123 1767
1965 1537 401 115 2053
1966 1699 475 144 2318
1967 1764 487 187 2438
1968
1969 2390 770 273 3433
1970
1971 2605 802 467 3874
1972 2992 745 448 4185
1973 3295 780 526 4601
1974 3418 778 623 4819
1975 3342 1056 824 5222
1976 3702 1392 1087 6181
1977 4294 1578 1288 7160
1978 4904 1891 1288 8023
1979
1980 5581 1635 1360 8575
1981
1982 5874 1728 1282 8884
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